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ABSTRACT

COLLABORATIVE JUSTICE: AN ANALYSIS OF THE USE OF ―JUSTICE‖ IN THE
WRITINGS OF LISA SOWLE CAHILL

By
Dennis Feltwell
May 2013

Dissertation supervised by Elizabeth A. Cochran, Ph.D.
This dissertation explores the role of justice in the writings of Catholic ethicist
Lisa Sowle Cahill. Since 1990, Cahill has supported theological voices participating in
the public forum, which she describes as a meeting ground for diverse intellectual and
religious traditions. Good argumentation is necessary but not sufficient to resolve ethical
dilemmas within the politically liberal context in which Cahill makes her claims. Instead,
her commitment to justice underwrites those narratives and practices which demand
one‘s fullest possible participation in contributing toward the common good. Cahill‘s
notion of justice develops correlatively to the degree that she integrates the principles of
Catholic Social Teaching into her project. The dissertation describes this expansion in
Cahill‘s later essays as ―collaborative justice.‖ The dissertation concludes with an
examination of her writings on human genetic engineering as a potential application of

iv

collaborative justice. Cahill‘s strong arguments can be helpful in steering the process
toward less-harmful outcomes. In doing so, Cahill‘s principles of collaborative justice
look beyond act-focused considerations of Catholic ethics or the procedural justice of
liberal traditions, and leaves open the possibility of reconciliation should such future
genetic intervention prove undesirable.
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INTRODUCTION

The American Jesuit ethicist James Keenan recently wrote that the nature of
contemporary Catholic moral theology is constantly shifting. These transformations refer
to moral theology‘s methodologies, interlocutors, and even purposes.1 What remains
constant is the church‘s search to conform itself to the call of Christ. This pursuit also
presents a challenge: to dialogue with those outside of the tradition in a way that is at
once faithful to itself and intelligible to others. On the one hand, if Catholicism‘s public
voice employs an exclusively theological vocabulary, then we end up speaking largely to
ourselves. While this strategy might bolster the church‘s internal workings, especially its
institutional agenda, it becomes difficult to evangelize the world in a manner that honors
Jesus Christ‘s Great Commission to his disciples (Matt 28: 16-20 – NRSV). On the other
hand, if the church surrenders too much of its foundational symbols and guiding
practices, then it can be asked: what is distinctively ―Catholic‖ about the Catholic voice
in the public forum?
Since the Second Vatican Council (hereafter Vatican II), the Catholic Church has
sounded a clarion call: Christians must engage the world. Since then, it has not offered
detailed solutions to specific problems in the world, but instead has insisted on basic

1

James F. Keenan, A History of Moral Theology in the Twentieth Century: From
Confessing Sins to Liberating Consciences (New York: Continuum, 2010), 5.
xv

human dignity and the concomitant rights that follow from it.2 This human rights
approach has evolved as part of the century-old tradition of Catholic Social Teaching
(hereafter CST). Over the years, CST has aimed toward the goal of ―social justice,‖
which describes an ideal condition where human dignity is found in every corner of the
world.3 While recent papal social encyclicals have become increasingly grounded in
Sacred Scripture, they have also retained their roots in the natural law, which is knowable
in principle to all reasonable persons. As such, it is always possible in a pluralistic society
to improve the conditions of justice, though as believers we work in hope of its perfection
in the future, when the Kingdom of God becomes fully realized.
Located within the context of this diverse engagement, this dissertation will study
the usage and meaning of the term ―justice‖ in the writings of Roman Catholic ethicist
Lisa Sowle Cahill, who is one prominent and influential voice in the aforementioned
public moral discourse. Over a venerable career that has spanned five decades, her notion
of justice has developed in direct correlation to her integration of the Catholic social
tradition into her scholarly work. Sometimes, Cahill refers to ―justice‖ as a personal
virtue (i.e., giving persons their due). One can find this characterization of justice
especially at the early part of her scholarship. At other points, she employs the word as an
overarching philosophical principle, often (but not always or consistently) implying
egalitarianism. Still other times, justice refers to an increasing participatory role in public
life and larger society, especially for the marginalized. In undertaking this study, it is
necessary to examine Cahill‘s work in light of the two distinct intellectual traditions from

2

Second Vatican Council, Gaudium et Spes (December 7, 1965), paragraph 41.

3

Pius XI, Quadragesimo Anno (May 15, 1931), 57-58.
xvi

which she writes: the Roman Catholic moral tradition and contemporary American
philosophical context.
While elucidating an understanding of ―justice‖ from Cahill‘s writings is the
ultimate aim of this dissertation, I am also interested in how her conception of ―justice‖
might be applied to a reasoned public debate about bioethics, and especially about human
genetic enhancement at the germline level. It may seem strange to discuss an essentially
futuristic mode of enhancement, but I am prepared to argue that now is the ideal time to
undertake such a discussion. This claim is partly due to the church‘s expressed desire to
remain relevant in the public forum. For over two decades, Cahill has argued –
convincingly, I think – in support of theological voices to assert their right to participate
in public moral debate. Her claims about public policy discourse, coupled with her
writings on what constitutes justice, offers Christian voices (and others that speak from
theological contexts) an opportunity to earn leading roles in future conversations about
this technological possibility -- or inevitability, as some have argued.4 Thus, this
dissertation explores the concept of justice in Cahill‘s work with a special focus on her
bioethical writings. This dissertation‘s epilogue describes Cahill‘s negative assessment of
germline enhancement and engineering as a direct function of her focus upon justice,
which is a hallmark of her later writings.
The impetus driving this study is that justice is a fundamental concept when
approaching bioethical questions in theological and philosophical contexts alike. The
4

William Gardner, "Can Human Genetic Enhancement Be Prohibited?" The
Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 20, no. 1 (February 1995): 65-84. See also Francis
Fukuyama, Our Posthuman Future: Consequences of the Biotechnology Revolution
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 2002), especially 72-102; and Françoise Baylis and
Jason Scott Robert, ―The Inevitability of Genetic Enhancement Technologies,‖ Bioethics
18, no.1 (2004), 1-27.
xvii

development of new forms of technology raises familiar questions which are ultimately
rooted in justice: What does this do for humanity? What does this do to our humanity?
What does this do for me, and at what cost? Can it even be regulated? Such questions
affect all interested persons, who bring diverse intellectual, philosophical and religious
claims to discussions about contemporary technological developments. In other words, it
is a public moral issue. Although many nations regulate these new technologies through
strict legal guidelines, it is feasible that willing would-be parents, reproductive clinicians,
and research scientists can easily circumvent the law by pursuing experimental
interventions in a nation where reproductive technology is less well-regulated.5 I contend
that Cahill, a prolific and influential scholar, offers a fresh perspective in helping to
resolve such bioethical dilemmas. While affirming her commitment to Christian tradition,
Cahill develops a compelling argument to give theological voices a role in public debate
over bioethical issues.6
My thesis is that it is not so much Cahill‘s strong philosophical and theological
argumentation, which is necessary but not sufficient in her pluralist and democratic
context. Instead, it is her firm commitment to justice that undergirds her calls for
participation. This appeal to justice is also foundational to her negative, at times even

5

The inevitability of human genetic enhancement and of its potential
consequences is argued forcefully by Gardner, 65-84, as well as Baylis and Robert, 1-27.
6

See Lisa Sowle Cahill, "Genetics, Theology, and the Common Good," in
Genetics, Theology Ethics: An Interdisciplinary Conversation, ed. Lisa Sowle Cahill
(New York: Crossroad, 2005), 117-136; "Genetics, Ethics, and Feminist Theology: Some
Recent Directions," Journal of Feminist Studies in Religion 18, no. 2 (Fall 2002), 53-77;
(Ed.), "Theology and Bioethics: Should Religious Traditions Have a Public Voice?" The
Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 17, no. 3 (June 1992), 263-272; and "Can Theology
Have a Role in 'Public' Bioethical Discourse?" Hastings Center Report 20, no. 4 (JulyAugust 1990), 10-14.
xviii

harsh, moral assessment of germline enhancement.7 Another interesting facet of Cahill‘s
project is the development from a particular theological standpoint (personalist ethics in a
North American Roman Catholic context, with a tendency toward a feminist perspective)
to the aforementioned participatory, social mode, which achieves a global perspective in
her most recent writings.8 In this transnational context, Cahill grounds her bioethical
arguments upon an explicit commitment to the Catholic Church‘s social justice tradition.9
In her later scholarship, Cahill insists that justice is required from and afforded to each
and every member of society, and its scope includes social structures like church and
secular governance, political and social organizations, and policymaking entities.
Moreover, her conception of justice requires constraints on activities to the degree that
they concentrate social power into privileged, stratified classes of persons. In Cahill‘s
account, justice empowers everyone – individually and collectively – to contribute to and
participate in the pursuit of the common good. In Chapter Four, I refer to this
methodological development in Cahill‘s later work as ―collaborative justice.‖
In examining Cahill‘s views of justice, I situate her writings in relation to two
contemporary conversations which are important for her context. At the theological
margin, I focus primarily on Roman Catholic theologians writing after the Second
Vatican Council. On the philosophical edge, I emphasize select ethicists writing since the
1970s, when Cahill‘s writings first appear in publications. Within both boundary lines, I
7

Cahill, "Germline Genetics, Human Nature, and Social Ethics," in Design and
Destiny: Jewish and Christian Perspectives on Human Germline Modification, ed.
Ronald Cole-Turner (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2008), 157; and Theological Bioethics
(Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2005), 235-239.
8

Cahill, Theological Bioethics, 81-85. See also Bioethics and the Common Good
(Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 2004), 41-50.
9

Cahill, Bioethics and the Common Good (Milwaukee: Marquette University
Press, 2004), 41-50. see also "Germline Genetics," 145-166.
xix

focus on women and men who are writing primarily to audiences in North America, with
extensive (though not exclusive) emphases on bioethics. As I will demonstrate, Cahill
dialogues with scholars in both fields, and these limits are necessary to examine her
understanding of justice.
Chapter One begins with a brief exploration of the philosophical and theological
influences on Cahill‘s work at various points in her career. In order to describe the
expansion of Cahill‘s perspective on justice as precisely as possible, I divide her essays
into two general periods: earlier and later. ―Earlier‖ refers to her work before 1990, and
―later‖ signifies those essays after 1990. In the latter part of the chapter, I analyze
Cahill‘s argument in favor of theological voices participating in the public forum. The
chapter concludes with a summary of Cahill‘s guiding principles which allow such voices
to facilitate intelligibility to others while remaining faithful to the tradition.
Chapters Two and Three provide a general discussion of six contemporary
accounts of justice in order to locate Cahill‘s notion of justice within the streams of
philosophical and theological scholarship. Chapter Two explores three philosophical
perspectives from John Rawls, Alasdair MacIntyre, and Michael Walzer. Rawls and
Walzer represent two strains of American liberal thought, which attempts to construct a
society of free individuals who can pursue their own life plans. By contrast, MacIntyre‘s
perspective is more communitarian in scope and presupposes a narrative tradition, which
requires that its members fulfill a prior social role in the pursuit of their individual life
goals. Not only are these three thinkers influential within their fields, but they also have
borne some degree of influence on Cahill‘s work. While several points of similarity can
be made with each account of justice, Cahill‘s notion of human dignity sometimes

xx

demands that liberal notions of liberty and choice be set aside for the sake of the common
good. I should clarify here at the outset that Cahill does not insist that social justice ought
to come at the expense of individual choice. Rather, it is ideal that individual choices of
privileged persons should not come at the expense of individual choices of the poor and
others at risk for marginalization. At the same time, her insistence on vigorous
participation from all in the larger political community attempts to avoid the danger of
social marginalization of religious voices.
Chapter Three analyzes three significant views of justice from the Catholic
tradition. One comes from the Catholic hierarchy since Vatican II. Here, I consider select
conciliar documents and later papal encyclicals, especially those from John Paul II and
Benedict XVI. I also explore the American pastoral letter Economic Justice for All, which
attempts to define ―basic justice‖ in the particular context of the late twentieth century
United States. Next, I examine the work of two American representatives of the
contemporary Catholic virtue tradition: Jean Porter and James Keenan. Considered
separately, these two scholars offer contrasting accounts of virtue insofar as they differ on
the degree to which the Christian tradition from which they argue can be expressed
intelligibly to others. Taken together, though, both demonstrate that the virtue tradition is
eminently communal in its roots and deeply relational in its anthropology. Third, I look to
the specific realm of Catholic bioethics, where Cahill has written extensively throughout
her career. In this part, I investigate the writings of Thomas Shannon and Margaret
Farley, who have also collaborated with Cahill in various works. Shannon and Farley also
point out the unique challenges of achieving justice in the distribution of scarce
healthcare resources.

xxi

Chapter Four turns to an extended analysis of Cahill‘s writings that ultimately
synthesize into her later conception of collaborative justice. I divide her work
chronologically into three sections in order to trace several developments in her
expression of justice. The first covers her earliest writings, spanning from 1976 until
1990, where her work focuses on the deconstruction of Roman Catholic personalist
ethics. The second describes a ―transitional‖ period in Cahill‘s scholarship from 1991
through 1996. Not only does she fully endorse Catholic participation in public discourse
during this time, but she also undertakes a new integration with Catholic social thought.
The final section explores what I have called Cahill‘s notion of ―collaborative justice.‖ It
is built upon a worldview that entails global interdependence and a responsibility toward
society‘s marginalized populations, especially women.
The dissertation concludes by way of an epilogue that considers future bioethical
applications of Cahill‘s understanding of justice. Collaborative justice is particularly
relevant to genetic intervention, and challenges the liberal context which privileges
autonomous choice above all other considerations. Because of the possibility of
exploitation and further stratification of society according to wealth and privilege, Cahill
is consistently inclined toward a strongly negative appraisal of human germline
enhancement. If human germline enhancement is inevitably on the horizon, it seems that
Cahill‘s strong claims regarding its contingent wrongness can be diffused by procedural
or other applications of justice. But the cooperative, networked practices, which are
inherent in Cahill‘s later notion of justice, look further than the immediate questions of
whether and how to proceed with the act of genetic manipulation. In fact, if enhancement
is a foregone conclusion, then Cahill‘s conception of justice might function even more
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strongly in steering that process toward a less harmful outcome, and in caring for those
affected by such interventions.

xxiii

CHAPTER 1
LISA SOWLE CAHILL AND PUBLIC MORAL DISCOURSE
This first chapter serves three purposes which will ground the analyses of Cahill‘s work
on justice in Chapter Four. First, it is necessary to explore some of the major theological
and philosophical influences upon Cahill‘s work in order to appreciate her scholarship
against the broad backdrop of Catholic theology in particular and Christian ethics in
general. Second, since her essays attempt to address urgent social and ethical concerns to
others both inside and outside of her faith community, it is important to analyze her
significant contribution in support of theological voices participating in the public sphere.
In her later writings, she makes an explicit case to identify justice with such participation.
Third, and as a corollary to the first two, Cahill brings certain values, many of which are
drawn from Catholic Social Teaching, into the kind of public discourse that she
envisions. Therefore, it is vital toward this dissertation‘s aims to outline these values, as
they underwrite her conceptions of justice, of contemporary society, and of moral
theology and especially bioethics, all of which will be addressed in the remaining
chapters.
The research here is presented in two major sections. The first part briefly
highlights a few of the many individual philosophers and theologians whose work has
significantly informed Cahill‘s essays at various points in her scholarship. It also
summarizes Catholic Social Teaching, which is a distinct element that has created an
indelible impact upon her later work. Catholic Social Teaching offers relevant
anthropological principles based on human dignity and the common good, which Cahill
firmly endorses and applies, especially in her later essays. Various illustrative examples
1

are provided in this section, especially as Catholic Social Teaching relates to her views
on justice.
Next, for over two decades, Cahill has argued in favor of theological voices
participating in public discussion regarding significant moral issues and has offered solid
warrants for this participation. The second part analyzes the premises of her arguments
and finds them compelling. However, as this part of the chapter also demonstrates,
difficulties arise for religious thinkers with regard to their ability to articulate a positive
argument in a public forum while attempting to maintain the integrity of the theological
foundations behind that argument. Cahill offers three clarifying principles to resolve this
problem. Finally, the second section concludes with an analysis of some of the major
philosophical and theological issues at stake for participants in public moral discourse. At
the same time, this section will elucidate a few essential values of the Catholic standpoint
from which Cahill argues. Not only do her writings indicate a strong commitment to the
anthropological principles of Catholic Social Teaching, but they also exhibit a critical
cognizance of the liberal, democratic values within the socio-political context from which
she contributes to this discourse. Also, she occasionally uses the terms ―values‖ and
―virtues‖ seemingly interchangeably. This feature of her work raises a few questions,
particularly regarding the value/virtue of justice, which will need to be worked out in
Chapter Four.

Philosophical and Theological Influences in Cahill’s Work
This first chapter section presents some of the thinkers and ideas who have
influenced Cahill over the span of her writing career. It is laid out in two parts. The first

2

part simply highlights some of the individual philosophers who have exerted significant
influence in her essays. However, the second parts describe in greater detail Cahill‘s most
important theological foundation: Catholic Social Teaching (hereafter CST) and its
affirmation of human dignity, human sociality, and the common good. Part two of this
section outlines CST‘s contours, and describes precisely how they influence Cahill‘s
work, especially in bioethics. CST is an essential element to Cahill‘s context, and her
deepening appreciation of it over time becomes apparent through a chronological reading
of her texts in Chapter Four.

Philosophical Influences
First, the dissertation turns to the philosophers that have influenced Cahill‘s work.
It must be stated at the outset that Cahill remains fully conversant with contemporary
trends in social and moral philosophy. She is a frequent contributor to and editor for the
Journal of Medicine and Philosophy, The Hastings Center Report, and other ―secular‖
periodicals. In individual essays, she considers the work of many philosophers, including
Mary Ann Glendon, Alasdair MacIntyre, John Rawls, Charles Taylor, Michael Walzer,
and many others. However, within the totality of her writings there are three philosophers
who have positively influenced her theological work: the moral philosophy of Mary
Midgley as well as the collaborative writing of Albert Jonsen and Stephen Toulmin.
These next few pages summarize their influence and its significance for the rest of the
dissertation.

3

Mary Midgley‟s Influence on Cahill‟s Early Natural Law Scholarship
With regard to moral philosophy, Midgley‘s thought seems to have the most
prevalence in Cahill‘s earlier writings. Midgley‘s influence is especially palpable in
Cahill‘s theological anthropology. At several points in Cahill‘s earlier work on sexual
ethics, she appropriates Midgley‘s writings regarding the complexity of the human
person.1 With respect to human sexual experience, Cahill calls attention to some of the
negative impulses toward sexuality in early Christianity. For instance, Augustine of
Hippo refers to ―the shameful motion of the organs of generation,‖ and other ancient
writers express a subtle (and at times overt) suspicion of sex in general.2 Nonetheless, the
sex drive remains as an irresistible animal drive, and sexual desire should be strongly
regulated. Midgley‘s work counteracts some of this suspicion by first of all asserting that
such interpretations miss the point that ―animality,‖ including its sexual dimension, is
constitutive of but not totalizing of human experience.3
Furthermore, following Midgley, Cahill argues that animal nature directly affects
the sociality of human beings beyond sexual acts and into familial structures.
The philosopher Mary Midgley once wrote that our distinctively human capacities
arise within the patterns established by our animal nature, not over against them.
This is a wise observation, insofar as it cautions us against defining relational
ideals and moral obligations in a way antagonistic to the working material genetic
inheritance provides to us. On the other hand those qualities which humanize us
also need to transform our animal behaviors.4
1

Cahill, Between the Sexes: Foundations for a Christian Ethics of Sexuality
(Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1986).
2

e.g., Augustine, City of God, XIV, 21; cf. Cahill, Between the Sexes, 2-4.

3

Mary Midgley, Beast and Man: The Roots of Human Nature (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 1978).
4

Cahill, ―Sex, Gender, and the Common Good,‖ in James Donahue and M.
Theresa Moser ed., Religion, Ethics, and the Common Good (Mystic: Twenty-Third
Publications, 1996), 150.
4

Applying Midgley‘s claims to her own argument, Cahill demonstrates that while social
hierarchy is common in mammalian species, and sometimes violently maintained, the
varieties of human societies demonstrate common capabilities that lend themselves to
respect for others beyond kinship and other particular social groups and resolution of
conflicts. These capacities are constitutive of human nature.5
Further still, Midgley‘s work impacts Cahill‘s thought with respect to natural law
ethics. Within the evolutionary context of natural law, there is a growing reliance upon
normative descriptive accounts of humanity in excess of scripture and tradition, including
contributions from the natural and social sciences. Cahill frequently addresses this
development throughout the corpus of her scholarly work.6 Again drawing Midgley into
her argument, Cahill claims that empirical evidence demonstrates that the ―whole cluster‖
of human qualities, including voluntary behavior, affectivity, cognition, and judgment.7
Moreover, these traits are located neither exclusively nor predominantly in one sex.
Rather, differences are spread throughout humanity and not reducible to inferiority in
either males or females.8
To note Cahill‘s critical understanding of natural law theory is not to say that she
has abandoned it. In fact, she often returns to natural law as the privileged language with

5

Ibid., 150; cf. Midgley, The Ethical Primate: Humans, Freedom, and Morality
(London: Routledge, 1994).
6

For example, see Cahill, Between the Sexes, 83-100; Sex, Gender, and Christian
Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 16, 49; Bioethics and the
Common Good (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 2004), 8-9; and Cahill, Hille
Haker, and Eloi Messi Metogo ed., Human Nature and Natural Law (London: SCM
Press, 2010), 8, 10-11.
7

Cahill, Between the Sexes, 88-89.

8

Midgley, Beast and Man, 353.
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which to engage in public moral discourse. Moreover, she demonstrates an appreciation
for the cultural and ideological pluralism present in natural law discourse, and this
approbation is exemplified especially in her bioethical writings. For instance, in an earlier
discussion of the Catholic position on in vitro fertilization, she argues that norms
articulated through the language of any moral tradition, especially a religious one, limits
the scope of what one might reasonably claim in public settings.9 Again, Cahill cites
Midgley on natural law thinking in ethics, which makes claims about those purposes or
goals which are ideal or fulfilling for human persons. ―We all believe that understanding
what we are naturally fit for, capable of, and adapted to will help us to know what is good
for us and, therefore, to know what to do.‖10 Cahill qualifies Midgley‘s claim:
A modest natural law moral claim requires an inductive judgment based on the
consistent elements in humanity‘s de facto physical, psycho-spiritual, and social
constitution – known experientially, refined critically and socially, and expressed
in generalizations.11
In other words, natural law claims, according to Cahill, can be neither fully derived
through deductive reasoning, nor perfectly expressed in universal norms. Instead, such
claims are in part dependent upon the human experience at the local level, and only then
are they persuasive and applicable to the community. As others have argued, nature is not

9

Cahill, "Moral Traditions, Ethical Language, and Reproductive Technologies,"
The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 14, no. 5 (October 1989): 497-522 (hereafter
―Moral Traditions‖) cf. John Rawls, Political Liberalism (Cambridge: The Belknap Press
of Harvard University Press, 1993), 59.
10

Midgley, Beast and Man,177.

11

Cahill, "Moral Traditions," 510.
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merely a given, but is itself an ―interpreted category.‖12 To call something ‗natural‘ is not
just to report on it, but to recommend its acceptance or approval.13
On this last point, it might be argued that ―approval‖ in this context could imply a
mode of argumentation that amounts to ―emotivism,‖ as Alasdair MacIntyre calls it.14 A
detailed consideration of MacIntyre‘s work and its relevance to Cahill‘s context will be
taken up in Chapter Two. At this point in the dissertation, though, it is more fruitful to
explore Cahill‘s enduring attention to the broad scope of cognitive claims and moral
values within the postmodern context, which includes both rational and non-rational
modes of argumentation. It is also a worthy point of departure to discuss the influence of
Stephen Toulmin‘s thought on Cahill‘s own theological arguments.

Albert Jonsen‟s and Stephen Toulmin‟s Influence on Cahill‟s Work
With regard to philosophical argumentation, the work of Albert Jonsen and
Stephen Toulmin seems to have produced a lasting effect on Cahill‘s writings in two
ways. One, it has helped her both to embrace and to critique her own traditions (i.e., the
Roman Catholic moral tradition and the United States political tradition), particularly in
the realm of casuistry. Two, it has challenged her, especially in her reflections on public
moral discourse in the postmodern situation, to make her claims intelligible and
12

Alister E. McGrath uses this phrase to describe the interaction between
observing nature and constructing it. See A Scientific Theology 1: Nature (Grand Rapids:
William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2001), 113. Jean Porter critiques McGrath‘s
view of nature; Nature as Reason: A Thomistic Theory of the Natural Law (Grand
Rapids: Eerdmans, 2005), 59-68. Porter‘s view of the natural law will be discussed in
greater detail in Chapter Three.
13

Cahill, "Moral Traditions," 511.

14

Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue, 3 ed. (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame
Press, 2007), 12-13.
7

persuasive through mediating language that is sometimes not translatable directly to her
Catholic context.
First, casuistry, broadly defined, is a tradition of moral argumentation which helps
to delineate the limits of received moral principles through the consideration of hard
cases. The practice of casuistry in the Christian tradition is said to have flourished
between the thirteenth and seventeenth centuries. It is also claimed that casuistry has
often been abused.15 This abuse first of all refers to its misuse in the history of casuistry.
For example, in the seventeenth century, the variety of positions that could conceivably
be taken in a particular case led not only to moral perspectives such as probabilism, but
also to the extremes of rigorism and laxism.16 Later, the Neo-Scholastic manuals of the
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries approached casuistry with their solutions
modeled on Modernity‘s ideal of scientific truth, in continuity with the respective
cognitive claims of their day.17 That is, the manuals proceeded deductively from
universal, immutable principles to certain conclusions in any hard case. These solutions,
like the principles from which they were derived, were also universal in their application.
15

Jonsen, ―Casuistry‖ in Jeremy Sugarman and Daniel P. Sulmasy ed., Methods
in Medical Ethics (Washington: Georgetown University Press, 2001), 105.
16

Probabilism attempts to move from practical doubt to necessary certitude when
application of the moral law was in dispute by allowing for a range of probative positions
with respect to the selfsame law. There several classifications of probabilism, but all of
them aim for a middle course between an extreme adherence to the letter of the law
(rigorism) and a diametric freedom from it, which results in wide permissiveness
(laxism). See John Mahoney, The Making of Moral Theology: A Study of the Roman
Catholic Tradition (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987), 138-143.
17

Thomas F. Kopfensteiner, ―Science, Metaphor, and Moral Casuistry,‖ in James
F. Keenan and Thomas A. Shannon ed., The Context of Casuistry (Washington, D.C.:
Georgetown University Press, 1995), 207. See also Richard M. Gula, ―Normative
Methods in Ethics: Surveying the Landscape of Ethical Pluralism,‖ in Todd A. Salzman
ed., Method and Catholic Moral Theology: The Ongoing Reconstruction (Omaha:
Creighton University Press, 1999), 11.
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However, casuistry in the contemporary context has been recovered by way of
fruitful revision, which is documented extensively in the work of Jonsen and Toulmin. 18
Instead of applying a universally-recognized principle to a single case by use of
deductive reasoning, contemporary casuistry argues by analogy.19 The ethicist takes a
paradigm case that has reached a successful, consensus resolution in the past, and
determines the suitability of that case to the morally relevant circumstances of a more
complex issue at hand. Moreover, casuistry is not a practice accomplished for its own
sake, but is set within the context of the moral striving of the agents involved and their
moral community. As such, the resolution of the hard case is meant to be an inductive
and dialogical process that requires careful discernment of the complementary and
competing considerations in each case.20 Therefore, prudence is a required virtue that

18

Albert R. Jonsen and Stephen Toulmin, The Abuse of Casuistry: A History of
Moral Reasoning (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988).
19

Philosophers frequently employ arguments from analogy in order to illustrate
the function of a particular moral principle. However, the analogy still requires a
dimension of deductive reasoning in order to determine its suitability. Analogies in moral
philosophy are very similar to case studies, in that the scenarios are frequently contrived
or imaginary. A famous example is Judith Jarvis Thomson‘s analogy of an unwanted
fetus to a famous violinist [Thomson, ―A Defense of Abortion,‖ Philosophy and Public
Affairs 1, no.1 (Fall 1971), 47-66]. Cahill responds to Thomson‘s argument and other
analogies by pointing out four interrelated shortcomings in them: 1. They imply that
conception is arbitrary, and portray the fetus as a hostile alien in relation to the mother; 2.
They rely on inappropriate and often negative connotations regarding gestation; 3. They
neglect the uniqueness of maternal-fetal relations; and 4. They are often founded on a
liberal notion of freedom that generates all moral obligations. See Cahill, ―Abortion and
Argument by Analogy,‖ Horizons 9, no.2 (Fall 1982), 271-287.
20

Thomas Aquinas writes: ―Actions should be considered differently in view of
different conditions of the person, of time, and other circumstances.‖ Summa Theologiae
I-II, q.18, aa.10-11. Hereafter, the Summa is abbreviated ST.
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lends itself to the achievement of a reasonable and fruitful conclusion, not just for the
agents, but also for the community in which their moral wrangling is set.21
Utilizing Jonsen‘s and Toulmin‘s work, Cahill analyzes proportionate reason and
applies it to the common good.22 Starting with the Catholic method of double effect
reasoning, Cahill argues that it suffers from a similar shortcoming to casuistry in its
traditional and revisionist forms.
They take principles and rules that have evolved as short-hand, experience-based
safeguards against biased thinking and action, and turn these prudential maxims
into logically necessary and practically absolute characteristics of individual
moral behavior. As scholars of casuistry have already shown, principles like
double effect were refined, eclectically and over centuries, precisely to guide
analogical thinking that compared present situations to dilemmas that had been
satisfactorily resolved in the past.23
This analogical application to individual acts introduces considerations of ―context and
specificity‖ to moral discernment. One can also strive for the ideal of moral objectivity
while simultaneously acknowledging the relativity of standpoints and needs.24
Furthermore, Cahill expands this mode of individual discernment to cover the
practices of social groups. Citing again the work of Jonsen and Toulmin, Cahill notes the
depth of agreement on public bioethical issues despite the plurality of social contexts of
its participants.25 Jonsen and Toulmin attribute this consensus to Aristotelian practical
reasoning. Again underscoring prudence as a guiding virtue in this discussion, they claim
21

Jonsen and Toulmin, 130-131; cf. MacIntyre, After Virtue, 190.
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Cahill, Bioethics and the Common Good, 18-20.
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Ibid., 30.
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Ibid., 18.
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Here, Cahill refers to Jonsen‘s and Toulmin‘s work with the National
Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects in the mid-1970s. Cahill, Theological
Bioethics: Participation, Justice, Change, Moral Traditions, ed. James F. Keenan
(Washington: Georgetown University Press, 2005), 44.
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that discourse provides good judgment in particular over formal deduction of universal
norms.26 Cahill endorses this view, and applies it to her religious context. Rather than
providing master theories to solve bioethical dilemmas, theology in the public sphere
encourages a ―social and intellectual milieu in which the social priorities of religious
communities can be recognized sympathetically.‖27 Consequently, in the public sphere,
which ―is actually a meeting ground of the diverse moral traditions that make up our
society,‖ there is a possibility of an overlapping consensus on particular moral
dilemmas.28 This consensus corresponds to the ―locus of certitude‖ that Jonsen and
Toulmin claim as a possibility in moral discourse.29 Without necessarily endorsing the
foundational beliefs of an individual participant, the group might find his or her argument
persuasive, and they will likely be convinced on different grounds. This persuasion works
analogously. For example, one might not endorse the Judeo-Christian belief that humans
are created in the image of God, but one can accept the ―human dignity‖ that is derived
from this religious belief. On the grounds of common humanity, one can conclude that
this solidarity is required to participate in a just society. Through this analogous
reasoning, a participant might come to any number of agreements regarding access to
health care, education, or other pressing concerns. This consensus in public discourse
relies on contextual rather than universal claims.30
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Jonsen and Toulmin, 341.
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Cahill, Theological Bioethics, 45.
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Cahill, ―Can Theology Have a Role in ‗Public‘‘ Bioethical Discourse?‖
Hastings Center Report 20, no.3 (1990), Supplement, S11.
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Jonsen and Toulmin, 16-19.

30

Cahill, ―Can Theology Have a Role in ‗Public‘‘ Bioethical Discourse?‖ S13.
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Before moving to the influential theologians and religious frameworks that are
significant to Cahill‘s work, it should reiterated that Cahill remains firmly engaged in
public discourse, and is cognizant of the prevalent philosophical trends. As such, there
are many other philosophers whose work she cites and critiques. She addresses the work
of the philosophers analyzed in the next chapter, but there are many others. For instance,
she frequently cites the work of legal scholars like Hillary Charlesworth, Mary Ann
Glendon and Amy Gutmann; of social ethicists such as Martha Nussbaum and Jeffrey
Stout; and of bioethicists like Allen Buchanan and Sidney Callahan. However, Cahill
usually addresses their writings within individual essays or for illustrative purposes. By
contrast, Midgley‘s thought and that of Jonsen and Toulmin, cited throughout Cahill‘s
work in multiple writings, and in many instances, are constitutive components of her
argumentation.

Theological Influences
In addition to the aforementioned individual philosophers in the previous section,
there are also a number of Christian theologians who have had a weighty influence on
Cahill‘s work. The late American Jesuit Richard McCormick is pre-eminent among these
theologians with a telling effect on Cahill‘s scholarship. Throughout her career, Cahill
analyzes McCormick‘s attempts to work through contentious issues in Catholic ethical
methodology and broad disagreement on moral dilemmas which have developed since
the Second Vatican Council.31 His method is a useful supplement to the theological

31

See (chronologically) Cahill, "Within Shouting Distance: Paul Ramsey and
Richard McCormick on Method," The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 4, no. 4
(December 1979): 398-417; ―Teleology, Utilitarianism, and Christian Ethics,‖
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elements of Cahill‘s scholarship described herein. According to Cahill, this utility is
derived from the dialectical relationship between McCormick‘s Roman Catholic tradition
from which he writes and the North American political context to which he addresses
himself. Nonetheless, while his influence on Cahill‘s thought is notable, she tends to
depart from his work when she discusses the common good. Instead, she often employs
McCormick‘s vocabulary with regard to the personalist concerns of ―human beings,
integrally and adequately considered‖ and his description of embryos as ―nascent human
life.‖32
Furthermore, James Gustafson‘s theocentric ethics has deeply influenced Cahill‘s
work throughout her career.33 Cahill frequently utilizes his various theological models as
frameworks for her own theological reflection, one of which will be summarized in the
next section of this chapter. Other theologians, like the array of philosophers mentioned
at the close of the previous section, are addressed frequently in individual essays. For
Theological Studies 42, no. 4 (December 1981): 601-629; ―Can Theology Have a Role in
‗Public‘‘ Bioethical Discourse?‖ S11-13; and Thomas Shannon, Religion and Artificial
Reproduction (New York: Crossroad, 1988), 118-120. ―On Richard McCormick: Reason
and Faith in Post-Vatican II Catholic Ethics,‖ in Allen Verhey and Stephen E. Lammers
ed., Theological Voices in Medical Ethics (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans
Publishing Company, 1993), 78-105; ―Religion and Theology,‖ in Jeremy Sugarman and
Daniel P. Sulmasy ed., Methods in Medical Ethics (Washington: Georgetown University
Press, 2001), 51, and especially 56-58; ―Richard A. McCormick, S.J.‘s ‗To Save or Let
Die: The Dilemma of Modern Medicine,‘‖ in Jennifer K. Walter and Eran P. Klein ed.,
The Story of Bioethics: From Seminal Works to Contemporary Explorations
(Washington: Georgetown University Press, 2003), 131-148; Bioethics and the Common
Good, 10-41; and Theological Bioethics, 104-105.
32

Cahill, Sex, Gender, and Christian Ethics, New Studies in Christian Ethics, ed.
Robin Gill (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 238-239; ―Stem Cells and
Social Ethics,‖ in Nancy E. Snow ed. Stem Cell Research: New Frontiers in Science and
Ethics (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2003), 123.
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Cahill, ―James M. Gustafson and Catholic Theological Ethics,‖ Journal of
Moral Theology 1, no.1 (2012), 92-115.
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instance, the Methodist ethicist Paul Ramsey usually appears in her writings in tandem
with and contradistinction to McCormick‘s work. Also, the feminist theologian Margaret
Farley, whose writings on justice will be analyzed in Chapter Three, is cited in many of
Cahill‘s writings. Finally, given his central place in Catholic theology, Cahill frequently
engages the work of Thomas Aquinas as a representative of classical Catholic thought.
However, the tradition of Catholic Social Teaching (hereafter CST), especially its
notion of the common good, is elemental to her work. This section discusses CST with
respect to how it influences Cahill‘s thinking on public moral discourse. However, the
various aspects of CST will reappear throughout the later chapters of this dissertation.
First, this chapter section addresses three foundational, interpenetrating facets of CST:
inviolable human dignity, essential human sociality, and the common good. Next, it
offers several examples from the breadth of Cahill‘s writings that demonstrate CST,
particularly its later expressions, is an essential component to her context in myriad ways.

Three Basic Affirmations of Catholic Social Teaching
To begin, for over a century, CST has attempted to relate the Catholic faith to
human social conditions. This is not to say that the church‘s hierarchy was uninterested in
social matters prior to the late nineteenth century, but it is customary in Catholic theology
to locate Leo XIII‘s encyclical Rerum Novarum as the starting point for modern social
teaching – a starting point with which Cahill also concurs.34 Likewise, it is not implied
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E.g., Kenneth Himes (ed.), Modern Catholic Social Teaching: Commentaries
and Interpretations (Washington: Georgetown University Press, 2005), 3; and Charles E.
Curran, ―The Changing Anthropological Bases of Catholic Social Teaching,‖ in Curran
ed., Change in Official Catholic Moral Teaching (New York: Paulist Press, 2003), 171;
cf. Cahill, ―Globalization and the Common Good,‖ in John A. Coleman and William F.
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here that CST has been monolithic since Rerum Novarum. Indeed, Leo himself accepted
social and economic inequalities as a symptom of the fallen world in which people live, a
position rejected seventy years later by the Second Vatican Council.35 As CST evolved,
however, it has consistently upheld three basic values: the inviolable dignity of the
human person, the social nature of human beings, and a universal notion of the common
good. These values are inexorably interrelated, though the last figures most prominently
in Cahill‘s writings.
First, citing the creation stories of Genesis 1-2 and the song of praise in Psalm 8,
the Second Vatican Council (hereafter Vatican II) locate basic human dignity with a
createdness that is common to all human persons. As part of the created order, this
dignity is ―sublime‖ and demands protection for the ―universal and inviolable‖ rights of
all persons. In addition to the rights considered normative within a liberal democracy,
such as freedom of conscience and religion, the Council affirmed other positive rights
that, while applied to individuals, are required for participation in social life. These rights
include food, clothing, employment, and self-determination, among others. 36 Since these
rights are in constant flux from place to place, subsequent papal social encyclicals have

Ryan ed., Globalization and Catholic Social Thought: Present Crisis, Future Hope
(Maryknoll: Orbis Books, 2005), 43.
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Leo XIII, Rerum novarum (1891 – Hereafter RN), 18-19; cf. Gaudium et Spes
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Austin Flannery ed., Vatican Council II: The Basic Sixteen Documents (Northport:
Costello Publishing Company, 1996).
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stressed the need for human development on a global scale.37 Still, this development
always built on the transcendent and prior dignity of the human person.38
Second, CST does not assert these individual rights for the sake of isolated,
autonomous action. From the time of Leo XIII, wages for labor signified far more than
personal wealth and contractual obligations. Instead, he implies that compensation should
support the survival of the employee‘s family, which is the first natural society.39 Later,
John Paul II explicitly calls this fair pay a ―family wage.‖40 Moreover, rights such as a
living wage represent a basic justice that allows human beings to participate more fully in
their society. Human dignity is thereby placed within the context of the manifold and
interdependent human relationships within society.41 In fact, it is humanity‘s social nature
that enjoins church leaders at Vatican II to engage in active dialogue with the modern
world.
Today, there is an inescapable duty to make ourselves the neighbor of every
individual, without exception, and to take positive steps to help a neighbor whom
we encounter, whether that neighbor be an elderly person abandoned by everyone,
a foreign worker who suffers the injustice of being despised, a refugee, an
illegitimate child wrongly suffer for a sin of which the child is innocent or a
starving human being who awakens our conscience by calling to mind the words
of Christ: ―As you did it to one of the least of these my brothers or sisters, you did
it to me‖ (Matt 25:40).42
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The fulfillment of the aforementioned rights that facilitate active participation in turn
discloses a call to identify those who cannot fully participate. Thus, there is a polar yet
creative tension between individual and society that requires each Christian to attend to
the amelioration of both – that is, to advance the common good.
Third, Vatican II understands this common good as ―the sum total of social
conditions which allow people either as groups or as individuals, to reach their fulfillment
more fully and more easily.‖43 As an aggregate condition, the common good requires
both the respect for human dignity and the development of human societies. However,
there is also another level of polarity found here: the political community within a world
of other communities. As such, there is a certain particularity of these conditions within
the local group that, relative to itself, may be rightly called the ―common good.‖ This
community maintains and promotes the common good from within itself.
On the one hand, as the philosophers discussed in Chapter Two of this dissertation
point out, there will always be some level of disagreement about the constitution of the
common good within each society.44 On the other hand, Vatican II envisions a
transcendent common good.
Close ties of dependence between individuals and peoples are on the increase
world-wide nowadays; consequently, to facilitate effective and successful work
for the universal common good the community of nations needs to establish an
order suited to its present responsibilities, especially its obligations towards the
many areas of the world where intolerable want still prevails.45
43
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With these words, the leaders at Vatican II offer a perspective of the world that is rooted
in human dignity and sociality, and also treats developing political communities
analogously as persons in need. They point to the necessity of global organizations and
international cooperation in order to achieve this vision of an overarching common good,
especially with regard to agriculture and education.46 In fact, later in the document, they
call attention to the exemplary activity of Christians working to foster such a universal
community, though they do not mention any specific Christians or organizations.47
Furthermore, a required virtue to achieve and maintain the common good is
solidarity. At its root, solidarity implies a fundamental respect for human dignity that
might be formulated according to the Golden Rule (Matt 7:12).48 More importantly,
solidarity carries a social connotation that requires the responsible use of all natural and
manufactured resources for the good of everyone in order to sustain and develop life.
Pius XII identifies this use as the ―law of human solidarity and charity.‖49 As this notion
of solidarity developed, later encyclicals further identified it as an opportunity for
conversion: a turning away from sin, which, in addition to breaking one‘s relationship
with God, also destroys friendship with one‘s neighbor, either an individual or a
community. 50 For instance, John Paul II claims that one must be attentive to the ways
that one‘s pursuit of wealth and prosperity affects others.
46
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When interdependence becomes recognized in this way, the correlative response
as a moral and social attitude, as a "virtue," is solidarity. This then is not a feeling
of vague compassion or shallow distress at the misfortunes of so many people,
both near and far. On the contrary, it is a firm and persevering determination to
commit oneself to the common good; that is to say to the good of all and of each
individual, because we are all really responsible for all.51
International solidarity is required order to achieve the universal common good described
by John Paul. In addition, he adapts the motto of his successor Pius XII: ―peace as the
fruit of justice,‖ to what John Paul claims is identically precise and equally biblically
founded: ―peace as the fruit of solidarity.‖52 Or, put another way, peace is the fruit of
reconciliation, in light of a deeply rooted practice of solidarity.
Before describing how CST has become an indispensable element in Cahill‘s
writings, it is important to mention that this understanding of solidarity and the common
good has become more and more tied up with various conceptions of justice. This section
began with the conventional starting point of Leo XIII, and described his call for a living
wage that moved beyond contractual obligations. However, Leo locates the obligation to
pay a living wage within the context not of justice but of charity – ―a duty not enforced
by human law.‖53 As the tradition evolved, the common good and solidarity have become
constitutive of social justice. As a result, more will need to be said about CST‘s
theological conception of justice in Chapter Three.
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Cahill and Catholic Social Teaching
Moving now to Cahill‘s context, it is difficult to underestimate the importance of
post-conciliar CST, especially with regard to her later writings. While much more will be
said in light of her writings on justice in Chapter Four, a brief survey of her work here
demonstrates the three-fold considerations of human dignity, human sociality and the
common good that are affirmed in CST. This survey addresses two distinct research
interests that Cahill has pursued throughout her career. The first involves her theological
perspectives on the family, gender and sexuality. The second delves into bioethical
concerns regarding aging, biotechnology, and HIV/AIDS. 54 Within this survey, it is
apparent that Cahill‘s writings especially emphasize the common good and its requisite
solidarity, while tacitly presuming the former two affirmations of dignity and sociality
within the context of her arguments. There is also a major, polar departure from CST in
that Cahill describes the community as prior to the individual. This discrepancy might be
accounted for by the implied presumption of human dignity throughout her work.

Cahill on Sex, Gender, and the Family
Though they are conceptually distinct issues, Cahill usually address the moral
concerns that arise from human sexuality, gender differences, and family dynamics as a
unity. Her cohesive approach is derived from the biological, political, and religious
aspects of sexuality. Because of its procreative capability, sex is ultimately at the service
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of the species – the human community writ large.55 Since Cahill‘s approach to theology
privileges the specific, local context, this ―service‖ is rendered more immediately at the
level of the local community. Within Christian communities, sexual activity is informed
by its foundational sources of scripture and tradition. This community is also informed by
the values of the larger political community in which Christians participate. For example,
in the United States, Roman Catholic couples have struggled with the magisterial
teaching on artificial contraception at least since Paul VI‘s encyclical Humane Vitae in
1968. However, the American political community already resolved the problem of birth
control three years earlier.56 By the time Humane Vitae was promulgated, a significant
number of men and women in the United States were engaging in ―free love,‖ ―sexual
revolution,‖ and ―women‘s liberation,‖ much of it due in part to the acceptance of the
benefits afforded by the oral contraceptive pill.
Furthermore, Christianity has exhibited ambivalent or negative attitudes toward
sexuality, especially with respect to women. The previous section alluded to Augustine‘s
―shameful,‖ involuntary appraisal of sexual activity. Cahill describes Augustine‘s
sublimation of sexual desire through the rational will as consistent with his notion of
human dignity, which is grounded in neo-Platonic thought. 57 Nonetheless, in the New
Testament era which preceded Augustine, celibacy and perpetual virginity were upheld as
positive values in light of the eschatological vision especially of Paul, and also against
the sexual norms of the larger communities in which Christians lived. Cahill points out
55
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that the longest New Testament discussion of sexual matters takes place within Paul‘s
discourse on ethics for a healthy, kingdom-minded Christian community (1 Cor 5:18:13).58 She writes, ―Paul sees, not just marriage, but also all preoccupation with one‘s
social state in life, as a distraction and a hindrance to communal membership.‖ Paul
relativizes marriage and other temporal statuses to the immanence of the coming of the
kingdom of God. Instead, the norm of Christian membership is located in service to the
community and awaiting the arrival of the eschaton.59
Later Catholic tradition, especially papal encyclicals on the family, emphasized
the Christ-Church analogies from the New Testament‘s ―household codes,‖ which require
women‘s submission and men‘s headship within the family (Eph 5:21-33; Col 3:18-21;
Titus 2:3-5; and 1 Peter 3:1-7). The encyclicals did not harbor the same eschatological
vision that Paul exemplified in 1 Corinthians, but they did begin to note the freedom that
came with a growing liberalism in their societies. One example is found in Leo XIII‘s
1880 encyclical on Christian marriage, where he insists on male headship, though he also
espouses mutual love and limits the power of fathers by permitting their children to freely
choose their own spouses.60 Another example is Pius XI‘s Casti Cannubii, where he calls
for an ―order of love‖ within the Christian household. There, his body imagery mirrors
the New Testament language of Ephesians 5, but extends it beyond duties of submission
on the part of wives. The husband is the ―head‖ of the family, but the mother is its

58

Ibid., 62-65.

59

Ibid., 64.

60

Leo XIII, Arcanum Divinae Sapientiae (1880), 12, 15.
22

―heart.‖ Furthermore, the dignity of women precludes them from being treated
paternalistically or deprived of liberty.61
At the end of the twentieth century, John Paul II wrote multiple encyclicals on the
family, many of them under the banner of CST. Among them, he describes the family as
the ―domestic church.‖ As a sacramental reality, the family transcends biological bonds
of genetic kinship and the social bonds of contractual marriage. By contrast, the family
―constitutes a specific revelation of ecclesial communion.‖ 62 The family still reflects the
analogical Christ-church images presented in Ephesians 5, but not strictly in terms of
hierarchical structure. Instead, the family imitates and communicates Christ‘s self-giving
love, and becomes a ―saving community.‖ 63 More importantly, John Paul connects his
theological reflection to CST by describing the family as a ―school of deeper humanity,‖
one that shares benefits and burdens among itself, and extends its action beyond itself in
service to the larger society.64
The Christian family is not closed in on itself, but remains open to the
community, moved by a sense of justice and concern for others, as well as by a
consciousness of its responsibility toward the whole of society.65
Thus, this ideal of the family in John Paul‘s thought is far more substantive an account
than Leo‘s ―first natural society,‖ as he called it in Rerum Novarum. The family becomes
the primary contributor to the common good.
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While this increasingly positive appraisal of sexuality and family life in the papal
encyclical tradition has been well received in Cahill‘s writings, it is not unproblematic.
Part of the problem is located within church tradition, as it frequently has insisted on
assigning gender roles within the Christian community.
For most of Christian history, it has been taken for granted that biological sex
entails specific gender roles that go beyond reproduction and child care to include
significant differentiation in most domestic and social roles. Behind this
assumption is the idea that women were created primarily for reproduction, and
are in all other ways weaker than men. Men are assumed to be the natural leaders
in public affairs, as well as the supervisors of women‘s fulfillment of domestic
responsibilities.66
Cahill‘s observation here is rooted in critiques from a variety of feminist writers in the
Christian tradition. However, she also notes on the one hand the broad range of religious
opinion on the implications of these inequalities for individual communities and on the
other hand the increasing consideration of women‘s participation within the complexities
of those opinions. For example, Augustine‘s pessimistic view of sex notwithstanding,
Cahill insists that he was no misogynist. His strict view of sexual norms applies equally
to men and women.67 During the Middle Ages, church interventions such as greater
attention to women‘s rights in marriage and vowed celibacy in convents modified
women‘s social roles and offered alternatives to the larger societies in which they lived.
Moreover, as these examples illustrate, the Christian vision of sexuality and
family life, particularly in light of CST, offers a constructive critique of the liberal values
toward sexuality in contemporary society. It also marks a significant development in
Cahill‘s work that demonstrates the growing importance of CST for her context. In her
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earlier writing on gender and sexuality, Cahill concludes that New Testament ethics is
immanently and inherently communal.68 Consequently, Christian marriage structures
human sexuality and deflects the power of gender differences.69 Historically, marriage is
the vehicle that links the individual to the community, naming one‘s dynamic familial
place, and its concomitant roles. Today‘s society envisions marriage and sexuality in a
diametrically personal way. In the liberal vision of life in general, the person is an
autonomous agent who exists to fulfill his or her own interests and needs, limited only by
the competing rights of others. As such, liberal sexual ethics legitimize acts between
consenting adults, with the absence harm to others as the sole regulating moral criteria. 70
Cahill proposes a solution for Christians living within larger society that refines rather
than redefines Christian sexual ethics. In formulating moral criteria, Christians should
consider the sexual norm of a ―lasting procreative union‖ between one man and one
woman, while allowing for variance within the community. Departures from the norm
include those conjugal situations which are found in contemporary society as ―choices:‖
e.g., divorce and remarriage, pre-ceremonial cohabitation, contraceptive situations, and
committed homosexual relationships. 71 While these examples are excluded as moral
choices in current Roman Catholic practice, they might be acceptable as part of the
inclusive vision of the New Testament.
However, Cahill‘s later work utilizes CST to transform the society in which these
choices are presented. For example, a decade after the work referenced in the previous
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paragraph, where sex is at the service of the community, she switches the polarity with
respect to its emphasis. She argues in her later work that the way sex and gender relate to
the common good is primarily through the family.72 Her argument still rests on the major
premise that sex is a fundamental service to the species, but modifies this assumption in
that the gender roles within the family organize sexual activity and serve social purposes.
Cahill also defines the common good as a ―philosophical and moral concept which gives
content to the notion of justice considered in its societal dimensions.‖73 The common
good orients sex and procreation justly by requiring distinctly human capacities – e.g.,
empathy, commitment, solidarity, and responsibility. Her definition of the common good
also implies corresponding notions of sociality, equality, and interdependence.
Furthermore, she adds that this arrangement is not always just. Consequently, justice as
constitutive of the common good is required in order for sex, gender, and the family to
function properly in society.
Given these capacities, Cahill looks to three normative models of the family in
current scholarship (sociobiology, ―family values,‖ and deconstructionist) and why they
fail in the Christian context.74 Sociobiology and evolutionary psychology reduce sex and
parenting to biological strategies that ensure species propagation. The ―family values‖
approach describes the family unit in terms of its harmony and cooperation, with all
members faithfully fulfilling their roles in the family, usually in conformity with socially
conservative norms. The deconstructionist model asserts that there is no ―natural‖ pattern
72
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of the family because it is socially and historically constructed. In this model, all family
ties are voluntarily bound, with no regard for kinship or other factors. The first two fall
short because of their ―givenness.‖ Sociobiology grants too little importance to these
human capacities. As Midgley argues, human capacities arise within the patterns
established by human nature, not in spite of them.75 To Midgley‘s claim, Cahill adds that
our human capacities have a transforming effect on our animal nature, too.76 The appeal
to values is unsuccessful because it envisions the normative values only within a nuclear
family paradigm. The third model fails because of its overemphasis on contractual and
intentional aspects of human relationships.
Instead, Cahill argues for a model of the family that integrates the positive
natural, moral, and historical aspects of the three insufficient models. The way to
integrate them, she argues, is through CST. CST envisions family as a fundamental unit
of society that engages the world. It brings freedom and responsibility together to serve
the common good. The family is dependent upon society, but also ministers to transform
it.77An organic part of Cahill‘s argument here involves the family as ―domestic church.‖
Here, she recalls the radical reinterpretation of family structures in light of her earlier
work on the New Testament community.78 The family becomes the primary educator for
solidarity and service to the community and society at large.79
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Conversely, because families serve the common good, Cahill argues that societies
should also provide social support to families in order to facilitate their participation.
Citing the U.S. bishops‘ letter on children and families, Cahill argues that this support is
the ―flip side‖ to the family‘s service in light of an ―interdependent world.‖
Of all families, poor families (worldwide) need the most help. The question is not
whether the middle class in our society has a duty to assist families needing
welfare, but rather, what form of assistance expresses genuine solidarity and
enables those families active, long-term participation in the common good.80
In short, the family cannot serve the common good without a proportionate response from
the society that is likewise served by the common good. The domestic church carries the
moral vision of the larger church, and helps to transform its larger society.
However, Cahill notes a certain danger of the ―domestic church‖ as an integrative
model for the family, especially for women. She applauds the later papal encyclicals that
have strongly advocated women‘s rights internationally. John Paul‘s writings, especially
Familiaris Consortio, have moved far beyond male headship of the family to a paradigm
of marital love among equals.81 Nonetheless, this equality is counterbalanced by an
emphasis on complementarity that reifies domestic roles as normative for women. It also
says little for women‘s leadership roles within the Catholic Church. Thus, Cahill‘s later
work also argues that justice for women must include special attention to their lives not
only in the family but also within the church.82
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In summary, this section has demonstrated how CST has exerted a vital influence
on Cahill‘s later work on sex, gender, and the family. Utilizing CST, Cahill‘s writings on
sexual ethics and the family have moved from its significance for sustaining the Christian
community itself to how the values of solidarity and responsibility can transform the
larger society in which Christians live. Employing John Paul‘s metaphor of the family as
domestic church, Cahill confirms the interdependence of the family and society upon
each other, calling on society to provide support for families, so that they might thereby
work for the common good. Cahill also demonstrates that the Christian community has
not yet achieved complete participation of its own membership. Thus, her commitment to
justice for all within the community gives her some reluctance to utilize fully the
metaphor of ―domestic church.‖

Cahill‘s Bioethics of the Common Good
Turning now to the influence of CST on Cahill‘s bioethical writings, this section
surveys her writings on biotechnology utilization and HIV/AIDS prevention. Since a
detailed examination of her appraisal of human germline enhancement is forthcoming in
the dissertation‘s conclusion, this section focuses on biotechnology with respect to aging.
This section also considers her application of CST regarding HIV/AIDS as her paradigm
illustration of a bioethics of the common good in practice. What is clear from this survey
is that Cahill rejects what she perceives in the current ethos in contemporary society as
attempts to medicalize issues which are primarily social concerns. Against this trend, she
argues that allocation of particular medical practices should be prioritized relative to their
contribution to the common good. Furthermore, she increasingly describes bioethics in
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terms of the common good over and above the other two affirmations of human dignity
and sociality.
First, Cahill deals with the problem of aging exclusively in her later writings – she
first takes up aging in 1991 in a volume of Concilium.83 It might be expected, then, that
she would begin to integrate CST into her work, but in a brief editorial introduction, she
alludes only to ―social and cultural challenges‖ of a growing population of elderly
persons, with no explicit reference to CST. Similarly, the articles presented in the issue
attempt to read the ―signs of the times‖ as they apply to aging (e.g., biblical and
theological perspectives, and cultural responses to aging), but none of them refer to CST
or its affirmations.
However, in more recent work, Cahill again has taken up the moral problems
associated with aging, this time with a more fully developed theory that integrates CST as
an element of her argument. In the United States, seventy-five percent of deaths occur in
old age, with many leading causes of death disproportionately affecting the elderly. 84
Clearly, death is part and parcel with the experience of every human life, and longevity
has changed the dynamics of dying in contemporary society. As the President‘s Council
on Bioethics has noted, because human beings live longer, they die differently than they
have in the past.85 So, the moral questions that arise are not about avoiding death, but
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about the limits of prolonging life, the permissibility of hastening death, and the prudent
employment of resources for the dying process. Implied in all three of these questions is
the overarching issue about the general care and human dignity of the elderly, since other
socioeconomic factors like poverty and gender enhance their vulnerability.86
Furthermore, prolonging human life often involves the employment of technology
that can be scarce, expensive, and even burdensome. Yet, in addition to durable medical
equipment like oxygen concentrators, bariatric beds, and dialysis machines, newer antiaging interventions are being developing that actually slow senescence. Such innovations
include cell repair and hormone therapy, but like human genetic engineering, they remain
in various stages of early research.87 Looking at the current marketing strategies of
pharmaceutical and medical equipment companies, however, Cahill remains pessimistic
that future anti-aging interventions will serve the common good. Instead, she argues that
such technology will be marketed to societal elites, with two dangerous consequences: 1.
Aging will be increasingly medicalized; and 2. Technological approaches to aging will
siphon resources away from more widely accessible modes of care.88
One part of the problem, Cahill notes, is that decline and death are often seen as
―outside the norm.‖ 89 For example, Michael Walzer, whose thought on justice is studied
in Chapter Two, addresses a problematic understanding of human disease that might be
expanded to describe the situation that Cahill criticizes. He claims that:
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What has happened in the modern world is simply that disease itself, even when it
is endemic rather than epidemic, has come to be seen as a plague. And since the
plague can be dealt with, it must be dealt with. People will not endure what they
no longer believe they have to endure.90
Dealing with disease, however, requires costly medical research and a corresponding
public effort. As he continues this line of argument, it must be stressed that there is only
the perception that people should not have to endure a problem. But what happens when
the ―problem‖ is simply age-related? Then, medicine has moved from a practice of
restoring or even maintaining health to one of providing for human wants. Therefore, the
personal desire for longevity, coupled with the entrepreneurial proclivities of technology
development, and both set within a context that prizes free choice, tend to undermine the
common good.
Another part of the problem for Cahill is the increased isolation that the elderly
feel as a result of the privatization and mobility of the nuclear family. 91 A key source of
this isolation is the growing distance among family members, who traditionally have
been the primary caregivers for their elderly relatives. Furthermore, poverty exacerbates
the declining health of older people because it tends to limit their means of access to
health resources, proper nutrition, and other factors which facilitate active participation in
society.
As a solution, Cahill offers three proposals that achieve the common good
through cooperative strategies. The first involves the urgent needs of the elderly already
living today. While anti-aging interventions might produce some future benefit, their
realization is still found in the unpredictable future. Because these current needs are
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immediate, and their practical solutions ―relatively clear,‖ a bioethics of the common
good demands that they not be compromised by resource allocation toward futurist
technology.92 The second recalls the ―flip side‖ of providing for families as they promote
the common good.93 A solidaristic appreciation of justice for older persons finds an
obligation on the part of society, especially through government action, to subsidize
support for the elderly and their caregivers, allowing them to participate in community to
the greatest extent possible. In several writings, Cahill underscores the call from Vatican
II to seek the universal common good through direct action and activism. She highlights
the work of organizations like the Catholic Health Association and the lay religious
community of Sant‘Egido, both of whom work to enhance the life of vulnerable
populations like the elderly.94 The third encourages legislative and financial restrictions
on anti-aging interventions. Without such measures, allocation decisions will be
determined by the market, and diseases will be treated according to their profit margins. 95
With regard to the use of biotechnology, Cahill makes a clear connection to the
affirmations of CST, especially the common good. Her proposed cooperative strategies
suggest that a just society must attend to the treatment of persons rather than diseases.
She also encourages society to move beyond consumerist interests. To embrace the
market, with its strongly individualistic concept of freedom, might bring about a ―market
only for the strong.‖ To allow people to decide within the context of voluntary
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association might allow for a ―misguided compassion‖ that encourages the elimination
and further marginalization of the elderly and other vulnerable people.96
Moving now to Cahill‘s bioethics of the common good in the context of
HIV/AIDS, she describes this disease not only as a worldwide crisis that
disproportionately affects women and the poor, but also as a useful case that poignantly
illustrates the universal common good. In doing so, she highlights two major shifts in
thinking about HIV/AIDS. The first is moves away from personalist sexual ethics that
privilege autonomy and choice to a more structural paradigm that analyzes poverty and
sexism. The second involves a reappraisal of absolute sexual norms within Catholic
moral theology that prohibit condom use in light of this disease. While this latter shift
might seem to remain a case of personal ethics in continuity with revisionist projects
regarding sexual ethics, its reconsideration is actually located within and engendered by
the larger framework of the former shift.
First, Cahill notes that American bioethicists in the 1980s initially described
moral issues surrounding the AIDS crisis in personalist terms, encompassing problems of
sexual promiscuity, illicit drug use, and medical confidentiality.97 The initial response
from Catholic bioethicists involved stricter observance of sexual morality, and increased
responsibility to care for patients with AIDS. 98 Even as preventive measures were
developed, bioethical discussion remained firmly planted within a framework of
individualist concerns such as informed consent (among sexual partners), needle
exchanges, and mandatory testing. This discourse is consistent with liberal American
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values like autonomy and liberty. Cahill argues that, absent a way to engage the larger
problems of gender discrimination and poverty, analysis of the moral issues surrounding
HIV will be ineffectual both in its treatment and prevention.99 For instance, according to
available statistics, three-fourths of HIV-infected persons are living in the developing
world, but only about ten percent of them receive anti-AIDS medication.100 The crisis is
exacerbated by unrelenting poverty and patriarchal structures that especially affect
women‘s choices regarding care for them and their children. One major part of this
problem is that unmarried or widowed women, lacking the means to provide for
themselves and their families, are forced into another marriage for their own survival.
Another complication is the lack of women‘s sexual rights regarding abstinence or safer
sex practices, and nearly no influence to change their husbands‘ sexual habits. Still
another compounding problem is the stigma attached to HIV infection that is prevalent in
developing countries.101 Stigmatization is located in the negative social interpretations,
further isolating those already within marginalized communities.102
Underscoring theological bioethics as a possible solution, Cahill encourages the
current contribution of Christian organizations that help to alleviate HIV/AIDS, and
advocates their continued participation in the global fight the disease. Deeply influenced
by CST, including its emphasis on the common good and the ―preferential option for the
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poor,‖ Cahill offers four interdependent aspects of the common good to restore its
power.103 One, a substantive account of the content of the common good is required.
Contemporary CST has understood the common goods in terms of social justice and
increased participation in a good society. Two, the means of achieving the common good
must be located within the competent levels of authority. As such, subsidiarity is an
important procedural principle that addresses not only ―vertical‖ aspects of hierarchical
structures of administration, but also ―horizontal‖ aspects of maximizing the delivery of
goods. Three, solidarity and hope are required in order to facilitate genuine commitment
to the common good over and against pure self-interest. Solidarity helps to make
religious symbols intelligible in a pluralistic world; hope transcends the current situation
to continue work for a better future. Four, CST must interface effectively with other
moral traditions and social traditions in order to achieve and maintain the common good.
Tied together with solidarity and subsidiarity, particular groups can work together
to encourage compassionate and participatory action in order to advance the common
good.104 Cahill writes that
The global common good, to be served by CST, is participation of all peoples in a
diverse and differentiated, yet solidaristic and collaborative world society. The
global common good is both a normative ideal and an incipient form of life,
embodying the cooperative and just interdependence of all human beings and
cultures, and also of all that is human with the entire created universe.105
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In the case of HIV/AIDS, the universal common good is achieved through prudential
reasoning about allocation of medication, while at the same time working to transform
social structures that continue to complicate the epidemic. Because of the givenness of
pluralism, this two-fold goal can be achieved only through a coalition with other health
care organizations that do not endorse the ―full range of Catholic values.‖106 Public moral
discourse about bioethics, which will be discussed at length in the next section of the
chapter, will encourage this partnership. This partnership is essential, since the Catholic
Church provides about one-fourth of the total care of HIV/AIDS victims globally.107
Next, with the ideal exceptions of sexual abstinence and absolute monogamy,
condom use is the chief means of HIV prevention. This mode of prevention, though, is
problematic from the standpoint of Catholic moral theology, which has an established
tradition against using artificial means of contraception.108 Papal teaching insists that ―it
is necessary that each and every marriage act remain ordered per se to the procreation of
human life.‖109 Because condoms provide a barrier that prevents semen from moving
freely, they have an apparent contraceptive use. However, this teaching is rooted in a
church tradition which is ―on the side of life.‖110 The conjugal act with an HIV-infected
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spouse seems to raise a paradox, as it risks the life of the uninfected partner if this
teaching is to be upheld. Consequently, several Catholic theologians have attempted to
resolve this issue through the principle of double effect or proportionate reasoning.111 In
fact, Benedict XVI has opened the issue further in recent statements by speculating that
when conception is not at stake (i.e., in homosexual acts), condom use does not present
an insuperable moral problem per se.112
In the context of the HIV/AIDS crisis, though, especially in situations like those
in developing nations, where the disease is directly complicated by a corresponding lack
of women‘s sexual rights, Cahill calls such attempts ―a distraction‖ at best, and at worst
―a contradiction‖ to the Catholic health care ministry‘s commitment to vulnerable
populations.113 Even if condom use were permissible in a Catholic context, under double
effect, proportionate reasoning, or some other justification, it would do little good
because such a choice implies a freedom which women in particular – and the poor in
developing nations in general – simply do not possess.114 Magisterial authority here is
important, but it must it must be in an interdependent relationship with the receiving
111
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community. Cahill locates that authority in the magisterium‘s power to illumine the ―real
situation,‖ and offer guiding principles that respect human dignity and the common
good.115 In short, theological debates are as much political as they are moral in scope.
Therefore, the solution to HIV prevention is not a straightforward moral choice, to
be determined analogously through casuistry, or adjudicated according to proportionate
reasoning. The discussion must return to the first shift away from one regarding personal
behavior to one concerning the common good. A participatory bioethics informed by
CST helps to translate that discourse. As she did with aging in the preceding paragraphs,
Cahill names multiple Christian organizations and leaders that actively struggle against
the epidemic and the social conditions that impair this endeavor. Groups like Catholic
Relief Services, the Jesuit African AIDS Network, the Community of Sant‘Egido, as well
as the African Catholic Bishops, the Church of South India all work to one degree or
another to provide anti-retroviral medication, AIDS education, community-based support,
and other direct action to combat the spread of HIV. In particular, Cahill points to the
leadership of the Sisters of Mercy, especially that of Margaret Farley (see Chapter Two),
in order to illustrate the ―global to local‖ Christian activism with regard to HIV. 116
Starting with the feminist standpoint from which Farley most often writes, she
collaborated with peers in the American theological community to form a movement of
strategic planning and cooperative endeavors to raise awareness about the global scourge
of HIV. In turn, her efforts became the springboard for the All Africa Conference: Sister
to Sister, which developed financial interventions to support African women to do the
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same in their local situation. This paradigmatic display of cooperation and solidarity,
claims Cahill, is the essence of participatory theological bioethics.117

Cahill and the Relationship between the Community and the Individual
Before moving to Cahill‘s work on public moral discourse, one important contrast
with CST in her writings must be discussed. As stated at the outset of this section, when
employing the language of CST, Cahill emphasizes the common good over and above the
other affirmations of human dignity and sociality. On the one hand, the papal social
encyclicals generally use the dignity of the human person as their point of departure,
trying to navigate between radical individualism and extreme collectivism.118 In fact,
Paul VI reflects on some negative influences of the family on individual development,
going so far as to claim that ―the family‘s influence may have been excessive to the
detriment of the fundamental rights of the individual.‖119 On the other hand, at different
points in her most recent essays, Cahill reverses the polarity. One example is located in
her discussion of abortion where, against the current liberal ethos of choice, she
underscores the importance of moral bonds that arise out of human sociality, which she
calls elsewhere ―relationality:‖ interdependence with others in community. 120
A theory of the common good begins with the premise that persons are by
definition interrelated in a social whole whose fabric of reciprocal rights and
duties constitutes the very condition of their individual and communal agency and
well-being. The community is prior to the individual, and each individual is
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entitled to participate in the community and share in its benefits as well as
obligated to contribute to the good of the whole and of fellow members.121
By absolutizing the value of choice, and exercising that primacy within an equally
absolute context of autonomy, one neglects the social supports, personal obligations, and
even human embodiment that interact within the milieu of a meaningful choice.122 It is
unclear, though, what impact this priority of community relative to the individual might
have in terms of personal accountability to that society.
Another example is found in her acceptance of coercive policies that enforce
social change. Due to the consequences of human sinfulness, and especially the structural
nature of some injustices, social transformation will never achieve a fully transcendent
common good. As a result, power occasionally must be used against embedded power.
Thus, an element to be accentuated in social teaching of the future is the
occasional, but still very definite, need for coercion to secure justice in social
relations. Still needed is a principle of forceful intervention that is similar to the
principle that undergirded the traditional just war theory. Once again, though, the
structures of social agency have changed in the age of globalization; coercive
authority is not limited to the nation-state, a comprehensive public authority, or
international institutions. Activist networks and non-governmental organizations,
along with dissenting national governments, can challenge and even coerce some
aspects of global systems, at least some of the time.123
In so many words, Cahill seems to be advocating revolutionary action to some degree or
other in order to destabilize the status quo. The activism that she envisions seems to be
political in nature, though her inference to just war theory renders this claim somewhat
uncertain. Happily, in a footnote following this provocative quote, she lists two examples
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of legislation and litigation to combat pressing social problems, buttressing the notion
that Cahill is endorsing political solutions and deliberative remedies.124
However, it would be imprudent to make much of these discrepancies with CST
for two reasons. In the first place, issues like the marginalization of poorer women and
their unborn children, the isolation of the declining elderly and the stigmatization of HIV
victims are urgent, immediate concerns for Cahill. The status quo is unjust. The context
of both illustrative quotes is the extreme individualism that CST attempts to
counterbalance. By advocating direct action on behalf of the interests of the community‘s
marginalized citizens, Cahill is tacitly upholding the human dignity of those affected
negatively by the current ethos in both cases. In the second place, Cahill also presumes
relationality (i.e., sociality according to CST) in these quotes. For instance, in her
discussion of abortion, she notes that those who take a ―pro-life‖ position on abortion,
conforming themselves to the Catholic Church‘s absolute prohibition against killing the
unborn, do not seem to adhere equally to CST‘s call for solidarity with the most
vulnerable and exploited members of society.125 The common good must be advanced by
all and for all within the community. Given the relational nature of human beings, Cahill
is affording those in power an opportunity for the aforementioned conversion that
solidarity implies. Peace, indeed, is the fruit of reconciliation, which is borne by
solidarity, the necessary virtue to achieve the common good.
In summary, this first section of the chapter has attempted to accomplish three
tasks. First, it has demonstrated the philosophical and theological influences that are most
relevant to Cahill‘s work, as they will underwrite her views on justice in Chapter Three.
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Second, chief among these influences is Catholic Social Teaching, which she firmly
endorses and consistently applies especially in her later essays. Illustrative examples from
her writings on sex, family, and bioethics were offered to present her application of CST
to the point that it has become elemental to her theological context. Finally, this section
analyzed what seemed initially to be a radical departure from CST by prioritizing the
community over the individual, falling into the extreme of collectivism which CST seeks
to avoid. However, this critical perception can be reconciled in light of Cahill‘s
significant emphasis on the common good. In dire circumstances, justice seems to be
completely absent from the given context. Respect for human dignity demands action on
behalf of the marginalized; social interdependence demands that society identify those
who most need aid and discern how to help them with compassion and respect. In
closing, if CST‘s affirmations of human dignity and the common good are to be relevant,
then they must be advanced in public moral discourse in innovate ways.126 The chapter
now turns to an analysis of Cahill‘s contribution to that discourse.

Cahill and Public Moral Discourse
In order to demonstrate how Cahill‘s writings on justice may apply to future
public discourse about human germline enhancement, it is necessary to note her
contribution in support of theological voices in the public sphere, since her later writings
make an explicit case to identify justice as encompassing such participation.127 Starting in
the late 1980s, and continuing through today, a trajectory can be drawn through her work
that first makes the case that theological voices can participate in public discourse, that
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they should participate, and finally, given the universal common good from CST that
informs her later work, that they must participate. Also, Cahill notes the secularization of
American bioethics and perceives a corresponding marginalization of religious voices
during the 1970s and 80s. To counteract these inverse trends and to encourage wider,
more inclusive participation, she offers guiding principles for religious yet public action
to formulate policy discourse and to build political coalitions in support of their goals.
This section opens with a brief summary of Cahill‘s conception of public moral
discourse. Next, it develops an historical analysis of her calls for participatory theological
bioethics throughout various essays. Her strong argumentation entails a foundational
claim that all knowledge is partial and perspectival; no standpoint can be considered,
prima facie, more privileged or more reasonable than another. But this claim cuts both
ways. As a result, a question might be raised: what, if anything, are theological voices
surrendering in order to engage in public discourse? Put another way, what remains
―theological‖ about theological bioethics in the public sphere? Cahill addresses these
concerns by suggesting principles for theological voices involved in such participation.
The concluding part of this section briefly analyzes these guidelines.

Bioethics and the ―Public Sphere‖
This section introduces two concepts that aid the reader in understanding the values
that Cahill claims are at stake when theological voices engage in public moral discourse.
The first is contextual, as it situates Cahill‘s writings within the historical framework of
recent bioethics. It briefly addresses the secularization of bioethics that occurred over the
last two decades of the twentieth century, and studies Cahill‘s reaction to this trend. The
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second is more philosophical, in that it interprets the metaphor of the ―public sphere‖ in a
manner consistent with Cahill‘s usage of the term. Taken together, they account for
Cahill‘s positive arguments on behalf of theological voices participating in public
discourse, which will be analyzed in the next part of the chapter.

The Secularization of Bioethics
Considering the broad scope of philosophical and theological history, bioethics as a
specialized discipline is a relative newcomer. In the latter half of the twentieth century,
the development and refinement of medical technologies and increasing mercantilization
of health care gave rise to moral problems that could no longer be contained within the
hospital setting, under the aegis of ―medical ethics.‖ Innovations like organ
transplantation and kidney dialysis engendered concerns beyond principles of best
practice involving the safety and efficacy of these respective interventions to issues of
procedural justice regarding their deployment and utilization. Furthermore, the
conversation included a wider range of participants beyond hospital staff; debates over
these dilemmas involved not only physicians, but also policymakers and many others.
Moreover, theological voices, particularly Christian and Jewish theologians, have been at
the forefront of bioethics, and have served on prominent national policymaking and
advisory boards for a half-century.128 Since its inception, bioethics has been
interdisciplinary and has included diverse religious elements.129
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However, theological bioethics enjoyed this great success in the 1970s and 1980s in
part because there was an air of ―secularity‖ about them. In general, theologians opined
with the language and methods of their secular counterparts. Some influential religious
thinkers like Richard McCormick emphasized autonomous action and responsible choice.
Because of his use of natural law, McCormick claims that his conclusions are not
substantively different from reasonable nonreligious moral traditions.130 Cahill claims
this influence came at the cost of increasing marginalization of theologians, or at least the
foundations of their craft. 131 For example, Daniel Callahan notes that theologians in the
field of bioethics rarely appealed to their theological convictions in their many and varied
contributions. Moreover, as bioethics developed within a diverse society, the application
of universal principles like autonomy, beneficence and justice were superior to private
concerns like religion.132 Reflecting on thirty years of advances in bioethics, Daniel
Callahan celebrates on the public acceptance of bioethics in a later essay.
It is hard to recall these days [1993] that there used to be a great deal of suspicion
about any public talk on the matter of ethics. Even to suggest that we needed a
public debate and discussion about issues of ethics ran into a fundamental problem.
For many, particularly among educated people and particularly the educated elite,
ethics connoted religion, and religion had been put behind them, at least within the
universities.133
According to Callahan, public acceptance of bioethics in the United States was
accomplished first by clearing out its superfluous religious considerations. Callahan‘s
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claim betrays a secular worldview informed solely by the phenomenon of scientific
advancement and consideration of its best utilization. There are traces of philosophical
elitism that rings of Victorian secularism from the nineteenth century, and his claim is
built on a premise that society has simply ―outgrown‖ religion. Public moral discourse
has no place for ―private‖ matters like religion. As a result, ethical issues in the United
States generally are resolved politically and economically, with both solutions grounded
solely in Western liberal traditions.
Furthermore, philosopher Iris Young raises another problem of the ―civic public‖
regarding moral issues.134 Young argues that those who enter into public discourse
generally do so with the goal of consensus in mind. In order to distill from the discussion
the emotions, participants seek a ―reasoned,‖ public discussion that wants all voices to be
heard. The idea of ―impartiality‖ creeps in, but this impartiality seeks to reduce plurality
to unity, insofar as consensus is the goal of public discourse. As the discussion evolves,
differences may be cast aside, but the impossible ideal of impartiality masks the
inevitable partiality of perspective from which moral deliberation takes place. Thus,
religious voices might be given a place at the table, and even heard with some deference.
In the push toward resolution and consensus, though, difference must be wiped away, and
to the degree that moral theology agrees with moral philosophy, its contribution will be
accepted. However, any major difference can be accounted for by their religious
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commitments, and the revelatory sources that they privilege.135 Thus, moral theology runs
the risk of being reduced to moral philosophy.
It should be noted that Cahill appreciates the growing suspicion of religious
considerations in a public forum. She points to the political power of the American
―religious right.‖ Socially conservative Roman Catholics and Evangelical Protestants
undermined consensus on medical and social issues throughout the 1980s and 90s.136
Nonetheless, Cahill sees a real contradiction in a public setting that excludes participants
and creates new justice issues.137 ―Public‖ is distinct from ―secular,‖ and the public
sphere is strongly inclusive of all voices. It covers society‘s diverse religious and secular
moral traditions. Moreover, as the coming sections of this chapter bear out, Cahill argues
that all moral discourse is tradition bound, and as one community among communities, it
is unjust to exclude Christian thinkers simply because they are Christians.138
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The “Public Sphere” as Place
Just as Cahill‘s definition of ―public‖ is at odds with Callahan‘s presumption that
bioethics is secular through and through, so is her account of the ―public sphere‖ or
―public square‖ contrasted with other views. By employing geometrical metaphors of a
public ―sphere‖ or ―square,‖ one might be inclined to conceptualize public discourse as a
space. For example, Charles Taylor defines the public sphere as a common space where
ideas may be discussed and a ―common mind‖ formed. 139 Though it is conceived of as a
unity, the discourse is actually pluriform in that it is a multimedia locus for the exchange
of ideas. The common mind can be described as the ―public opinion,‖ which emerges
from the discourse. But the ―public sphere‖ is more than a meetinghouse for the exchange
of ideas. Much less so is it a place for rational debate, and so ―public arena‖ is also
imprecise. Cahill finds the idea of the public sphere as ―place‖ problematic, because it is
far from a ―neutral‖ territory.
The public sphere is never outside of or immune to the dialectics of power.
Although the common space may not be identified with any one manifestation of
institutionalized political power or government, the participants in discourse will
have differentials of influence along a number of different axes – income,
education, race, gender, age, profession – and so will the practices and institutions
in which they participate. The public sphere is a space in which power is exercised
and mediated, resulting both in conflict and in shifting equilibria.140
Cahill‘s appraisal here squares with Taylor‘s account of the public sphere, but she takes it
a step further by demonstrating theological bioethics potential role in transforming the
dynamics of discourse. Others have noted that the public forum is usually convened
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within the context of a capitalist media, and so advertising dollars can unduly influence
its editorial content.141
As a corrective to the power differential that frequently is found in policy debates,
Cahill suggests an understanding of participatory bioethics that includes action and
activism.142 Better still, participatory discourse involves multiple ―spheres‖ and networks
that transcend ―secular‖ values, privileging specific goods while simultaneously
excluding other goods. This exclusion thereby causes harm to those who cannot join in
the discussion. For instance, using vocabulary similar to that of philosopher Michael
Walzer (See Chapter Two) in her discussion of genetic therapy, Cahill argues that the
value of this intervention collides against the ―sphere‖ that values equitable access and,
one could add, the value of money.
The moral center of Catholic social teaching is a concept of justice as including
mutual rights and duties of all members and groups in society, the cooperation and
interdependence of all in the common good of society, the moral and legal
responsibilities of state, and the legitimate sphere of independence of local groups
and institutions.143
As medical technologies become increasingly scientific and market-driven enterprises,
they risk excluding the humanistic and common-good dimensions of their utilization.
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Participatory theological bioethics works within a network of institutions, each with its
own spheres of influence, vocabulary, and worldviews. It attempts to transform all three
through cooperative strategies and political activism.
The next two parts of this section outline two vital components of this
participation. What immediately follows is an historical analysis of Cahill‘s work
regarding whether and to what degree theological bioethics can play in public discourse.
After that, the final part examines her guiding principles regarding how to participate in
these spheres. Also, these next two parts will refer back to the secularization of bioethics
and the problem of the ―public sphere‖ discussed in this opening part. Ultimately, this
analysis reaches a conclusion that justice is the overarching value at stake, and will need
to be analyzed in subsequent chapters.

Can (and Should) Theological Voices Participate in Public Moral Discourse?
Historically, Cahill‘s work encouraging theological participation in public
discourse can be traced to her 1979 essay in The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy,
where she contrasts the methods of theologians Richard McCormick and Paul Ramsey. 144
What is striking is that her essay (and the issue in which it appeared) characterizes
theology as the primary voice in bioethics, a situation far removed from the
marginalization she describes in her later work. The editors of that issue were theologians
James Gustafson and Stanley Hauerwas. In their introductory editorial, Gustafson and
Hauerwas remind readers that
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In spite of secularization, there are still far more people who belong to religious
communities in American [sic] than would warrant membership in that fictional
denomination called autonomous rational moral agents to which our colleagues in
moral philosophy seek to evangelize us.145
However, Cahill envisions the theological wrangling between Ramsey and McCormick in
a context quite remote from both Christian theology and public discourse. It is an
exchange between two scholars, and, as such, their claims are not necessarily defended
on the foundation of a comprehensive Christian faith. Furthermore, Cahill implies that
public discourse helps to settle a theological matter. For example, she writes
For both [Ramsey and McCormick], theology provides a court with which to hear a
moral case, but the outcome is decided only with the assistance of amici curiae
(e.g., philosophy, the social and empirical sciences).146
The question raised by the exchange is what role these outside influences have in
adjudicating the dispute. This meeting of minds is between two Christians, an internal
matter, as it were, in which a third party – apparently a coalition of secular voices – helps
to shape the key components of the discourse. As the field of bioethics became more
secularized, though, its participants from religious communities often adapted their
vocabulary for the emerging audience. Philosophers and theologians were already
discussing the implications of this secularization in the early 1970s.147
By the end of the 1980s, Catholic theology‘s role in public bioethics seems to
have been largely diminished. For their part, moralists pursued other pressing issues of
the day, including nuclear disarmament, urban poverty, and environmental concerns. In
fact, Cahill‘s own writing during this time emphasized family and gender concerns rather
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than medical ethics.148 Bioethical questions were resolved to the satisfaction of many
through secular channels with the vocabulary of autonomy and ―rights talk.‖149

Cahill‟s Positive Argument for Participation
Beginning in 1990, though, Cahill begins to build an argument that theology still
has much to offer bioethics. As noted in the opening section of this chapter, she draws
frequently from the respective works of James Gustafson and Richard McCormick, both
of whom influenced her early work. In order to demonstrate that theology can and should
have a participatory role in public moral discourse about bioethics, Cahill develops the
following argument. First, public discourse about bioethics draws participants from a
wide range of intellectual and moral traditions. Second, participants with religious
commitments likewise speak from an intellectual and moral tradition. Third, there exists
no independent realm of philosophical discourse, privileged as more reasonable, neutral,
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objective, or less tradition-bound, than religious ones. So, concludes Cahill, public
discourse ought to include participation from theological voices. 150
Cahill‘s first premise is not controversial. Religious voices continue to exert
considerable influence in public discourse, as evidenced in recent public discussions
about federal funding for embryonic stem cell research or California‘s recognition of
same-sex unions. In these cases, some religious groups influenced public perspectives
over and above those from a broad coalition of clinical researchers and social scientists,
Hollywood actors and political activists, as well as secular philosophers and even other
religious voices. 151
The argument‘s second premise is also uncontroversial in that religious traditions
have strict, non-scholarly and even anti-intellectual interpretative movements within
themselves. Several examples can be offered from the philosophical writers who are
analyzed in Chapter Two. First, John Rawls simply excludes as ―unreasonable‖ those
who do not accept the political conception of justice.152 Next, Michael Walzer notes that
groups like the Amish or Jehovah‘s Witnesses do not participate in many aspects of
public life in the United States. He claims that such groups are tolerated because they
accept a position at the margins of society.153 Finally, Alasdair MacIntyre argues that a
tradition in good order is always constituted by an ongoing argument about the ultimate
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purpose of itself.154 But Cahill is not making the case that every religious tradition is a
monolith. Rather, her second premise is heuristic. In public discourse, religious voices
speak from an intellectual and cultural tradition, just as all other participants speak from
their respective and mottled traditions. Therefore, the second premise to Cahill‘s
argument is founded on two prior sub-premises.
Theologians and religious groups can introduce the civil community to insights
borne by their own traditions, on the assumption that and provided that these
traditions are not sheerly insular nor the civil community a wholly foreign country
in which values with originally religious sponsorship are entirely unintelligible.155
Moreover, as David Tracy points out, the strictest religious interpretations and leastwilling dialogue partners simply will refuse to enter public discussion. Instead, they will
withdraw into the ―safe‖ boundaries of their own communities.156 The concluding part of
this section will address the self-limiting aspect of public participation for the confessing
community, but the present discussion about theology‘s possible contribution implies at
least some degree of openness to dialogue from all parties – religious and secular.
But Cahill‘s third premise requires further qualification. On the one hand Jeffrey
Stout has recommended to theologians to limit their language to ―immanent criticism‖ in
public discourse. 157 Because empirical data have become vital to contemporary accounts
of reality, religion has been challenged to move the bulk of its enterprise away from the
metaphysical realm. Thus, argues Stout, theologians can employ a vocabulary that rises
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―above the fray,‖ that is, above the special religious commitment inherent in particular
theologies.158 However, because so many of Christianity‘s claims, including moral ones,
are founded upon metaphysical assumptions, it becomes difficult to assert any theological
claim without moving, ultimately, away from the empirical realm. On the other hand,
Cahill‘s responds to Stout‘s claim by rooting her third premise in the postmodern
philosophical claim that all knowledge, even universal principles, is contextualized and
perspectival. She reasons that all ethical discourse is tradition-bound, and this assertion is
the crux of the third premise of her argument.159 Empirical studies, Cahill points out in
another work, help to shed light upon ethical issues, but empirical information remains
descriptive. 160 In order to apply this knowledge in any meaningful way in Catholic
bioethics, it is necessary to examine empirical evidence in light of Sacred Scripture,
Sacred Tradition, as well as human reason and experience, all of which might engender
prescriptive accounts of the human person.161
More importantly, public policy discourse is a meeting ground for diverse groups
of people with a common, highly specific purpose.162 The ad hoc character of public
discourse implies that discussion can proceed in spite of a lack of consensus on
substantive questions about either the ―good life‖ or other metaethical considerations. In
deciding to enter into public discourse, all parties involved have (tacitly, at least) agreed
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that a particular issue transcends local or particular concerns. The resolution of that
public issue lends itself toward something that can be called ―the common good.‖163

Participatory Bioethical Discourse
Cahill reasons that while ethical discourse is tradition-bound, the plurality of
traditions does not create an ideological impasse. Instead, it allows for discussion to
commence from a common ground of shared assumptions and openness to dialogue. She
cites William Placher‘s pluralistic model of conversation: ―Do not pretend that you can
stop being a Christian and become the neutral and therefore authoritative moderator of
the whole discussion. Do not let a representative of ‗modernity‘ or anyone else assume
that role either.‖164 The challenge, notes Cahill, is not to replace a ―thin‖ tradition for a
―thicker‖ one. In fact, there are already thick traditions embedded in the public sphere.
The real issue is which tradition has priority, precedence, and presumed authority
within the patterns of social exchange about ethics and ethical behavior. The three
main contenders in twenty-first-century postindustrial societies are science,
economics, and liberalism. Theological bioethics should and can confront these
thick traditions with persuasive counterstrategies, symbolic systems, and narratives,
as well as with ethical ―reasons.‖ The challenge before theologians is not to cast
aside a thin discourse for a richer one, but to dislodge the thick discourses that are
so widely entrenched that their constituting narratives and practices are no longer
directly observed.165
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Catholicism displays an interplay of scriptural and narrative, sacramental and liturgical,
as well as historical and social theological methods. Those who seek to participate in
public moral discourse must appreciate these overlapping parts of the tradition.
Toward the goal of effective engagement, Cahill describes five modes of
discourse.166 The first four are taken from the work of James Gustafson: ethical, policy,
prophetic, and narrative.167 The criteria of their taxonomy are not rigid, and the various
modes can work in concert with one another. Rather, to describe them as such is to name
a species among general types of discourse by referring to the activities associated with
its participants in the public sphere. For example, policy discourse builds consensus on a
common ground of experience in the context of shared political and legal institutions.
Issues are resolved through activities organic to those institutions, and their solutions are
shaped by the values of that tradition. The challenge for theological bioethics is to resist
being held in place exclusively by policy discourse, since the terrain of that public sphere
is marked primarily with the values of liberal democratic capitalism. 168 Alternatively, to
name practices of the body politic as ―sinful‖ or ―unjust‖ is to engage in prophetic
discourse. At the same time, it calls for struggle against practices that are labeled as such,
including revolutionary or subversive action against sinful practices and unjust
institutions.169 But prophetic discourse takes place at the margins of the larger
conversation. It entails in some ways a refusal to participate, since the contemplated
action will lead to further harm. Nonetheless, it can also serve not only to unite coalitions
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against deleterious actions by embedded economic and political forces, but also to call
attention to them through public outcry and destabilizing activism.
To these four, Cahill adds a fifth category called ―participatory discourse.‖
Gustafson‘s modes already imply willingness to take part in dialectic engagement, but the
fifth brings the public nature of the discourse to the surface. Participatory discourse is
characterized by a strong affinity to assess realistically the moral and political contours in
which the public debate situated. The current context can be described as a ―deliberative
democracy‖ or ―civil society.‖170 Some of the tools for engaging in participatory
discourse have already been considered in this chapter. For one thing, casuistry is a
helpful method for solving a current hard case in light of past success in an analogous
issue. For another, subsidiarity and solidarity can help to respond to the ad hoc nature of
pressing public concerns, as they both seek equitable resolutions at the appropriate levels
of society. However, while faith commitment gives rise to participation in public
discourse, faith language is of limited value, Cahill argues, as its use will convince only
members of that faith tradition. In the forthcoming analysis of collaborative justice as it
relates to human germline enhancement (see Epilogue), legal restrictions play a
significant role in regulating this technology. For example, Françoise Baylis and Jason
Scott Robert argue that not all ethical objections to human engineering are persuasive for
everyone, and some (like religious arguments) will persuade no one who does not share
similar beliefs. Atheists will hardly find arguments against transgressing divine laws
persuasive.171 By contrast, participatory discourse links faith commitment with the public
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context – its institutions, coalitions, and limitations. ―Participation,‖ then, can have a
variety of referents, from advancing current public values to transforming or even
subverting them. Once again, prudence is necessary to discern the wisest course of action
for religious participants in public discourse.172
In conclusion, Cahill‘s argument for participatory bioethical discourse is rooted in
her commitment for inclusive participation of all, especially the marginalized of society.
This influence comes from Catholic Social Teaching that is clearly expressed in her later
writings, which was analyzed in the opening part of this chapter. Cahill‘s argument is
further informed by her critical cognizance of the values of the larger society to which
she addresses her essays. She seeks to transform those values in the service of the
common good. Moreover, theological voices are not beholden to a single mode of
discourse, such as those described by Gustafson. Instead, participatory strategies allow
them simultaneously to embrace and to critique their own traditions. Informed by
Catholic Social Teaching, participatory discourse aims to move beyond ―first world‖
issues (i.e., liberalism, technology, and the market) toward pressing global concerns, such
as the poverty and sexism that were discussed in the previous section of this chapter.173
Prudent action facilitates the best practices and strategies to resolve the issue at hand.

172

Jonsen and Toulmin, 130-131.

173

―The social and ethical implications of genetic research cannot be understood
apart from economic globalization, worldwide health inequities, and the absence of any
one institution or well-coordinated set of institutions that can define and govern a ‗world
order.‘‖ Cahill, ―Genetics, Theology, Common Good,‖ 117.
60

Cahill‘s Guiding Principles for Public Moral Discourse
This section synthesizes Cahill‘s principles to guide the application of participatory
modes of bioethics. These guidelines facilitate engagement in the various kinds of public
discourse without isolating themselves within one particular mode and its concomitant
values. At the same time, they especially help Catholic voices to make a distinctive
contribution within the plurality of other religious voices and ideological commitments.
There are three major guiding principles which can be gleaned from the breadth of
Cahill‘s writings on public moral discourse and participatory theological bioethics: the
self-limiting and self-critical nature of theological ethics, the conjunctive worldview of
Catholic theology, and the common language of natural law ethics.

The Self-Limiting Nature of Contemporary Theological Ethics
To begin, if Cahill‘s premise from the previous section is correct that there is no
privileged standpoint, then it begs the question: What should be distinctive about
Christian contributions to such discussions in the first place? Reacting to a series of
papers written by theologians, one of whom was Cahill‘s, Alasdair MacIntyre responds
caustically to what he understood as muddled thinking in their positions.
Theologians still owe it to the rest of us to explain why we should not treat their
discipline as we do astrology or phrenology. The distinctiveness and importance of
what they have to say, if it is true, make this an urgent responsibility.174
Here, MacIntyre offers more than a choleric barb at a perceived weakness in certain
theologians‘ methods.175 He challenges Christian theological voices to remain both
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distinctively Christian and eminently relevant. In his estimation, the theologians whom
MacIntyre addresses lost their prophetic bite and countercultural edge in articulating their
positions, or, worse still, they used no theology to back their claims.
Early in her call for participation in public discourse, Cahill expresses an
awareness of this danger. Rather than accepting dichotomous propositions that force
policy discourse into one of two camps – ―rational scrutiny‖ or ―religio-moral fanaticism‖
– she suggests that there is an ―historical reasonableness‖ of the contextualized nature for
all moral arguments, including those from religious voices.176 So, Cahill offers three
guiding principles for theological voices that participate in this discourse.
First, theological bioethics ought to be socially engaged. This principle may seem
tautologous; theological bioethics is essentially dialogical. However, this principle is
essential because there are two levels of dialogue. The self-evident part of this principle
is found at level of the dialogical nature of discourse itself. But the other necessary
element of dialogue is the critical self-reflection by a particular community. In turn,
deliberation about bioethical matters via participatory discourse helps a believing
community draw boundaries for itself, what it will do or not do when faced with difficult
moral choices. Cahill describes this self-defining character as the primary role of
Christian bioethics.177 Toward this goal, paradigmatic narratives form and guide the faith
community.
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In turn, the self-critical community can enjoy robust participation in public
discourse, since it is aware of its own boundaries. In the Catholic context, CST reappears
as an essential agenda item for the values that its participants bring to public discourse.
From her more recent work, Cahill argues that theological bioethics must take the option
for the poor as its central theme in order to reassert a prominent place in public policy
discourse about medical research and health care.178 Making this case, Cahill prioritizes
justice as the chief participatory criterion. She thereby envisions theological bioethics as
a ―self-conscious mediator‖ among ideological and institutional movements at the local
and global levels.

A Conjunctive Stance in Contemporary Catholic Ethics
Second, Catholic theology often expresses a worldview that sees contrasts
working in dynamic relationship rather than dividing in mutual exclusivity. For instance,
the previous part described the vexing issue of distinguishing between faith language and
faith commitment. MacIntyre‘s frank commentary suggests that some scholars find such
a distinction unsatisfactory. In another context from his earlier work, MacIntyre argues
that for theologians to shuck off faith language is to accept a priori the modern claim that
only secular language is privileged to describe and, presumably, prescribe moral
norms.179 Similarly, theologian Stanley Hauerwas notes that even if religious thinkers are
the historically-recognized leader in bioethical discourse, it is not clear to what degree
they remain in the discourse qua religious thinkers.
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If the theologian attempts to underwrite the medical ethos drawing on the particular
convictions of Christians, just to the extent those convictions are particular they
will serve only to emphasize society‘s lack of a common morality. Thus
theologians in the interest of cultural consensus, often try to downplay the
distinctiveness of their theological convictions in the interest of societal harmony.
But in the process we only reinforce the assumption on the part of many that
theological claims make little difference for how medicine itself is understood or
how various issues are approached.180
The previous section also described Iris Young‘s critique of the ideal of impartiality.
However, as Hauerwas states in another work, much of secular society‘s moral attitudes
are rooted in Judeo-Christian beliefs that are popularly thought to be false, or at least
irrelevant. Thus, much of the disagreement stems from the difficulty and implications of
developing a truly secular, or better yet, public morality.181
Historically, Christian theology and philosophy have at times experienced an
uneasy relationship. For example, in the second century, Tertullian perceived Gnostic
errors in his opponents‘ writings. Because he believed that these errors grew out of their
study of the natural philosophies, he was inclined to condemn all philosophy that tried to
intertwine itself with church teaching.
What indeed has Athens to do with Jerusalem? What concord is there between the
Academy and the Church? Away with all attempts to produce a mottled
Christianity of Stoic, Platonic, and dialectic composition!182
Contemporary thinkers often quote Tertullian‘s famous statement regarding the
relationship between religion and other modes of describing the world, like science and
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secular philosophy. But as Hauerwas notes, Tertullian‘s contemporaries developed
effective apologetic strategies founded on natural observation. Even Tertullian admits
that appealing to the scripture is of limited value to settle a controversy.183 But there is at
least one significant difference between the early Christian schema and the contemporary
context. In the past, the apologist was ever-seeking ways to make the Christian faith
intelligible to non-believers. Today‘s situation, according to Hauerwas, is that many
theologians temper their language in order to be admitted to the discourse, trying to
locate the ―essence‖ of the religion free from its ―embarrassing particularistic aspects.‖184
Hauerwas advises Christian theologians to avoid policy discourse and the seduction of
―relevance.‖185
Moreover, the tandem metaphors of ―pilgrim‖ and ―home‖ help to describe the
difficulty in maintaining particularity, especially in ethical discourse. In many cases the
foundational claims of religion have had difficulty finding a home in the world. As Paul
Tillich notes, theological ethics is often given shelter as a ―poor relative‖ to ethics for its
instrumentality, namely to help people to be good, but is evicted quickly when its
anthropological claims exceed secular ethics‘ needs.186 By contrast, Cahill uses the
metaphor of a domicile both to describe the uncomfortable relationship among religious
and other stances, and to encourage a more vibrant participation in the public realm to
engage the issues that bring them together in public discourse.187
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These cautions notwithstanding, by employing Gustafson‘s modes of discourse,
coupled with her own fifth participatory mode, Cahill demonstrates the conjunctive rather
than disjunctive relationship between faith language and faith commitment. Arguments
(especially moral arguments) that are laden with faith language will be most convincing
those who share similar beliefs. Specific Catholic claims often entail a certain field
variance that gives considerable weight to the privileged sources of Sacred Scripture and
Sacred Tradition. Simultaneously, though, many arguments in Catholic moral theology
are grounded in the invariant sources of reason and experience, in that both are common
to all persons. For instance, the Natural Law tradition employs reason and observation in
arriving at an appreciation for both primary purposes and ultimate ends of material
phenomena. Moreover, while it is claimed that natural law principles are universal, they
do not require divine revelation in order to be known, in that they are accessible to all
reasonable people. Likewise, the Catholic bioethical tradition frequently revises positions
in light of refinements in healthcare delivery and availability of medical technology. For
example, CST is grounded in the human experiences of suffering and oppression, and the
compassion they engender. It prohibits the common good from being undermined by any
one particular interest. In so doing, Catholic social ethicists might argue that maximizing
health in a community will be undermined by pursing the relief of suffering individuals
with highly technological, relatively rare, and extremely expensive medical equipment or
genetic intervention.188
Looking ahead to public discourse regarding germline enhancement (See
Epilogue) and procreative technologies in general, faith commitment can transcend faith
language. On the one hand, firm commitment to ethical discourse encompasses critical
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self-reflection (via narrative discourse), significant engagement (via policy discourse) and
policy-level critique (via prophetic discourse). Thus, CST can commit itself to public
discourse on this topic in a way that emphasizes solidarity, even though the root
metaphor of that commitment is the Catholic belief that humanity is created in God‘s
image (Gen 1:27-28).
On the other hand, because all parties involved in this discourse seek resolution
about enhancement of the human person, discussion might be best-informed by steering it
along the natural law tradition insofar as it is conceived in pragmatic terms and informed
by particular contexts. At least two reasons back this claim. First, the human person is
generally understood as complex and relational. This fact is confirmed by psychology
and anatomy, as well as theology. A holistic view of the person must be a primary focus
of public discussion. Second, despite a lack of consensus on notions of the common good
or other substantive issues, natural law, with its emphasis on reasoned observation, helps
to locate shared experience and values within socio-historical contexts.189 Cahill writes
A modest natural law moral claim requires an inductive judgment based on the
consistent elements in humanity‘s de facto physical, psycho-spiritual, and social
constitution – known experientially, refined critically and socially, and expressed in
generalizations.190
Thus, participants in public discourse do not need to agree on the ―ultimate purpose‖ of
humanity in order to agree on the primary good of ―this‖ action, which requires
immediate cooperation. As Jeffrey Stout notes, agreement on the immediate issue does
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not mean that all parties must agree for the same reason. 191 Or, as John Rawls puts it,
they do not necessarily have to agree ―all the way down.‖ 192 Similarly, Natural law
ethics can respect these differences when building consensus on the issue. As the
discussion surrounding human germline enhancement turns to the question of the
―natural‖ character of these enhancements, natural law ethics might have a vital role in
steering the conversation back to the person affected by the enhancement, and to the
society engaged in this future practice.

Natural Law Ethics and Consensus
Third, according to Cahill, there should be, if participation is properly ―catholic,‖
not only a countercultural edge to the contribution of religious ethics in the public sphere,
but also ―bridging language‖ to span the chasm between Christian and secular ethics. 193
This second-order language is helpful when there is no generalized notion of the common
good. Stout describes the language of rights as one such ―bridge dialect,‖ one that spans
opposing or unconnected parties in public discourse. The language of rights maintains
open channels for dialogue by providing a mediating vocabulary that is common to all
parties and by establishing a framework that is operable in public spheres (i.e.,
government agencies, federal courts, and public education).194 For example, in public
discourse regarding human rights, Christian communities under Islamic rule, like those in
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Pakistan, have been employing a second-order discourse of human rights, what some call
a ―bridging language,‖ which assists the more confessional, ―first-order‖ discourse of
their respective traditions.195
In the American context, though, the referent for ―rights,‖ particularly in the case
of procreative technologies, is individual rights. Couched in terms like ―reproductive
liberty‖ and ―ethical individualism,‖ those contemplating parenthood are the ones for
whom these ―rights‖ are often generated.196 In American bioethics, autonomy is often
privileged as the primary ethical principle.197 Even though she agrees with the usefulness
of ―rights talk,‖ Cahill envisions a more robust understanding of the relationship among
autonomy and other moral considerations, particularly justice. This caution is especially
warranted by CST, which seeks to counterbalance both extremes of individualism and
collectivism.
Furthermore, this relationship is vital to public moral discourse about
biotechnology in general, and human engineering in particular. For over a decade, Cahill
has argued that in ―principlism,‖ which for years dominated secular bioethics, the values
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implied in the principles of justice, autonomy, beneficence, and nonmaleficence are
interdependent. Citing Linell Cady, public moral life is understood as a macrocosm of the
atomistic individual. Alternatively, Cahill begins with the Catholic virtue tradition.198 She
reasons that justice, the Thomistic personal virtue of giving to each his or her due
implies a respect for the individual seen as part of a social whole within which
benefits are to be shared and harms avoided. Thus autonomy and distributive
justice should be treated together, as counterparts and neither can be isolated from a
consideration of what counts as a good for persons or society in the first place. 199
In a later work, Cahill asserts that justice ought to be the comprehending principle.200 So,
Cahill‘s conception and application of justice places individuals and the community in a
proper relationship that is a hallmark of her later writings – ―the common good.‖
The Catholic common-good tradition can bring to the public forum a viable and
persuasive concept of the common good as entailing full social solidarity,
participation, and empowerment, as well as the right to basic material and social
goods. Moreover, it can embody a concept of an inclusive common good in
specific narratives, image, and practices that capture the imagination and help
create the political will to change social structures and institutions.201
The vehicle for this change is participatory bioethical discourse. By applying the guiding
principles outlined herein, Catholic voices can engage in public moral discourse. They
can be fully self-aware of their position and defining the boundaries of their own actions
in light of their particular privileged sources of moral knowledge. More importantly,
outfitted with an integrative view of the human person, they can discern how to best
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deploy their arguments in a public setting. Finally, with the aid of natural law and its
practical reasoning in light of human experience, Catholic ethicists can effectively utilize
the primary language of the American political context, while simultaneously criticizing
the values implied in them. They can partner with those already at work in evaluating the
customary liberal emphasis on autonomy and ―rights talk.‖202 Together, these three
guiding principles offer Catholic voices and other religious participants a relevant,
effective, and transforming participatory strategy.

Conclusion to Chapter One
Lisa Sowle Cahill‘s arguments, as stated in the dissertation‘s introduction, are
formulated within the dual contexts of the Roman Catholic moral tradition and North
American philosophical tradition. The first section of this chapter has attempted to sketch
the contours of this complex by analyzing those aspects of both contexts that are most
influential to her work. Theologically, she is rooted in the Roman Catholic tradition and
often utilizes the sources and language of natural law ethics, which asserts that universal
moral norms may be discovered in light of human reason and experience. However, the
philosophical work of Mary Midgley, Albert Jonsen, and Stephen Toulmin have exerted a
considerable impact on Cahill‘s work throughout her career, and have helped her to
remain ever attentive to the particular contexts in which the natural law is expressed.
Moreover, the tradition of Catholic Social Teaching has also grounded her later
theological work in a tireless pursuit of advancing the common good. While she tends to
emphasize this feature of CST over and above the other affirmations of human dignity
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and relationality, both are fully present yet understated. Across the considerable topical
span of her essays, the foundational principles of CST are elemental to her claims.
Also, because her scholarship is grounded in CST, it requires that Cahill engage
the modern world in dialogue. Thus, the latter section has analyzed her positive argument
in support of participatory theological bioethics. Her claim is rooted in the premise that
all moral arguments are tradition-bound, and as such, religious traditions must not be
excluded from the public forum. Cahill also notes that theologians have been somewhat
marginalized as a function of the growing secularization in bioethics. As the field has
considered nonreligious variants for its principles, Catholic theologians have struggled to
articulate positions that are relevant while attempting to be faithful to their own moral
tradition. To avoid the pitfalls of irrelevance in the discourse on the one side and
departure from one‘s religious tradition on the other, she prescribes three guiding
principles that serve to shape a responsible and effective participation.
Toward the end of this chapter, some of the direct quotes from Cahill contained
reference both to public discourse and to justice. Their proximity to one another
demonstrates the significant but understated importance of justice as a comprehending
concern throughout her writings. To date she has written no substantive account of justice
itself, and in various contexts she refers to justice as a value, a virtue, or a principle.
Thus, the aim of this dissertation is to distill from her writings a more complete
understanding of her conception of justice, the bulk of which will be accomplished in
Chapter Four. In order to situate the analysis of justice in Cahill‘s work, the dissertation
now turns to a study of justice in the complexity of both contexts from which she writes.
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The following two chapters consider the work of diverse representative voices from both
the secular philosophical and Roman Catholic traditions, respectively.
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CHAPTER 2
JUSTICE IN THREE WESTERN PHILOSOPHICAL TRADITIONS

The next two chapters identify six accounts of justice that are significant to understanding
Cahill‘s writings in Chapter Four and offer a general discussion of each. The
dissertation‘s focus on Cahill‘s thought makes it neither feasible nor necessary to offer a
comprehensive account of justice in either the Roman Catholic or Western philosophical
traditions. Rather, it follows the example of scholars like Karen Lebacqz and Mary
Elsbernd, who give detailed but representative philosophical and theological accounts of
justice in their respective writings.1 The purpose in taking this approach is to help to
situate the forthcoming analysis of Cahill‘s writings on justice within their theological
and philosophical contexts.
The present chapter opens with sketch of the Western philosophical terrain with
respect to three secular accounts of ―justice.‖ While Cahill writes from within the Roman
Catholic moral tradition, her work often addresses others writing outside of theological
contexts. This representative survey helps to locate Cahill‘s writings within a
contemporary philosophical frame of reference. The first comes from John Rawls and his
1

Karen Lebacqz, Six Theories of Justice (Minneapolis: Augsburg Publishing
House, 1986); and Mary Elsbernd and Reimund Bieringer, When Love Is Not Enough: A
Theo-Ethic of Justice (Collegeville: The Liturgical Press, 2002). By contrast, I am not
attempting to write a treatise on justice, as others have done recently. See Michael
Sandel, Justice: What‟s the Right Thing to Do? (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux,
2008); and Nicholas Woltersdorff, Justice: Rights and Wrongs (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 2008).
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conception of justice as fairness, particularly with respect to distribution of goods. For
Cahill, distributive justice is a hallmark of social justice; in turn, social justice is a vital
component of her later bioethical writings.2 Since Rawls deliberately sets out to write a
theory of justice, his work is essential to the discussion of Cahill‘s work. Moreover, with
the revision of his theory in Political Liberalism, Rawls‘ work is more closely connected
to Cahill‘s, which is situated similarly within a religiously and ideologically diverse
democratic society. The second account is offered by Alasdair MacIntyre, who laments
the contemporary use of a moral vocabulary with no real connection to its historical
roots, and seeks to retrieve a communal morality, with justice as a prominent and guiding
virtue for that community. It should be noted that Cahill has not explicitly engaged
MacIntyre‘s thought in some time. Nonetheless, she makes several arguments regarding
justice and the communal context, sometimes similar to his claims and other times quite
different.3 Thus, MacIntyre‘s contribution, critically considered, lends itself toward
locating Cahill‘s writings on justice along this philosophical trajectory. The third account
is put forth by Michael Walzer. His writings on justice in a pluralistic society apply
directly to the contemporary American context. His commitment to public discourse
likewise complements Cahill‘s work on public discourse, which was discussed in the
previous chapter and will be reprised in Chapter Four.4

2

Cahill, Bioethics and the Common Good (Milwaukee: Marquette University
Press, 2004), 43-44. See also, ―Genetics, Theology, Common Good,‖ Genetics, Theology,
and Ethics: An Interdisciplinary Conversation, ed. Lisa Sowle Cahill (New York:
Crossroad, 2005), 123.
3

e.g., Cahill, Bioethics and the Common Good; see also Theological Bioethics,

43-69.
4

Michael Walzer, Politics and Passion (New Haven: Yale University Press,
2004), 128-130.
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This chapter surveys the respective works of Rawls, MacIntyre, and Walzer as
they relate to justice. Individually and collectively, each writer‘s positions are addressed
in Cahill‘s work on justice, which will be analyzed in Chapter Four. Individually, each
account contributes to the dissertation‘s goals because they either attempt to define
justice (as demonstrated in Rawls‘ earlier work), or apply the term in a significant way
(as in Walzer, MacIntyre, and the later work of Rawls). Collectively, their work is
significant because Cahill‘s writings resonate well with these three accounts. She often
cites their work, and occasionally employs the term ―justice‖ in a manner similar to these
three scholars.
The attempt to offer some account of justice within (or in spite of) the pluralist
context is a hallmark of the writings of Rawls, MacIntyre, and Walzer. This section is
divided into three parts in order to survey and analyze their work separately. Structurally,
the three constitutive parts of this chapter are similar in that each begins with a survey of
the scholar‘s seminal or foundational early project, followed by an analysis of their later
writings, and finally a demonstration their explicit contribution to the analysis of Cahill‘s
conception of justice in Chapter Four.

John Rawls: Justice as Fairness
No study of justice in contemporary liberal society could be complete without a
consideration of the work of John Rawls. In fact, the sheer amount of analysis and
criticism of Rawls‘ earlier work, A Theory of Justice (hereafter Theory), spurred him to
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reconsider significant portions of his work.5 Therefore, this dissertation draws largely
upon Rawls‘ claims in Political Liberalism, which represents his revision of Theory.6
While he maintains the basic principles of liberty and difference (described herein),
which was the prominent feature of Theory, Rawls‘ later work attempts to place them
within the disparate worldviews and particular commitments of the intellectually,
religiously, and culturally diverse Western democratic societies, particularly North
Atlantic nations, those to whom Cahill also addresses the overwhelming majority of her
essays.
There are three parts to this discussion of Rawls‘ work. The first part offers a brief
synopsis of Rawls‘ earlier Theory, and situates his later work within the context of the
current study. The next portion summarizes two prominent features of Rawls‘ later work:
his political conception of justice as ―fairness‖ and its corresponding idea of ―overlapping
consensus.‖ Following this summary, this consideration of Rawls concludes with a
cursory examination of some significant yet understated features of Rawls‘ work as they
relate to the forthcoming analysis of Cahill‘s work.

5

John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971).
Rawls‘ early work has a host of critics and supporters. For a concise summary of the
major points of contention in Theory, see Karen Lebacqz, Six Theories of Justice, 40-49.
For a libertarian response, see Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia (New York:
Basic Books, 1974), 183-204. For a feminist critique, see Jane English, ―Justice between
Generations,‖ Philosophical Studies 31 (1977): 91-104. For a communitarian critique, see
Michael J. Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 1982). Later, Sandel revises his essay to include a response to Rawls‘
Political Liberalism.
6

Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996).
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A Theory of Justice
Rooted in the social-contract tradition of Jean-Jacques Rousseau and
deontological liberalism of Immanuel Kant, Rawls argues in Theory that a well-ordered
society implies both cooperation and competition among its citizens. How does one draw
a line between the two? Rawls constructs a thought experiment that helps to derive the
society‘s principles of justice, which he calls the first virtue of its social institutions.7 For
a proper and fair deliberative process, he begins by ―calibrating‖ the scales of social
justice through what he calls the ―original position.‖ In the original position, all citizens
begin deliberation under a metaphorical veil of ignorance, so called because they will not
know where they will be in the society when the veil is lifted.8 Even though they are
cognizant of society‘s basic workings (e.g., with respect to commerce and politics),
citizens will not know their age, race, gender, education level, family relationships, or
other socioeconomic factors that that they might be able to exploit for their own gain. In
short, the power of privileged knowledge is subtracted from the original position.
In the context of an enlightened self-interest among citizens, coupled with each
one‘s mutual disinterest in the affairs of others (i.e., each citizen is left alone to pursue
her or his own life goals), their deliberation yields two principles which are necessarily
just, because they are rooted in fairness to all.9 The first secures the equal right of all
citizens to as much basic liberty as possible. It also assigns the basic duties of each
citizen in a similarly equitable manner. The second principle accounts for the social and
economic inequalities that a competitive society will generate over time. Such
7

Rawls, A Theory of Justice, Revised Ed. (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of
Harvard University Press, 1999), 3.
8
Ibid., 11.
9

Ibid., 52-53.
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inequalities are just, if they are arranged to be of advantage to all, especially the least
well-off in the society. Additionally, all offices and occupations are open to those with
the requisite talent with no regard to social class.10 The first principle is the Liberty
Principle; the second is the Difference Principle. Taken together, these two principles will
yield the social and economic arrangements that constitute a well-ordered society.
Furthermore, the two principles stand in serial or lexical relation to one another.
In other words, the liberty principle may be constrained only for the purpose of garnering
more liberty for all. One may not distribute social and economic goods according to the
Difference Principle without first satisfying the Liberty Principle.11 For example, one
may not correct social or economic inequalities through utilitarian modes that allow
misery for a few while increasing happiness in the aggregate.12 In addition to overcoming
this moral component of justice, Rawls asserts that the serial ordering is a practical
method which avoids the thorny (perhaps insuperable) problem of having to balance the
two principles when they seem to conflict with one another.13
In Rawls‘ theory of justice, the concept of right is prior to that of the good. 14 The
political conception of justice guides one‘s public life; comprehensive doctrines inform
10

Ibid., 63.

11

Ibid., 220.

12

Ibid., 13.

13

Ibid., 37-38.

14

―The priority of the right means that the principles of political justice impose
limits on permissible ways of life, and hence the claims citizens make to pursue ends that
transgress those limits have no weight,‖ Ibid., 174. The distinction goodness/rightness
distinction is also significant in recent Catholic moral theology. It is grounded in
Thomistic natural law ethics; see Summa Theologiae I-II, q.9. On the one hand, Bernard
Hoose maintains a similar distinction to Rawls throughout a lengthy portion of his text;
see Chapter Three of Proportionalism: The American Debate and Its European Roots
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one‘s private sphere. Consequently, a striking feature of Theory is Rawls‘ account of
deliberative rationality.15 Rawls claims that deliberative rationality is the best method for
individuals to form life plans. In a well-ordered society, an individual‘s account of the
good conforms to publicly-recognized principles of rightness, and there are myriad ways
to formulate a life plan that is consistent with this conception of justice. Moreover,
rational deliberation is subject to the various constraints of knowledge and opportunity
costs of planning. Thus, one can formulate a plan only to the point where he or she can
benefit from such planning.16 Afterward, one must execute the plan and revise it as
circumstances dictate.
This contingency on an individual level stands in stark contrast to the deliberative
process that Rawls describes at the outset on a societal level when it comes to choosing
the two principles of justice. The ―back and forth‖ of describing the circumstances of the
original position is accounted for in the phenomenon of reflective equilibrium.17 Rawls
admits that the equilibrium itself might be unstable. Still, justification of the principles of
justice it yields depends on its mutual support by all parties in the original position.18 It
begs the question: why is an individual‘s life plan subject to revision, but not the
(Washington: Georgetown University Press, 1987). On the other, James Keenan (see
Chapter Three) argues that rightness is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for
goodness. With the exception of charity, the intention, end, and even virtuous by the
agent striving are located within rightness, not goodness. See Keenan, Goodness and
Rightness in Thomas Aquinas‟ “Summa Theologiae” (Washington: Georgetown
University Press, 1992), 174. It seems difficult to segregate one‘s public and private lives
as radically as demanded by Rawls‘ political conception of justice.
15

Rawls, A Theory of Justice, Revised Ed. 365-372.

16

Ibid., 367.

17

Ibid., 18.

18

Ibid., 507.
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society‘s principles of justice? It is this question, among others, that Michael Walzer
takes up within the context of a complex pluralism, and will be fleshed out in the
concluding section of this chapter. For now, the dissertation departs from a direct
discussion of Rawls‘ Theory to his later work in Political Liberalism, which attempts to
revise a few major problems in the former while still maintaining its foundational
conception of justice.

Political Liberalism
In Political Liberalism, Rawls states at the outset that his earlier project attempted
to highlight both his endorsement of the social contract and its superiority to utilitarian
senses of justice. The problem, Rawls notes, is that Theory made no adequate distinction
between justice as moral virtue and justice as political conception. The distinction, he
claims in Political Liberalism, is fundamental. As a result, it raises questions regarding
the stability of the political community he envisions in Theory.19 Rawls‘ questions
demonstrate a political rather than metaphysical grounding for his conception of justice.
In doing so, Rawls differentiates his project from Enlightenment and Modern
thinkers, all of whom were seeking universal, rational alternatives to the claims of
religious authorities. Those philosophers sought secular claims that were no less
totalizing than the claims of religious doctrines. In fact, Rawls admits that a major
19

Rawls, Political Liberalism, xviii: ―How is it possible that there may exist over
time a stable and just society of free and equal citizens profoundly divided by reasonable
though incompatible religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines? Put another way: How
is it possible that deeply opposed though reasonable comprehensive doctrines may live
together and all affirm the political conception of a constitutional regime? What is the
structure and content of a political conception that can gain the support of such an
overlapping consensus? These are among the questions that political liberalism tries to
answer.‖
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shortcoming in Theory was to presume a particular comprehensive doctrine (i.e., Kantian
liberalism) as a prerequisite to the stability of the society which he envisioned. 20 Rawls
defines a ―comprehensive doctrine‖ as one which ―includes conceptions of what is of
value in human life, and ideals of personal character, as well of ideals of friendship and
of familial and associational relationships, and much else that is to inform our conduct,
and in the limit to our life as a whole.‖ 21 In particular, ―comprehensive doctrines‖
include cognitive and value claims of concrete religious traditions, particularly JudeoChristian precepts that permeate the Western democratic regimes to which Rawls
addresses his work.22 At the same time, major secular philosophical ideas, especially
deontological and utilitarian liberalism, are likewise covered under the umbrella term of
―comprehensive doctrine.‖
To solve this problem from Theory, Rawls asserts that political liberalism is not a
comprehensive doctrine itself.23 Rather than taking a stand on the classic dichotomous

20

Ibid., xl.

21

Ibid., 13.

22

There is a palpable tension in Rawls‘ work between ―liberal‖ and
―fundamentalist‖ contexts for religion. In his treatment of reasonable comprehensive
doctrines, he includes religious views that offer an account of ―free faith.‖ ―Here I shall
suppose – perhaps too optimistically – that, except for certain kinds of fundamentalism,
all the main historical religions admit of such an account and thus may be seen as
reasonable comprehensive doctrines.‖ Ibid., 170. Happily, the religious claims described
within this dissertation, with its encouragement of public discourse and its theological
notion of the ―common good,‖ seem to fall within Rawls‘ spectrum of ―reasonableness.‖
23

Rawls‘ revised claim is still criticized especially by feminist and
communitarian thinkers. For instance, Susan Moller Okin argues that Political Liberalism
devotes even less attention to the family as basic subject of justice than Theory. Okin
charges that Rawls equivocates with two contradictory claims: 1. That the family is the
basic structure in society; and 2 That the family is nonpolitical. See Okin, ―Political
Liberalism, Justice, and Gender,‖ Ethics 105 (October 1994): 26-27; cf. Rawls, Political
Liberalism, 137. Also, Michael Sandel contends that justice has an ―unavoidable
judgmental aspect.‖ His raises three objections to Rawls‘ political liberalism: 1. It is not
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questions of moral foundations (i.e., particular or universal epistemology, external or
internal source, and external or internal motivation), as he did in Theory, Rawls states
that his view accepts the second part of each question simply to construct a political
conception of justice for a stable constitutional regime.24 Toward this practical end,
Rawls argues for a freestanding conception of justice as fairness, which is engendered by
an ―overlapping consensus.‖ This consensus is drawn from the disparate worldviews and
divergent practices encouraged by various comprehensive doctrines, all of which work
within a given social system.25 Rawls attempts to make his aim clear in his later work by
stating that political liberalism ―offers no specific metaphysical or epistemological
doctrine beyond what is implied by the political conception [of justice] itself.‖ 26 In doing
so, Rawls‘ revision of Theory is not so much an abandonment of its principles as it is a
always reasonable to forego one‘s comprehensive doctrine for a political end; 2. If there
is a ―fact of reasonable pluralism,‖ as Rawls claims, then there is also reasonable variance
with regard to conceptions of justice in society; and 3. Public reason, if bereft of
comprehensive doctrines, actually diminishes effective public deliberation. See Sandel,
Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, 2 ed. (New York: Cambridge University Press,
1998), 196-218.
24

Rawls, Political Liberalism, xxvi-xxvii.

25

Ibid., 10-13. In another work, Rawls defines the word practice as ―a sort of
technical term meaning any form of activity specified by a system of rules which defines
offices, roles, moves, penalties, defenses, and so on, and which gives the activity its
structure. As examples one may think of games and rituals, trials and parliaments,
markets and systems of property.‖ Rawls, ―Justice as Fairness,‖ in Collected Papers, ed.
Samuel Freeman (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001), 47, n.1.
26

Rawls, Political Liberalism, 10. Chapter One of the dissertation introduced
several instances of this overlapping consensus. Cahill argues that consensus is possible,
since public discourse is a meeting ground for diverse moral traditions; Cahill, ―Can
Theology Have a Role in ‗Public‘‘ Bioethical Discourse?‖ 11. Jonsen and Toulmin call
this consensus a ―locus of certitude;‖ Jonsen and Toulmin, 16-19. Jeffrey Stout
recommends bricolage, a synthesized construction of various rhetorical and ideological
flotsams that leaves behind its foundational sources; Stout, 74-79. His consensus is more
pragmatic than the former two examples. Regarding the implications of bricolage for
theology, see Stout, 169-175.
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reduction of its scope.27 Instead of invoking a comprehensive doctrine to which all must
agree in order to belong to this just society, the political conception of justice is a
freestanding module. Hence, it can be held by all citizens, regardless of the individual
comprehensive doctrine to which they subscribe.28
As a result, Rawls‘ two-fold political conception of justice is very similar to the
principles that he offers in Theory. First, ―each person has an equal claim to a fully
adequate scheme of equal basic rights and liberties, which schedule is compatible with
the same scheme for all; and in this scheme the equal political liberties, and only those
liberties, are to be guaranteed their fair value.‖ 29 Next, social and economic inequalities
are acceptable only under two conditions: ―first they are to be attached to positions and
offices open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity; and second, they are
to be to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged members of society.‖30 Each principle
applies to different parts of the basic structure of a just society.
[B]oth are concerned not only with basic rights, liberties, and opportunities, but
also with the claims of equality; while the second part of the second principle
underwrites the worth of these institutional guarantees.31
Thus, at the same time he outlines a political conception of justice, Rawls also argues for
an egalitarian, democratic form of liberalism.

27

―The distinction between political conceptions of justice and other moral
conceptions is a matter of scope: that is, the range of subjects to which a conception
applies, and the wider the content a wider range requires.‖ Rawls, Political Liberalism,
175.
28
29
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Ibid., 144-145.
Ibid., 5.
Ibid., 6.
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Rawls, ―Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical,‖ Philosophy and Public
Affairs 14, no.3 (Summer 1985), 228.
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How does this restatement of the principles of justice as fairness move from a
comprehensive doctrine in Theory to a political conception in Political Liberalism?
Rawls claims that they are justified by overlapping consensus between the freestanding
political conception of justice and the various comprehensive doctrines. Rawls argues in
another essay that in a well-ordered society, all citizens can agree on the same political
conception of justice, even though they do not agree for the same reasons, ―all the way
down.‖32 The overlapping consensus is further based upon what Rawls called ―public
reason.‖ This basis rests on a two-part claim. One, there are ―very great values‖
demonstrated by the political conception of justice, which are not easily overridden.
There is a congruence of, or at least no conflict among, these political values with regard
to the variety of comprehensive doctrines.33 Two, although Rawls‘ conception of justice
is political, strictly speaking, citizens still hold it as a moral conception.34 This moral
affirmation arises from the normative accounts of the good life and human action from
the various comprehensive doctrines of each citizen; citizens must support the political
conception for their own reasons.35 Utilizing public reason shifts Rawls‘ principles of
justice from a comprehensive doctrine to a political conception. The overlapping
consensus allows the political conception of justice as fairness to stand on no particular
metaphysical grounds, or perhaps, on all reasonable metaphysical grounds.
However, even though Rawls argues against the validation of any comprehensive
doctrine, he notes a problem with his position regarding the stability of a community

32

Rawls, Justice as Fairness, 32; cf. Nozick, 225.

33

Rawls, Political Liberalism, 168-169.

34

Ibid., 168.

35

Ibid., 147-148.
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constituted by this political conception of justice.36 He raises a potential objection that the
political community will not and cannot be stable if the parties come to the political
arrangement for the sake of self-interest over cooperation, or what is referred to as a
modus vivendi. The overlapping consensus as distinct from both a modus vivendi and a
constitutional consensus will be addressed in the next paragraph, but it is helpful here to
note that Rawls insists that the consensus is free of any comprehensive doctrine.
To this objection, we say that the hope of political community must indeed be
abandoned, if by such a community we mean a political society united in
affirming the same comprehensive doctrine. [But] This possibility is excluded by
the fact of reasonable pluralism together with the rejection of the oppressive use
of the state power to overcome it.37
Due to reasonable pluralism, political liberalism can accommodate a wide range of
conceptions of the good, even if those views are incommensurate with one another.
Political liberalism does not delve into the foundational commitments and values that
give rise to the differing accounts of the good, and is far more concerned with public
commitment to a justice which is engendered by the individual accounts of the good.
While the political conception of justice is far more limited in scope than its
comprehensive doctrinal counterpart in Theory, it is not to say that the overlapping
consensus is superficial. In fact, Rawls makes two distinctions to demonstrate the great
depth and binding capacity of the consensus. He argues that political liberalism is distinct
from both a modus vivendi and constitutional consensus for two reasons. First, the
overlapping consensus is distinct from what Rawls calls a modus vivendi.38 Here, Rawls
uses the case of a treaty between two nations with competing aims to illustrate the limited
36

Ibid., 146-147.

37

Rawls, Political Liberalism, 146.

38

Ibid., 147-148.
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function of a modus vivendi. Because a treaty -- and implicitly, any modus vivendi - is
focused narrowly upon particular circumstances, its terms of agreement are limited to the
issue of contention to allow for fair play between the parties. More importantly, the treaty
is contingent upon the belief that the agreeing parties will comply with its term. Thus, a
modus vivendi does not capture the depth of Rawls‘ principles. Only a deeply held
conception of justice (political or otherwise) will be able to restrain such action.
Second, the overlapping consensus is also distinct from a constitutional
consensus. It is important to note that Rawls claims that his conception of justice as
fairness is worked out for political, social, and economic institutions of society. By
―society,‖ Rawls means the basic structure of the modern constitutional democracy.39 On
the one hand, a constitutional consensus is similar to the overlapping consensus in that
both are political syntheses of comprehensive doctrines. On the other hand, the principles
by which any constitutional consensus is derived must be of necessity deeper than the
consensus itself.40 Furthermore, the overlapping consensus ―goes beyond political
principles instituting democratic procedures to include principles covering the basic
structure as a whole.‖41 Further still, even though the overlapping consensus is deeper
and broader in scope than a constitutional accord, Rawls also claims that the overlapping
consensus is also far more specific because of its core focus on society as a fair system of
cooperation, coupled with the notion of a free and equal citizenry over generations.42
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Rawls, ―Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical,‖ 225-226.

40

Rawls, Political Liberalism, 164.

41

Ibid., 164.
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Ibid., 167; see also Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, 24.
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It should be noted here that Rawls enumerates five ―fundamental ideas‖ that lend
themselves toward the political conception of justice. They are: society as a fair system of
cooperation, the idea of a well-ordered society, the basic structure of such a society, the
idea of the original position, and the idea of citizens as free and equal.43 While the
original position was analyzed deeply in Theory, and is still included as a fundamental
idea, it does not play as central a role in Political Liberalism as these other four.44
Related to the aims of this dissertation, it is interesting to point out two premises
that Rawls notes but does not address during the course of his argument in Political
Liberalism. First, he assumes a basic cooperation among members of the society, each of
whom works toward what he calls ―the common good,‖ even if they have different
conceptions of that good (resulting from the incommensurability of their respective
comprehensive doctrines). 45 He also presumes that a legal system must be in place to
secure the common good and offers a few examples of what its content might resemble:
―I assume a society has a conception of justice that meets this kind [of legal system that
secures basic human rights] cohering with the common good. Otherwise, we may not
have a society but something else.‖46 In light of his refusal to subscribe to a
comprehensive doctrine, it is understandable that his conception of ―the common good‖
is purposefully general in scope. Nonetheless, in order to select one of his concrete
examples (or any example), a more greatly evolved notion of the common good might be
required to make more than an arbitrary choice.

43

Rawls, Justice as Fairness, 24-25.
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Cf. Rawls, Political Liberalism, 22-29, 304-310.

45

Ibid., 42, n.44.

46

Ibid., 109-110, n.15.
88

Second, Rawls alludes to a lexically prior principle that requires citizens‘ basic
needs be met.47 On the one hand, he does not refer to the content of these ―basic needs.‖
On the other hand, it seems that he is referring to a schema that generates within each
citizen a set of positive rights that he or she can claim against the State.48 If the latter is
the case, then regardless of how limited these basic needs might be, Rawls‘ position
seems to conflict with certain comprehensive doctrines (e.g., Nozick‘s entitlement
theory) and legal systems that do not aim to meet those needs through government
intervention. This point raises an important question that this dissertation attempts to
answer in the final chapter. Given that Cahill‘s ―faith language‖ gives rise to a ―faith
commitment‖ (as described in Chapter One) and it is commitment brings one into public
discourse, at what point does one‘s participation in public discourse become an
inappropriate public expression of his or her comprehensive doctrine?
Looking ahead, Rawls‘ work also figures prominently in Chapter Four. While
Cahill occasionally cites Rawls in her work, she offers neither an endorsement nor a
refutation of his entire project. But, as this dissertation argues in that chapter, her
commitment to justice and public discourse might offer real content to Rawls‘ political
claims and a satisfactory corrective for some critics of Political Liberalism. For now, the
dissertation analyzes Alasdair MacIntyre‘s writings on justice and their contrast to
Rawls‘ political liberalism.

47

Ibid., 7.

48

The Second Vatican Council (see Chapter Three) argues for such positive
rights. See Gaudium et Spes, 26.
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Alasdair MacIntyre: Justice within a Community’s Moral Tradition
This section analyzes the writings of the prominent British philosopher Alasdair
MacIntyre. There are two purposes in addressing MacIntyre‘s work that relate to Cahill‘s
context. The first is his critique of modern liberalism, which is found especially in his
work from the 1980s, like After Virtue and Whose Justice? Which Rationality? (hereafter
Whose Justice), where he challenges the liberal notion that ―the good life‖ from a public
standpoint is unresolvable.49 He also disputes Rawls‘ reduction of the virtues to mere
sentiment.50 Many arguments in Cahill‘s essays are similar to MacIntyre‘s, though she
makes them independently from or at least without direct reference to him. Not
infrequently, she also reaches conclusions that contrast with MacIntyre, in spite of her
own tradition-based point of departure. The second purpose considers the implications of
MacIntyre‘s claim that tradition-dependent claims are not necessarily relativist in nature
in light of Cahill‘s arguments in support of theological voices participating in public
discourse from the previous chapter.51 Her argument‘s second premise – that all
participants speak from a tradition – demonstrates her appreciation for the pluralist
context of contemporary Western society without reducing it to relativism.52 At the same
time, MacIntyre further analyzes various kinds of public discourse within a community.
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He distinguishes them in a way that is fruitful for the dissertation‘s later chapters.53
Chapter Four also summarizes Cahill‘s criticism of liberalism, and its relevance to her
understanding of justice.
This section of the chapter has two major parts. The first summarizes MacIntyre‘s
project in After Virtue and Whose Justice, especially his claims regarding ethics within
the living tradition of a politically-robust community. The second analyzes his account of
the virtues, particularly his conception of justice, in these two works. These essays offer
both a critique and an alternative to Rawls‘ political liberalism.

After Virtue and Whose Justice?
What follows here is a selective reading of MacIntyre‘s two most influential texts.
They are selective because at no point does Cahill ever engage MacIntyre‘s entire corpus,
but she does probe his claims in After Virtue. Hence, no effort is made here to detail the
evolution of MacIntyre‘s thought from his early analytical writings on Marxism toward
these later texts, since they do not relate to Cahill‘s work. As with the preceding section
on Rawls‘ political liberalism, this analysis of MacIntyre is designed to locate Cahill‘s
notion of justice within the currents of contemporary philosophical and theological
streams. As such, the following paragraphs outline three concepts distilled from this
reading of MacIntyre: the ―grave state of disorder‖ in moral discourse today, the
―invention‖ of the moral individual by Enlightenment thinkers, and the ―transformation‖
of liberal ideas into a liberal tradition.
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The opening chapters of After Virtue attempt to name the root problem that
MacIntyre describes as a state of ―grave disorder‖ with regard to public moral
discourse.54 For example, in his analysis of two contrasting moral methods – deontology
and utilitarianism – he calls attention to two key features of the problem.55 The first is the
conceptual incommensurability of competing moral arguments. On the one hand, there is
no basis for rational discernment between the notion of equality of persons and that of
liberty for them. The former treats persons with obligatory respect, while the latter
weighs consequences of proposed actions. On the other hand, each representative of these
methods has in fact reached a conclusion in his or her mind regarding the right course of
action. In spite of their corresponding personal convictions, neither can, in turn, convince
the other of the grounds for his or her claim. One argues that if the moral rules are
rational, then they must be uniformly binding upon for all rational beings.56 But another
objects that if the rules do not attend to consequences, then they can undermine
competing values that the rules seek to uphold. Even if they were to agree upon an
action‘s moral rightness (or wrongness), the participants would still disagree on their
reasons for calling it such. In cases of conflict, the disagreement is interminable. This
conundrum arises because both root their claims within the authority of an impersonal
rationality.
Consequently, MacIntyre makes a startling argument: emotivism, not rationality,
is the basis for moral decision-making from the Enlightenment period into contemporary
society. MacIntyre demonstrates that the prevailing liberal conception of the ―good‖ is
54
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simply the appellation of a simple, indefinable property. It is also a major premise of
Rawls‘ argument for reasonable pluralism. ―Right,‖ then, simply means the best course of
action (a conclusion to which Rawls would not subscribe), and include personal and
aesthetic enjoyments as the highest imaginable goods.57 Because of the
incommensurability of rival traditions, each side must account for these different social
and moral views. In contemporary moral debates, the contrasting representative voices
tend to be interpreted in terms of pluralism.58 Lacking a rational discriminant for a
definitive truth claim, MacIntyre argues that this gives rise to a kind of ―academic
dualism.‖59 Moreover, the bifurcation of truth and value is a product of the catastrophic
failure of the Enlightenment project. Thus, academic, purportedly ―value-free‖ methods
fail to identify this dualism as a shortcoming.60 In other words, truth has been displaced
by psychological effectiveness.61 Perhaps efficacy can be located in an experience of
satisfaction that comes from achieving consensus on a particular moral issue.
Nonetheless, overall satisfaction must be measured aggregately among all individual
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experiences, divorced from the potential human good that was achieved by consensus in
the first place.62
After sketching the contours of moral thinking from the Enlightenment through
the Modern period, MacIntyre devotes the bulk of After Virtue‟s middle chapters to
describing the complexities of divorcing the moral agent from his or her inherited modes
of thought and praxis. MacIntyre notes that the task of the Enlightenment since Kant has
consisted primarily in a human striving to think for oneself, rather than in conformity
with the prescriptions and proscriptions of some seemingly external authority.63
Enlightenment thinkers gave rise to the Modern ―invention of the self.‖ 64 This
detachment has come at the cost of authoritative content for the autonomous agent‘s
moral claims. The meaning and use of traditional moral language, now divorced from the
cultures and societies which first uttered them, are separated by an unbridgeable chasm.65
Thus, moral incommensurability is itself the product of a new historic conjunction: the
point at which individuals attempted to achieve moral thought without reference to its
moral legacy.
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As a result, new vocabulary soon emerged in the moral lexicon to describe the
Enlightenment‘s landscape. MacIntyre outlines three nascent concepts: human rights,
political protest, and psychological unmasking. With respect to rights, he strongly claims
that they simply cannot exist in this new framework, except in some utilitarian mode of
thinking.
The truth is plain: there are no such rights, and belief in them is one with belief in
witches and in unicorns…By ―rights‖ I do not mean those rights conferred by
positive law or custom on specified classes of person; I mean those rights which
are alleged to belong to human beings as such and which are cited as a reason for
holding that people ought not to be interfered with in their pursuit of life, liberty,
and happiness. 66
MacIntyre‘s allusion to the ―unalienable rights‖ explicitly enumerated in the Declaration
of Independence seems to place him in opposition to the entire liberal tradition. Despite
many critics on this very point, his subsequent work expresses no effort to placate them.67
One example is found in a 1991 article, where he refers to the ―inadequacy and the
66
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sterility of the modern idiom and rhetoric of rights.‖68 Another is his 1999 biological
account of the virtues, where there is a conspicuous absence of rights talk.69 It is
important to note, though, that his rejection of human rights is a necessary conclusion of
his thesis that discourse has lost its grounding in the Aristotelian-Thomistic morality of
the past.70 Only a society so ordered could ground such human rights, since they had an
internally coherent account of the good.
Regarding protest, the interminable nature of contemporary moral debate implies
(MacIntyre employs a stronger word: ―ensures‖) that protestors rarely have anyone else
to talk to but themselves. This is not to say that protest cannot be effective, just that it
cannot be rationally so. 71 Unmasking, which is a later, Freudian term, describes the
superego as an inherited morality from which the agent must be freed. Nonetheless,
theory is required to support observation, and vice versa, just as John Stuart Mill‘s
―experiments in living‖ give content to his utilitarian theory to which many contemporary
thinkers now subscribe.72
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Moreover, MacIntyre points out that the ―mock rationality‖ of debate masks the
arbitrary nature of will and power as its participants seek consensus.73 This insight leads
him to a dichotomy, which is the eponymous title of After Virtue‘s ninth chapter:
Nietzsche or Aristotle? He begins the chapter with a description of the ―vulgarized‖
nature of the moral culture in which Friedrich Nietzsche wrote; morality has become
generally available to all in society, but as ghosts of their defunct ancestors.74 In
MacIntyre‘s analysis, Nietzsche‘s central thesis is that all rational defense of morality
fails. Thus, morality must be explained in terms of the non-rational will.75 He positively
appraises Nietzsche‘s project, insofar as the latter was the first to remove the mask of
rationality from Modern moral discourse.76 Modern moral terms like ―good,‖ or ―right,‖
or even ―obligation‖ have become as arbitrary as an ancient one like ―taboo.‖77 Nietzsche
provides MacIntyre a starting point to explain what he perceives to be the incoherence of
contemporary moral utterances. From the standpoint of moral individualism, the self is
simply what the self chooses to be.78 Somehow, he or she can detach himself or herself
from social and historical roles. In the realm of choice, there is at the same time a
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presumption that the agent has the means (i.e., the will and power) to see the chosen
action through and to enjoy the satisfaction of its successful completion.79
MacIntyre‘s initial defense of Nietzsche turns on the question: was it right that the
Enlightenment project should have been undertaken in the first place? By accepting the
cognitive claims of the Enlightenment, many thinkers (including and especially
Nietzsche) have rejected the teleological and communal traditions of its predecessors.80
What once seemed to be appeals to rational objectivity turned out in the final analysis to
be expressions of volitional subjectivity. Thus, MacIntyre takes Nietzsche to task for
what the former takes to be an unwarranted, illegitimate leap from a descriptive statement
about moral judgments in his day to the prescriptive nature of morality as such.81
MacIntyre concludes this chapter by claiming that the problem is not a choice
between two contrasting ethical theories, but a question about two mutually-exclusive
ways of life. Either one must follow the Enlightenment project through, with its terminus
in Nietzsche, or one must admit that the project should have never been undertaken.
Clearly, MacIntyre accepts the latter part of the proposition. In the second part of this
section, the dissertation‘s analysis of MacIntyre‘s will turn once again to After Virtue‘s
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account of the virtues, especially justice. Before doing so, it is necessary to follow his
enquiry regarding the translation of these liberal streams of thought into the living
tradition of liberalism today.
In Whose Justice, MacIntyre continues upon a theme that began in After Virtue. A
well-ordered tradition is partially constituted by conflict regarding the goods which give
to that tradition its purpose.82 In this later work, MacIntyre reiterates this claim.
The conclusion to which the argument has so far led is not only that it is out of the
debates, conflicts and enquiry of socially embodied, historically contingent
traditions that contentions regarding practical rationality and justice are advanced,
modified, abandoned or replaced, but that there is no other way to engage in the
formulation, elaboration, rational justification, and criticism of accounts of
practical rationality and justice except from within some one particular tradition
in conversation, cooperation, and conflict with those who inhabit the same
tradition.83
MacIntyre understands that traditions are not monolithic in thought or practice. Instead,
they embody continuities of conflict, responding to rival claims, but always from within
the tradition.
If MacIntyre‘s claims from After Virtue are true, and liberal society has devolved
into a mélange of emotivist and freely-associating individuals, then the question can be
asked, how did liberalism become a lasting (if unviable) tradition?84 In the late chapters
of Whose Justice, MacIntyre attempts to answer this question. He offers three elements
which seem to correspond to the principles enumerated by John Rawls in Political
Liberalism. The three elements are: a pluralist notion of the good life, an individualist
practice of practical reasoning, and a just procedure for adjudicating conflict.
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Initially, MacIntyre points out that the liberal project was designed to provide a
three-fold framework (political, legal, and economic) in which all could assent to
rationally justifiable principles for the purpose of living together in society.85 This
daunting task, if it succeeds, allows individuals who embrace varying and even
competing notions about the good to participate peaceably in all spheres of public life.
―Reasonable pluralism,‖ as Rawls describes it, is part and parcel of contemporary society;
all can agree that there is no agreement, at least with respect to the good life which is to
be pursued.86
At the same time, participation in liberal pluralism entails a proscription: all must
refrain from attempting to transform the community toward illiberal ends. In fact, any
attempt to conform society toward something other than pluralism is, strictly speaking,
unreasonable. On this point, Rawls insists that ―human good is heterogeneous because the
aims of the self are heterogeneous.‖87 Moreover, a comprehensive doctrine like
MacIntyre‘s Thomist-Aristotelianism, with its singleness of purpose, must be regulated
within the society, precisely because its aims move far afield of reasonable pluralism.
Although to subordinate all our aims to one end does not strictly speaking violate
the principles of rationality…, it still strikes us as unnatural, or more likely as
mad.88
So, a corollary to the primary principle of pluralist notion of the good is the
mercantilization of goods and compartmentalization of dispositions with respect to public
participation.89 Goods -- and values, apparently - must be bargained for in liberal society.
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Another concept of the liberal tradition is the practical rationality of the newlyconstituted individual described in the previous paragraphs. MacIntyre begins this
discussion by comparing liberal rationality with some of its cultural predecessors.90 In
Aristotelian practical reasoning, it is the individual qua citizen of the polis who reasons.
In the Thomist tradition, it is the individual qua enquirer into her or his own good and
that of her or his community. In the Humean tradition, it is the individual qua propertied
(or unpropertied) participant in a society of a kind of mutuality or reciprocity. With
regard to liberalism, it is the individual qua individual who reasons. The strict,
unmodified predication of the individual infers an immediate problem in practical
reasoning. Lacking a context in which to reason, the reasoning individual must supply
some motivation for action, which MacIntyre locates in the individual‘s preference or
desire.91
From this point of departure, liberal practical reasoning proceeds in the public
realm through three stages. First, preferences are ordered by each individual and
enunciated in the public realm. Next, these individual desires are translated into practical
decisions, based upon the soundness of each individual‘s argument. Finally, the public
acts in order to maximize the satisfaction of those preferences in accordance with the
prior ordering. Preferences can and often do conflict, and it is necessary to devise a way
to adjudicate competing claims. It is in this third stage that utilitarian methods are
indispensable in public moral discourse.92
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What, then, is the function of justice in contemporary society? MacIntyre begins
by claiming that justice might be a rational consideration, but it is by no means necessary
in liberal society.93 It is in the first stage that individual preferences can be expressed in
one‘s own terms. Religious, non-religious, and rights language, rooted in the
comprehensive doctrines of each participant, supply the premises from which they argue.
Because of the incommensurability of those doctrines, however, there will be no
substantive agreement on their stated preferences. In tallying the preferences in order to
rank them, liberalism (as a tradition) must engage in debate about the principles of
justice. And even at this second stage, the full outcome remains inconclusive.
Nonetheless, consensus can be achieved with respect to the principles of justice. Thus,
the procedure justifies any inequalities in the eventual conclusion.
Liberalism thus provides a distinctive conception of a just order which is closely
integrated with the conception of practical reasoning required by public
transactions conducted within the terms set by a liberal polity. The principles
which inform such practical reasoning and the theory and practice of justice
within such a polity are not neutral with respect to rival and conflicting theories of
the human good. Where they are in force they impose a particular conception of
the good life, of practical reasoning, and of justice upon those who willingly or
unwillingly accept the liberal procedures and the liberal terms of the debate. The
overriding good of liberalism is no more and no less than the continued
sustenance of the liberal social and political order.94
In short, there is power at work in the liberal notions of public moral discourse, no less so
than in any other notion. And, like all other traditions, it cannot know in advance how
and in what condition it will emerge from its encounters with rival traditions.95
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Consequently, MacIntyre abandons any hope that a tradition, even one that has attempted
to divorce itself from all of its predecessors, can be found that is rationally defensible and
superior to ancient forms of moral and political thinking.96
Before moving to MacIntyre‘s detailed account of the virtues, it should be noted
that his critique of liberalism is not unproblematic. The final section of this chapter
explores Michael Walzer‘s thoughts on justice, and includes his response to MacIntyre
and other critics of liberalism. Nevertheless, MacIntyre‘s conception of justice is useful
both as a comparison for analysis of Cahill‘s tradition-dependent notions of justice and as
a contrast to Rawls‘ two-fold political conception of justice. MacIntyre also offers a
glimpse at what contemporary public discourse might look like within his context, and
this vision will be discussed in the following section as well.

MacIntyre‘s Account of the Virtues
In the conclusion to his chapter on Nietzsche, MacIntyre argues that, on the
modern view, the justification of virtue depends upon some prior scheme of rationally
justifiable rules and/or principles. If they become radically problematic, as MacIntyre has
argued they have, then so must the virtues which depend upon them. Instead of looking
to rules to justify the virtues, he asserts that the evaluative order should be reversed.97
Throughout the bulk of After Virtue‘s later chapters, MacIntyre analyzes the virtue
tradition from the ancient Greeks into the contemporary period. He demonstrates that
morality is embedded within the evolving social milieu of each living tradition. Despite
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the pessimism with which MacIntyre describes contemporary moral discourse and
practice, he offers a feasible solution by way of recovery of an Aristotelian virtue
tradition. ―If a premodern view of morals and politics is to be vindicated against
Modernity, it will be in something like Aristotelian terms or not at all.‖98 This section
explores MacIntyre‘s account of virtue with respect to his understanding of the
Aristotelian conception of virtue, the nature of the virtues as such, and, most especially,
the virtue of justice. With respect to the former two, MacIntyre‘s work stands in stark
contrast with the liberalism he critiques. With regard to the latter, MacIntyre provides a
strong criticism not only of Rawls‘ Theory, but also of its critics, many of whom share
the same moral and political presuppositions as Rawls.
Turning back momentarily to Friedrich Nietzsche, his ideal person was the
Overman, whom he envisioned as one who lived by pure will. 99 Curiously, MacIntyre
devotes very little space to discuss the Overman in After Virtue. Initially, it may be
because Nietzsche provides an inconvenient foil to MacIntyre‘s argument against
Modernity, to the degree that Nietzsche argues that humans in fact have a telos.100 His
―will to power‖ is tied to his claim that Western morality does not describe human beings
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as they really are. Therefore, they could never reach their ―highest potential power and
splendor.‖101 The will encompasses far more than a survival instinct; it calls human
beings to flourish by expansion, even at the expense of others.102 The Overman rules over
these others, and they glorify him over and above humanity, to a new relationship even
with nature. Nietzsche‘s thought contrasts with MacIntyre‘s interpretation of Aristotle not
only in its understanding of human nature, but also in its application of the virtues.
Whereas on Nietzsche‘s account, honor is the highest goal, for Aristotle it can be no more
than a secondary goal. Moreover, honor in Nietzsche‘s world can be afforded to only one
– the Overman. In Aristotle‘s reality, which is an honor culture, honor is due to all
persons by reason of their place in the social order. 103
In an Aristotelian account of the virtues, being a good person means being a good
citizen. Every human activity aims at some perceived good, a telos. The ―good‖ here is
defined in terms of specific human characteristics. At the same time, human beings have
a nature which is peculiar to the species, and this nature likewise has a specific telos.
Aristotle calls this human telos ―happiness‖ (eudaimonia). Thus, all action is aimed not
only toward the good to be drawn from the act itself, but also toward human happiness in
the pursuit of a complete human life. The virtues are those qualities necessary to enable
an individual to achieve happiness, and the lack of which to frustrate movement toward
the telos. 104
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This initial description of Aristotle contrasts with contemporary liberal morality in
two ways. First, the political nature of these Aristotelian goods means that all action is
expressive of more than just individual preferences or choices. They are tied to
communal life. Second, there is an overriding account of the human good, which cannot
be the case if one envisions a political structure free of comprehensive doctrines. These
are the positive contrasts that MacIntyre wishes to convey in his argument. But there are
negative contrasts as well. For example, Aristotle‘s system of virtues is elitist.105 For
instance, the wealthy possess certain virtues that the poor cannot. Moreover, Aristotelian
teleology presupposes a metaphysical biology that allows slavery, misogyny, and other
practices that are rightly abhorred in contemporary society.
MacIntyre also deals with these issues by way of historical analysis of the
subsequent virtue tradition found in Thomas Aquinas. Prior to doing so, he rejects
modern Aristotelian arguments that attempt to ―thin out‖ or generalize a notion of the
good and name it ―human flourishing.‖ Such notions ignore the deep conflicts and rival
traditions that give rise to these necessary tools of human flourishing on the Aristotelian
account and, more importantly, betray the relationship between the structure of the ethos
and that of the polis.106 Instead, he turns to the New Testament, Augustinian and
Thomistic traditions to demonstrate the correction to the Aristotelian tradition that arose
from its encounter with the Christian tradition over time. The Christian view of human
nature is no less teleological, though. The ―happiness‖ of Christianity is eternal
communion with a Trinitarian God. This shifting of the telos gives rise to new
―theological‖ virtues that are required for achievement toward that end (like faith, hope,
105

Ibid., 182.

106

Ibid., 162-163.
106

and love). Therefore, while the New Testament differs from Aristotle with regard to
content, the logical and conceptual structure of the virtues remains largely intact.107
MacIntyre goes on to describe the nature of the virtues, which are such that they
can be at home in two vastly different social and moral traditions.108 First, he insists that
virtues are secondary; no single virtue stands upon itself, for its own sake.109 These
virtues are required not only by the individuals who act within society, but also by the
community itself, if it is to remain a viable institution. In other words, the virtues are
functional. Next, MacIntyre describes three stages in the logical development of
Aristotelian virtue that can be sustained today. The initial stage requires a background
account of what MacIntyre calls a ―practice.‖110 It must be qualified here that, first of all,
MacIntyre does not mean to imply that the virtues are only exercised in the course of
practices, and, second of all, that practice is – like Rawls‘ use of it – a technical term to
contrast with its mundane usage (as in ―rehearsal‖). As such, MacIntyre‘s definition of
practice has three criteria: it must be complex, it must have internal goods, and it must
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have standards of excellence. For instance, his scheme includes farming and football as
practices, but he distinguishes them from acts like planting a vegetable or kicking a
football, even though both can be part of its corresponding practice.111 Internal goods are
those achieved from engagement in the specific practice, and only that practice. For
example, being a football player (or farmer, for that matter) might bring money, fame or
power to that person. Nonetheless, these goods are external to the practices so defined –
money and fame can be gained in manifold ways. Being consistently called upon at
critical moments in games to make a crucial play is both an internal good and a sign of
excellence. To call players or farmers as good or bad must have a clear standard for
calling them so and thereby removes emotivist tendencies of preference.112
At this point, MacIntyre offers a definition of virtue that belongs to his prior
concept of practice.
A virtue is an acquired human quality the possession and exercise of which tends
to enable us to achieve those goods which are internal to practices and the lack of
which prevents us from achieving any such good.113
While he distinguishes external goods from internal ones in certain practice, MacIntyre
takes care to note that some virtues are internal to all practices. Justice, courage and
honesty must be exercised in any practice.114 Justice relates to playing (or farming) fairly
with other practitioners in giving them their due. Honesty is required to face one‘s own
deficiencies in his or her practice, so that one can become more excellent at it. Finally,
courage is necessary to face one‘s critics, and submit to their constructive advice.
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The second concept central to MacIntyre‘s account involves a narrative order that
unifies the virtues for a single human person. In each life, there is no adequate means of
choosing among which practices to pursue. MacIntyre‘s use of narrative here is helpful
for unifying rather than bifurcating one‘s actions in light of conflicting claims. Striving
for excellence in the practices of an academic life, for example, can easily conflict with
those of being a good parent or worthy spouse. At times, there seems to be mutual
exclusivity among them. Using a narrative mode of explanation, MacIntyre claims that
one can understand human action in terms of rationally-grounded intention, rather than
emotivist preference.115
Adapting MacIntyre‘s analogy of gardening, one might ask the question: What is
Dennis doing?116 A variety of plausible answers can be given: he is writing a paper; he is
exercising his mind; he is earning a doctoral degree; or he is paradiddling on the
computer keyboard. Each answer implies a history that can be derived from them, and all
of them are true to a degree. But the answer is none of them. Dennis is in fact preparing
for career that offers myriad opportunities and benefits for himself and his family.
We identify a particular action only by invoking two kinds of context, implicitly if
not explicitly. We place the agent‘s intentions, I have suggested, in causal and
temporal order with reference to their role in his or her history; and we also place
them with reference to their role in the history of the setting or settings to which
they belong. In doing this, in determining what causal efficacy the agent‘s
intentions had in one or more directions, and how his short-term intentions
succeeded or failed to be constitutive of long-term intentions, we ourselves write
a further part of these histories. Narrative history of a certain kind turns out to be
the basic and essential genre for the characterization of human actions.117
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In order to understand the intentions of Dennis‘ actions, one must situate the perceived
action within the stream of intersecting narrative histories: of his academic and work life
and of academic life generally, in the history of Dennis‘ marriage and of the institution of
marriage (and even perhaps the Catholic sacrament of Marriage). MacIntyre claims that
actions become intelligible only in this way.
MacIntyre describes the ―narrative self,‖ who is constituted by a set of social roles
within various communities, vis-à-vis the ―emotivist self,‖ who is abstracted by liberal
notions of autonomy, reason.118 Earlier in his text, MacIntyre described the medieval
view of the person as essentially in via, embarked upon a quest or sojourn. The hero
seeks to achieve a goal or end, not just for its own sake, but in doing so can redeem all
that was wrong with his or her life up to that point.119 Here, he returns to that theme:
human life consists in a quest for the good. In turn, the conception of the good life is
identified as a quest for the good life.
Some conception of the good for man is required. Whence is such a conception
drawn? Precisely from those questions which led us to attempt to transcend that
limited conception of the virtues which is available in and through practices. It is
in looking for a conception of the good which will enable us to order other goods.
It is in the course of the quest and only through encountering and coping with the
various particular harms, dangers, temptations and distractions which provide any
quest with its episodes and incidents that the goal of the quest is finally to be
understood. A quest is always an education both as to the character of that which
is sought and in self-knowledge.120
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Not only do the virtues allow the sojourner to realize the internal goods of the quest and
its practices, but also they enable him or her to take the first step. Lacking the virtues, he
or she can be corrupted along the way, or easily distracted from the goal.
While the logic of MacIntyre‘s narrative account is patently circular, it is likely so
by design in light of MacIntyre‘s development of the virtues as it reaches the final stage:
a moral tradition. As stated before, he envisions traditions as embodied and partially
constituted by arguments about the goods which constitute themselves. Practices and
individual lives immerse themselves in these historical streams, which have been the
setting for these conflicts over generations at times.121 For instance, Rawls writes with a
stream of liberal thought that is often called ―social contract,‖ which could well be
considered a ―tradition.‖ Since in its early expressions, each writer (e.g., Hobbes, Locke,
and Rousseau) disclosed a clear conception of the human good beyond the political
structure of society. While human beings are essentially selfish, there are ways in which
they can tolerate one another in pursuit of their own goals.122 Rawls enters this stream of
tradition because he found that the social contract often falls prey to utilitarianism; justice
is at the mercy of instrumental political expediency.123 In Theory, he attempts to
ameliorate this shortcoming by integrating Kantian respect for persons into the social
contract. Put another way, Rawls is entering the ongoing argument of the social contract
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tradition. As a comprehensive doctrine, however, this Kantian addition limited the scope
of the society Rawls envisioned. In Political Liberalism, he attempts to overcome this
problem by reducing the scope of the principles of justice to political considerations. As
such, they do not entail a particular moral demand upon individuals to respect others. Or,
at least Rawls does not impose that reason.
Here is where the overlapping consensus and reflective equilibrium become vital
to this ―tradition.‖ The freestanding conception is held by those individuals for their own
reasons. The process by which this occurs is the overlapping consensus. But the
mechanism required in order to accomplish the consensus is the reflective equilibrium.124
In determining the principles of justice, there is interplay between the conditions of the
original position and one‘s judgments about them. Either can be revised. As described in
the previous section, Rawls places this equilibrium prior to the selection of principles. In
other words, the ―ongoing argument‖ about the original position must eventually become
―institutionalized‖ by the political conception of justice. At this moment, it seems that
Rawls no longer has a tradition in MacIntyre‘s sense of the term. Contra Rawls‘ claim
that justice is the first virtue of institutions, MacIntyre insists that practices should not be
confused with institutions. Each person, each practice is a part of the tradition, and
tradition can afford unity to individuals. The stream of tradition enters the person as
much as the person enters the stream. Hence, the circularity of MacIntyre‘s second stage.
Moving now to MacIntyre‘s conception of justice, it can be stated simply that he
subscribes to an Aristotelian-Thomistic notion of justice as rendering to others what is
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due to them. The simplicity betrays the complexity undergirding his argument. To
demonstrate this intricacy, MacIntyre turns to the classic exchange between John Rawls
and fellow American political philosopher Robert Nozick on justice. Their two positions,
borne out of their shared presuppositions of a liberal, capitalist society, are diametrically
opposed.125 On the one hand, Nozick claims that just entitlement (in acquisition or in
transfer) sets limits to the possibility of redistribution. On the other hand Rawls argues
that just distribution sets limits to legitimate entitlements. In both cases, the price of one
person‘s justice is paid by another.126
MacIntyre employs a three-fold argument against both positions. One, the
incompatibility of the arguments mirrors one another. Both offer reasonable arguments,
which are founded upon sound premises from their conclusions flow. Because of the
incommensurability of the rival positions, there is no way to decide between them on the
merits of argumentation alone. Two, there is an element, namely the concept of desert,
that neither party fully captures, but survives in classical traditions where the virtues were
central. In both schemes, individuals are prior to and independent of any social bonds
between them. By contrast, desert is intelligible only within the context of community.127
In Nozick‘s thought, desert is further ruled out, since entitlement can be traced to original
acquisition.128 Rawls allows for a ―common sense‖ view of desert, but argues that what is
deserved cannot be known prior to the principles of justice being generated. Once
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formulated, though, desert has been ruled out by Rawls‘ principles.129 Three, both share
some social presuppositions, which allows each to generate a general principle of
equality. Rawls makes need the primary principle; Nozick describes it as entitlement. The
former gives no attention to history; how the need arose is irrelevant. However, for the
latter, history is eminently germane with regard to establishing ownership.
MacIntyre‘s critiques of both positions help to develop the positive features of his
own claims about justice. Each seems to be complaining that the other‘s method is unjust.
Thus, they are arguing about injustice rather than justice, with no way to discern between
them. MacIntyre paints liberal society as individuals shipwrecked upon an uninhabited
island with other individuals.130 At length, he denies the concept of a neutral, traditionfree rationality that can give rise to an adequate account of justice.131 Furthermore,
MacIntyre‘s appeal to desert exhibits his allegiance to the Aristotelian-Christian view of
justice, which he calls a ―tribute to the residual power and influence‖ of that older
tradition.132
Finally, in After Virtue, MacIntyre opens up a further discussion regarding the
participation of religious voices in public discourse. They hail from tradition-laden
communities, which have both a deep sense of its own purpose and an ongoing
conversation about that purpose. A major issue from Chapter One of the dissertation was
the problem of translating the foundational religious concepts into vocabulary for use in
the public sphere. Here, MacIntyre makes a similar point. To enter into public debate
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enforces participation in a culture mélange, and requires the search for a ―common stock‖
of concepts and norms to which all may employ or appeal.133 He sees a clear and constant
danger of erosion of these communities. If his argument is correct that contemporary
society cannot hope to achieve any moral consensus, except by marginalizing such
voices, then it also entails a rejection of participation in the political order.134
However, in a later work, he offers a glimmer of hope by analyzing the limits of
toleration in public discourse.135 The essay attempts to answer two questions. The first
attempts to draw a line between justifiable intolerance and unjustified suppression. The
second seeks to describe the kinds of utterance, if any, that ought to be found
intolerable.136 MacIntyre begins with a classic liberal view of tolerance from John Locke.
Agents of the state promote general security and social order, but do not regulate beliefs,
except for the sake of security and order. Locke grounds this claim on premise that since
an individual cannot command his or her own opinions beyond the present, ―one cannot
give another power over that which he has no power himself.‖137 However, religious
beliefs seem to be distinguished from other types of belief. On the ground that they are
indefinitely contestable, religious beliefs may be justifiably restricted in ways that other
personal beliefs are not.
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MacIntyre turns to a discussion of the contemporary state, arguing that the state
not only is not neutral in matters of public conflict, but also is radically different from its
Enlightenment counterparts in at least three ways. First, Western politics has been largely
secularized. While this point is contestable, in light of the role that religion has played in
the American presidential elections since at least 2000, MacIntyre prefers to focus only
upon rival political conceptions of the good, which in fact are largely secularized.
Second, the scope of state activity has grown exponentially. It has become a vast network
of institutions, each with their own political values and internal goods. Third, the
activities of the state have global significance with regard to commerce and security. A
brief review of the current news headlines warrants his third claim.138
As a result of this secularized, magnified, transnationally-significant state activity,
MacIntyre states that particular cases are adjudicated by employing the concepts of utility
and rights. These procedures are justified by the three stages already described from
Whose Justice in the previous section.139 There is also a further tension between the
demands of the state and the market and those of the ―rational local community.‖
Because the state cannot be neutral with regard to these conflicting claims, local
communities must treat the agencies of the state with an ―unremitting suspicion.‖ For that
reason, the state must remain tolerant of all forms of local public discourse.
So by a very different route we have arrived at very much the same conclusion as
that reached both by classical liberals and by modern liberals: the state must not
be allowed to impose any one particular conception of the human good or identify
138
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one such conception with its own interests and causes. It must afford tolerance to
a diversity of standpoints. 140
While MacIntyre reaches the same conclusion as liberals regarding public discourse, but
for a very different reason. Classical liberals like John Stuart Mill envisioned the
institutional tolerance of contrasting viewpoints as a sign of its inherent neutrality.141 But
in contemporary society, as MacIntyre has shown, the government holds no such
neutrality to decide among competing claims. Further still, the government‘s power to
enforce those decisions endangers the stability of local communities. Therefore, agencies
of the state should not be the ones to exclude participation in public discourse.142
Nonetheless, MacIntyre‘s essay claims that certain kinds of utterances may be
justifiably excluded – just not through government power. He lists five conditions, rooted
in his understanding of virtue, that promote and maintain rational dialogue. The starting
condition concerns the participants. Those who wield power should be excluded from
discussion until after a decision has been made. Here, MacIntyre uses the example of
public discourse about health care. Participants should include health care practitioners
and community stakeholders, but not insurance executives.143 Another necessary
condition is the cultivation of those virtues necessary to exercise prudent judgment
regarding the modes of expression in the debate. Those with racist, sexist, or overtly
irrelevant ideas ought to be excluded from the discourse. The virtues are necessary here
because negative modes of speech like lampooning and insults often play a large part in
political debate. The participants must distinguish among them on a case-by-case basis. A
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third condition is that certain questions must be settled conclusively prior to engaging in
the discussion at hand. Such issues include the values at stake, the purpose of the
community‘s participation, and other substantive issues. As a corollary to the third
condition, a fourth situation involves the exclusion of certain classes of opinions. For
example, a Holocaust denier is not simply wrong on a question of historical fact.144
Because to deny the Holocaust also entails an unreasonable conception of human good
and likely involves an underlying anti-Semitism, the very holding of such an opinion is
grounds for excluding a participant in any public discourse. Finally, just as the state
cannot decide who should participate, it must likewise refrain from enforcing conditions
of tolerance against the reasonable will of the community. Local autonomy must be
respected. On the flip side of this political coin, the local participants are also liable to
―argumentative accountability.‖145 In the end, MacIntyre‘s account of the virtues comes
into play at every level of the discourse. Justice, honesty, and courage are all required, as
they lend themselves to deciding the list of participants, setting the agenda of discussion,
and submitting themselves to their opponents‘ scrutiny.
The necessity of the virtues notwithstanding, MacIntyre also insists that tolerance
is not in se a virtue. In fact, too much tolerance is a vice.146
Toleration is an exercise of virtue just in so far as it serves the purpose of a certain
kind of rational enquiry and discussion, in which the expression of conflicting
points of view enables us through constructive conflict to achieve certain
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individual and communal goods. And intolerance is also an exercise of virtue
when and in so far as it enables us to achieve those same goods. 147
Virtue here is taken to mean ―virtue of the local community,‖ which is constituted by
ongoing conflict about its purpose and values. In contemporary political and moral
debate, the community is inundated with external messages given to them by the media.
The local community thereby can be hamstrung by national political slogans, short
attention span, or even slick commercial advertising. Another nagging complication
arises. Even if a community has generated a set of compatible and coherent arguments, it
can still be weakened by the incompatibility between its rhetorical modes of rational
enquiry and those of the dominant and external political culture.148
In closing, MacIntyre‘s work, like Rawls‘ Theory, is dense and complex. Unlike
Rawls, MacIntyre eschews any hope of finding a rationally superior method to resolving
public moral issues beyond those which met their demise in the medieval period. The
fragmentation of public discourse mirrors the bits that have survived from that bygone
period. It is MacIntyre‘s firm opinion that the grave disorder contemporary society‘s
moral utterances can be ameliorated only through a return to a tradition-based sense of
Aristotelian telos. But he is pessimistic that an entire nation can achieve such a recovery.
Instead, he looks to local communities, especially religious ones, which at least stand a
chance of withstanding the Dark Ages he claims that society has entered. Though he
offers a way for local communities to participate in public discourse, he offers a strong
caveat against too much commitment to toleration.
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Looking back to Chapter One of the dissertation, it is clear that Cahill does not
share MacIntyre‘s pessimism regarding the state of moral discourse. In fact, as Chapter
Four will demonstrate, she is counting on the cooperation of diverse communities to
achieve a higher standard of justice. Moreover, while MacIntyre‘s critique of Rawls‘
political liberalism has been devastating, other liberals have noticed the same problems
with Rawls‘ position. They attempt to correct some of the thorny issues that MacIntyre
raises against him from within the tradition of liberalism. They also do not let
MacIntyre‘s negative appraisal of liberalism go without a response. One such response
comes from American political thinker Michael Walzer, toward whose work this chapter
now turns to explore.

Michael Walzer: Complex Equality and Passionate Liberalism
This third section surveys and analyzes the writings of Michael Walzer for two
purposes. First, while Walzer writes from within a similar liberal context as Rawls, he
distinguishes his project in several ways which will be considered here. Second, Walzer
describes a ―down-to-earth‖ worldview that is more accessible than Rawls‘ original
position.149 In presenting the basic research of his writings, this part surveys three major
works: Spheres of Justice (hereafter Spheres), On Toleration, and Politics and Passion,
respectively. This chronological survey also notes important concepts which contrast
with Rawls‘ project, especially Walzer‘s notions of complex equality and nondeliberative political strategies. Walzer‘s principles of justice, derived from these works
that span his writing career, might thereby have a closer affinity than those of Rawls with
149
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regard to the complex public discourse about human genetic engineering described in this
dissertation‘s last two chapters. Walzer also offers a rejoinder to MacIntyre‘s
communitarian critique of liberalism, which comprises the final part of this section.
Furthermore, Cahill‘s later writings reflect a deep awareness of the intricate coalitions
and passionate engagement that Walzer claims are necessary to resolve difficult political
issues.

Spheres of Justice
To begin, Walzer‘s first criticism in Spheres is very broad in scope. He asserts
that since the time of Plato, political thinkers have assumed that there is one and only one
distributive system that philosophy can rightly encompass.150 In essence, Rawls‘ claims
in Theory are simply the latest trend of this political fashion. On the one hand, Walzer‘s
starting point is similar to Rawls‘ in the idea that justice is a human construction. On the
other hand, Walzer‘s approach to distributive justice in Spheres sharply contrasts with
Rawls‘. Given the plurality of human interests, it doubtful that the principles of justice
can be as monolithic as Rawls‘ account makes them to be. As such, Walzer starts with a
society where distributive justice is not the first virtue of social institutions of free and
equal members (as in Rawls‘ Theory), but instead is the source and context for the art of
differentiation, of which ―equality is the end product.‖151 In other words, it is not simply
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that there is pluralism in justice as a philosophical concept, but that the principles of
justice are themselves pluriform.152
Next, Walzer‘s idea of equality also contrasts with Rawls‘ account of it in Theory
and Political Liberalism. Walzer defines the aim of political equality as a society free
from domination, that is, one which is mediated through a set of social goods.153 At root,
equality has a negative meaning, one aimed at eliminating not every difference, but a
particular set of them. His purpose, then, in Spheres is to describe a liberal society where
no social good serves (or can serve) as a means of domination.154 Rawls‘ idea of equality
presupposes a particular kind of dominance: government power. Because Rawls begins
with a society of free and equal persons, he requires a mechanism to return periodically
or continually to a situation as close to the original position as possible. The Difference
Principle serves this purpose. On the one hand, it breaks the monopoly of wealth (the
dominant good in contemporary liberal society), and emphasizes the cooperative nature
of individuals and groups in society. On the other, in order to break the cycle of
supremacy, constant government intervention is necessary in order to constrain the talents
of the dominant group that possesses the wealth (e.g., by way of taxation or other
equitable policies). Unfortunately, the practical outcome proves Walzer‘s point. Because
government intervention is required to maintain or recover the original position, Rawls
has simply replaced one dominant good (i.e., wealth) with another dominant good
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(namely, government power). In the end, government authority generally and political
power particularly become the object of competitive struggles, rather than wealth.155
To be clear, Walzer is not saying that the dominance of political power itself is
necessarily an unfortunate situation. On the contrary, political power is a special sort of
social good. Instead, the problem is a simple equality that is presumed by liberal society.
As a constant overriding factor of other spheres, political power is always
dominant – at the boundaries but not within them. The central problem of political
life is to maintain that crucial distinction between ―at‖ and ―in.‖ But this is a
problem that cannot be solved given the imperatives of simple equality.156
As a corrective, Walzer argues that a general reduction of dominance is needed in a just
society, and that an understanding of complex equality is the vehicle to overcoming the
tendency of tyranny.157 Complex equality is the opposite of tyranny. It resembles Rawls‘
overlapping consensus in that both account for the wide range of worldviews (or, per
Rawls, comprehensive doctrines) that actually are represented within a political
community. The political community is the setting for this distributive scheme, and its
155
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world of common meanings. However, membership in this body itself is a good, in that
its distribution happens by accepting others into it.158
For example, the right to religious freedom, guaranteed in the First Amendment of
the United States Constitution, is a fundamental rule of complex equality.159 It constructs
a dividing line between the spheres of religious community and the larger body politic. It
allows each ecclesial community to determine its membership, while at the same time
allowing individuals to join such groups that will have them as members; ―politics is not
dominant over grace nor grace over politics.‖160 Walzer illustrates this point by using the
case of conscientious objection. The political community does not nourish souls, but still
is not willing to allow a person‘s eternal salvation to be placed in jeopardy by forcing him
or her to take up arms against a national enemy. This situation respects boundaries of
religious belief, without acknowledging the truthfulness of the individual‘s religious
belief.
Still, this respect for boundaries is tenable only as long as those with such beliefs
remain at the margins of the political community. Following this strategy, the Amish or
Jehovah‘s Witness communities are tolerated only because they embrace their lifestyles
at the margins of society with respect to accommodations that must be made to their
eccentric beliefs regarding involvement in political and military life. What, then, are the
limits of toleration in a just society? Walzer attempts to answer this question in On
Toleration, the second book analyzed in this section.
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On Toleration
Following his claim in Spheres that membership is the first social good to be
distributed, he further argues that toleration is often underestimated as the most minimal
of entitlements in a just society.161 In this work, he describes precisely what societies do
when they tolerate difference within their political community. While his work takes a
broad historical approach with regard to various regimes of toleration, the following
paragraphs focus on those aspects of Walzer‘s argument there that describe contemporary
democratic society, which is the social context for this dissertation.162
In contemporary nation-states and immigrant societies, citizens have equal rights
and responsibilities. In other words, citizens of these regimes are considered as
individuals rather than groups. The difference between these two regimes is that in
nation-states, the majority (political, ethnic, religious, etc.) is permanent.163 In practice,
this means that the minority is treated first as citizens with respect to rights, privileges,
and responsibilities, and secondarily as members of a religious or ethnic minority with
particular communal practices. While members may form voluntary associations (like
religious identity), they may not exercise legal jurisdiction (i.e., Sharia or Canon Law)
apart from the institutional law of the land. More precisely, Sharia or Canon Law cannot
be applied beyond the principles of constitutional law. For example, while divorced
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Catholics might be barred from the sacraments of the Catholic Church if they remarry,
and are even forbidden from remarrying in a Catholic church building, they are still free
to wed according to the law of the land.
By contrast, immigrant societies are constituted by individuals who arrive in
waves, but not as organized groups. The sustainability of immigrant societies is based on
purely voluntary association with regard to identification as part of ethnic or religious
groups. Therefore, tolerance is far more personalized in immigrant societies, as opposed
to the stereotypical tolerance of an identifiable minority in the nation-state.164
In his later chapters, Walzer argues that toleration is always a relationship of
inequality, and he applies the practical consequences of that claim to several social
issues.165 With regard to power, the nation-state recognizes all individuals as citizens
before the law, and immigrant societies have a ―neutral state‖ that stands above particular
ethnic interests.166 With respect to class, Walzer claims that intolerance is worse when
differences of culture, ethnicity, or race coincide with socioeconomic status. Here, the
minority in nation-states serve the same function as the newest immigrants from poorer
countries. They are tolerated to the degree that they serve economically useful ends. They
do hard labor for low wages, and they are essentially invisible in society.167 Furthermore,
toleration is most compatible with inequality when the class systems are reiterated among
the different ethnic or racial groups. Walzer claims that government interventions aimed
164
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at equality (e.g., affirmative action) are not designed to help individuals, but instead to
achieve class stratification throughout a previously disenfranchised group.168 Hence, such
corrective actions aim at simple equality, and do not achieve the egalitarian liberalism
envisioned by Walzer.
In terms of gender issues, Walzer makes a few points that are applicable to the
later chapters of this dissertation. In nation-states and immigrant societies alike, regimes
are intolerant of particular practices that transgress the rights of individuals, even when
those practices are wholly internal, community matters. For example, in the United States
the banning of polygamy, at one time practiced among Mormons, was aimed at bringing
all citizens under a single law.169 It is significant to note here that the issue of gender also
frequently crosses into that of religion -- e.g., Mormon polygamy in America, Muslim
hijab in France, or Hindu suttee in British-ruled India. This hybridization is partly due to
the public nature of these intersecting expressions of gender and religion. In the case of
polygamy, a particular religious group seeks State recognition (and presumably,
approval) of a particular kind of conjugal arrangement.170 In France, the hijab is very
controversial, but there would likely be little complaint about it if Muslim women did not
attend public school. In other words, polygamy and hijab might be tolerated by society
were they ―purely‖ internal matters of their respective communities. However, the right
168
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of ―communal reproduction,‖ implied in the phenomenon of toleration, often conflicts
with individual citizen‘s rights or the nation‘s legal codes.171 More importantly, the
common denominator in all three cases is that women from these particular religious
communities are joining increasingly the public sphere, and as they do, questions of the
limits of toleration arise.172
What of the toleration of religion itself? Walzer‘s earlier work describes
constitutional religious freedom as an illustration of his concept of complex equality. In
On Toleration, he makes two further points that are pertinent to the goals of this
dissertation. One, equality is guaranteed through the First Amendment by denying
political power to all religious authorities. This freedom is not neutral, though, because it
arises from the ―realistic assumption‖ that all religious communities are potentially
intolerant.173 With fresh memories of the Puritan Commonwealth of England in the minds
of the Constitution‘s authors, the original position of the United States was designed to
maintain a separation between the spheres of political power and religious
communities.174 This separation also makes the State dominant over particular religious
communities, as evidenced by the aforementioned banning of polygamy. Two, the
tolerance is maintained at the level of the community, not of individuals. In practice,
171

See the recent Supreme Court decision of Hosanna-Tabor Church v. The
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, et al., 10-553 (argued October 5, 2011 –
decided January 11, 2012). The petitioner fired one of its school teachers in flagrant
violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990. In oral arguments, the church
does not question the constitutionality of the ADA. Instead, they claim that the
respondent is classified as a ―commissioned minister‖ of the Missouri Synod Lutheran
Church, and thereby falls under a longstanding ―ministerial exception‖ to federal
regulation. The Court sided with the church in a unanimous decision.
172

Walzer, On Toleration, 65.

173

Walzer, On Toleration, 81.

174

Walzer, Spheres of Justice, 246-248.
128

some communities are allowed to use narcotics and alcohol as part of their religious
ceremonies in excess of the law, but individuals are not permitted such use of those
substances. For instance, a Catholic grade-school child may partake of the chalice during
the celebration of the Eucharist, but he or she may not drink a glass of wine with lunch in
the classroom. In reality, the state tolerates the Catholic doctrine that wine is no longer
substantially present in the sacramental cup, but they do not extend the practice beyond
the boundary of the liturgy in which that belief is expressed.
However, this communal paradigm is shifting toward emphasis on individual
rights because of the privileging of voluntary assembly. Walzer locates this compatibility
in the entirely free and voluntary nature of association in any religious community. Is
there a contradiction here? Walzer answers in the negative. All religions, even tolerated
ones, aim to restrict various actions that are concomitant with individual freedom. Even if
religions are intolerant as communities, their goals are entirely compatible with the idea
of religious toleration. In this sense, Walzer‘s answer is closely related to Rawls‘ idea of
reasonable comprehensive doctrines. Rawls argues that such comprehensive doctrines are
neither fixed nor unchanging. Even so, being reasonable also limits the scope of what can
be justified to others. 175 This recognition leads to forms of toleration and supports the
idea of public reason. In Rawls‘ thought, this ―public reason‖ takes shape in the liberty of
conscience and freedom of thought.176 But this toleration only includes comprehensive
doctrines that are not unreasonable. Walzer‘s schema of toleration seems to include
unreasonable comprehensive doctrines, with the caveat that religious communities, no
matter how intolerant ad intra, still must accept religious freedom for all as a prior
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principle. Thus, the community itself might be intolerant of certain practices (like
homosexuality or drinking alcohol), but it also must be committed simultaneously to the
idea of religious freedom, even of other local communities that do not find homosexuality
or alcohol consumption objectionable.177
In his concluding chapter, he attributes this conflict to what he calls ―postmodern
life.‖178 He argues that the postmodern project undermines every sort of common
identity. ―Us‖ and ―them‖ have no fixed point of reference.179 This situation means that
all are strangers, and makes each individual responsible for his or her own identity, a life
without clear boundaries. Citing French scholar Julia Kristeva, the community (such as it
is) is founded upon ―lucidity rather than fate,‖ the latter being a reference to the regimes
of toleration in both nation-states and immigrant societies, where the minority casts its
fortunes.180 Kristeva claims that individual choice should create the social group, rather
than common origin. Without such choice, citizens (women especially) are reduced to
―boundary-subjects,‖ with socially-prescribed roles readymade for them.181 Walzer
disagrees with her contention. If everyone is a stranger, then no one is.182 Nevertheless,
the postmodern context encourages a ―politics of difference,‖ one that requires the
ongoing negotiation of group relations and individual rights. This negotiation requires a
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double protection of persons as differentiated citizens of both state and groups, who live
simultaneously as strangers to both.
The problem, Walzer notes, is that over generations, the ―divided self‖ will
weaken the undivided groups out of which they arose. From within what he calls ―the
first generation‖ (i.e., the current one), he concludes with cautious optimism.
There may be good reasons, then, to live permanently with the problems of what I
have called the first generation. We should value the extraordinary personal
liberty that we enjoy as strangers and possible strangers in contemporary
―transitional‖ societies. But we need at the same time to shape the regimes of
toleration in ways that fortify the different groups and perhaps even encourage
individuals to identify strongly with one or more of them. 183
In the end, Walzer argues that these centrifugal forces of selfhood and culture will correct
one another only if there is some planning. In contrast to Rawls, a balance between the
two is required, but that balance is not fixed. Consequently, one does not need to defend
either communitarianism or liberalism, but both can be held as the situation dictates.184 It
is unfortunate, though, that he names this method ―social democracy.‖185
In this context of voluntary association, the dissertation returns to an important
question raised by Walzer in his previous chapter. ―What will be the staying power and
organizational strength of a purely voluntary faith?‖186 This question is relevant for the
aims of this dissertation because it is also related to public discourse. Public moral
discourse brings many people with various comprehensive doctrines together to reach a
consensus on a pressing issue with broad social consequences. Public reason will admit a
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large number of voices into the discourse, but Rawls‘ notion of the term implies that
some will not have a place there. Apparently, religious communities that are constituted
by those with a ―purely‖ voluntary comprehensive doctrine will be deemed reasonable.
But what will be the role of emotional engagement as the various parties come together to
debate the issue? Does such public ―reasoning‖ rule out ―repugnance‖ as an argument
against human genetic engineering because its major premise is at root an appeal to an
emotion? Furthermore, what is the form of discourse that will allow the public to reach a
consensus? Will it be deliberative, arbitrative, or representative in scope? Walzer
provides a few ways to answer these questions in Politics and Passion, the final work
considered in this section.

Politics and Passion
In Politics and Passion, Walzer explains in greater detail these last points that he
made in On Toleration. He argues that a more egalitarian and strongly multicultural
politics is required to bring about a society of truly free citizens. In doing so, he alludes to
what he calls the ―deficiencies‖ of standard liberalism.
[Standard liberalism] is inadequate because the social structures and political
orders that sustain inequality cannot be actively opposed without a passionate
intensity that liberals do not (for good reasons) want to acknowledge or
accommodate. Accommodation is especially difficult when passion is, as it
commonly is, the product of our attachments and belongings.187
For this reason, he concludes that there must be a better doctrine than standard liberalism.
His argument rests on several premises, all of which are significant for the goals of this
dissertation. First, ―freedom‖ and ―equality‖ can still exist within the context of several
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important involuntary associations. Second, the United States political community is a
deliberative democracy, and deliberative politics is itself problematic. Finally, passionate
engagement with the hard cases of contemporary society is necessary in order to win the
arguments that will bring about a free and equal society. This part elaborates upon these
assumptions, which Walzer fleshes out in certain chapters of Politics and Passion.
First, Walzer describes four kinds of involuntary associations, which make for
what he calls ―intellectual servitude.‖188 He divides them into two categories: sociological
and philosophical. In the sociological category, there is a radical givenness to
family/social contexts and cultural determination. In the familial and social realm,
parental instruction and family dynamics reify notions of kin groups, national identity,
social class, and gender roles. Of these four notions, the only development that seems to
be encouraged is an upward mobility in the social hierarchy.189 In addition to these
considerations, there is also a cultural determination within our associational life. For
example, Walzer addresses the institution of marriage. Even a prenuptial agreement only
speaks to details of the arrangement; the conditions which make for a marriage are
dictated by law.190 While marriage is freely contracted, the range and style of choices is
already determined.
The next set of involuntary associations is political and moral. As citizens, our
membership is ―given‖ to us as the primary distributive good: a point that Walzer makes
in Spheres.191 Membership allows access to all of the opportunities and other goods that
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the society has to offer. ―If you are here in the political community, you are caught up in
a set of arrangements that you had no part in designing.‖192 This claim contrasts sharply
with standard liberal assumption that all associations are free and voluntary. In the moral
realm, it is not just the social mores or legal codes that constitute morality. Following
Rousseau, there is also an imperative to remain within a society, especially during times
of national or organizational crisis. This obligation stems from the benefits that were
reaped during the better days of the republic, or in local matters (say a labor union or
civic group), from the vanguard work of its activists and early leaders. In this context,
Marxist arguments about ―class consciousness‖ are really claims about the moral
epistemology of the nature of involuntary associations.193 Solidarity, then, is more about
a moral identification with the plight of others rather than a social or political idea.
In practice, even the abolition of these forms of association requires the grounding
of individuals in a less-than-voluntary association. Again citing Julia Kristeva, Walzer
claims that it is not possible (in fact, not even desirable) to have a community free of
involuntary associations.194 To form such ―entrepreneurs of the self‖ is not a matter of
simply commanding schoolchildren to choose freely, but necessitates the formation
guiding narratives that disclose the requisite values and paradigmatic rituals that reenact
the struggle for individuality.195 To bring about this situation, a community would first
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need to find this goal valuable, and then construct a social program through public
education and civic religion in order to instill these values within its members.
Next, while deliberative democracy is a standard contemporary political practice,
Walzer claims that it represents a shift in American liberalism. This shift is found in a
movement from a discourse of rights to one of decision.196 However, the process of the
second still looks toward the goals of the first, as evidenced by the litigious nature of
American politics. Deliberative democracy is akin to Rawls‘ public reason. In the face of
a pressing social issue, there is great value in ―reasoning together‖ in order to reach a
resolution. In fact, Rawls cites the Supreme Court as the ―institutional exemplar‖ of
public reason.197 There, deliberation takes place within the limits of ―reason alone,‖
removed from the political process. It is not to say that their function is not political.
However, it does mean that their personal morality is irrelevant and their political values
are limited within the scope of the constitutional question before the justices. In
deliberation, the Supreme Court must appeal only to the public conception of justice and
the political values of public reason.198
By contrast, Walzer expresses dissatisfaction with deliberative strategies by way
of his criticism of the work of Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson.199 Public reasoning,
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according to Gutmann and Thompson, is qualified by reciprocity, publicity, and
accountability, none of which are morally neutral.200 Walzer‘s critique here is about the
incompleteness of the strategy, and he amplifies the constitutive elements of deliberation.
Politics has many other values beyond qualified reason: passion, commitment, solidarity,
courage, and competitiveness, among others. In reality, American political discourse has
little to do with deliberation. In turn, he offers fourteen political strategies that are nondeliberative in form.201 Here, only two – debate and bargaining - are briefly considered.
In debate, the chief goal is to persuade the audience to agree with the speaker. The
parties involved in a debate are contestants; the point is not to agree but to win.202 In
Politics and Passion, Walzer seems to have in mind a structured debate between two
representatives from two conflicting intellectual positions. In public discourse, though, a
debate might appear much like a battle royal, if there are multiple positions. However, as
this dissertation pointed out in the first chapter, one goal of engaging in public discourse,
especially if minds cannot be changed, is to steer or slow down the process toward its
inevitable outcome. In this sense, winning a debate means to succeed through integration
of the party‘s values into the final resolution in some significant way.
Furthermore, it is not likely to be accomplished through debate alone, since there
will be multiple competing interests in this future public discourse. In moving toward
resolution, bargaining might be a viable option. In contemporary democracy, Walzer
200
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contrasts bargaining with deliberation by way of an example using the example of a jury
or panel of judges. In a criminal case, it will not do to engage in bargaining; all parties
involved want a true statement about a defendant‘s guilt. Politicians, on the other hand,
have options and method available to them from which juries are barred. Consequently,
political decisions are rarely deliberative in the literal sense of the word. Rearranging the
metaphor slightly for yet another comparison, while a criminal is constitutionally
protected from double jeopardy for the same crime, politicians must stand for reelection
at regular intervals. Politicians thereby can face adversity from opponents time and again
for all of their decisions. Thus, it is in the politician‘s interests to seek an equitable
solution to the issue the first time. 203
Here, the dissertation turns again to the idea of a modus vivendi. Walzer‘s critique
of Gutmann‘s and Thompson‘s claims focus on their tolerance of negotiation in a
deliberative democracy. As long as a moral principle is not involved, a bargain can be
made when the parties ―consider the merits of the collective results of their individual
deals.‖204 This claim presumes the necessity of making good arguments as a moral
requirement, since parties recognize one another as free and rational men and women. A
political victory is more legitimized by a wide, bipartisan majority decision. As an
egalitarian theory, though, deliberative democracy must remove power from the
process.205 In Rawls´ Theory, this end is accomplished by placing a veil of ignorance over
the participants as they deliberate. However, as Walzer argues in Spheres, equality is the
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end product of the process.206 As a result, it is not necessary to recognize others as
rational in the same way
But also as members of groups with beliefs and interests that mean as much to
them as our beliefs mean to us. If deliberation follows from the first of these
recognitions, bargaining and compromise flow from the second. In political life it
is the second that is more often appropriate, even morally appropriate: the better
we understand that differences exist, and respect the people on the other side, the
more we will see that what we need is not a rational agreement but a modus
vivendi.207
In other words, a modus vivendi implies the regular presence of conflicting interests, but
Walzer contends that good argumentation alone rarely will prevail in such conflicts. This
culture of argument cannot be isolated from other political activities. In practice, the
―back and forth‖ of debate and the push toward resolution of a particular issue eventually
will involve a negotiation of its solution. Therefore, deliberation has an important place
in political discourse, but not an independent one.208
Third, Walzer concludes this line of argument by returning to the problem of
passionate engagement. This passion stems from a strong commitment to a particular set
of beliefs, which Walzer describes in the context of his critique of deliberation.209 As
Rawls notes, reasonable comprehensive doctrines limit the scope of what can be
demonstrated to others.210 Walzer concurs with this argument, as the social range of such
convictions derived from exclusive comprehensive doctrines is limited.211 However, to
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join a group is more than a rational decision. Group membership entails affective ties,
and implies a commitment to the emotional, moral and material demands of the group.212
As this group engages in public discourse, it is imperative to recognize the
interests of others in the discussion. Quoting Karl Marx, Walzer argues that egalitarian
participation strategies stand vis-à-vis ―the ideas of the ruling class are the ruling
ideas.‖213 In combating these ideas, Walzer claims that no party can succeed against
established hierarchies of power and wealth unless it can arouse the passions of those on
the lower end of that hierarchy.214 Unfortunately, these emotions regularly take the form
of envy, hatred, and resentment. By recognizing the others and their particular interests,
and appreciating the strength of their commitments, enlightened participation can
accommodate itself to the passions while excluding these ―fiercer forms‖ of struggle.215
Coupled with non-deliberative strategies, enthusiastic participation can resolve society‘s
complicated issues in a way far superior to a standard liberalism that privileges
deliberation.
Finally, two relevant points can be made which relate Walzer‘s notion of justice
to Chapter Four. To the first point, it can be argued that his understanding of justice is not
fixed, at least when compared to Rawls‘ arguments in Theory and Political Liberalism. In
Spheres, Walzer claims that justice is relative to social meanings.216 He still holds this
idea. In December 2009, he writes:
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What is most distinctive about humanity is its creative power—to think, imagine,
speculate, argue, and disagree. So men and women will imagine different good
societies, argue about their political and economic arrangements, and disagree
about which one is best.217
In cases of disagreement, such as the one envisioned in this dissertation‘s Epilogue,
justice requires that society remain faithful to the disagreements by providing outlets for
their resolution.218 To elaborate, his argument in Politics and Passion relies heavily on
recognizing that others can have strongly-held beliefs (i.e., a comprehensive doctrine, to
use Rawls‘ phrase). Disagreement can be resolved within a reasonable yet passionate
setting.219 Walzer‘s further claims that it is through negotiation that an equitable solution
can be found rather than deliberation. Similarly, the ―back and forth‖ of Rawls‘ reflective
equilibrium implies the importance of discourse when choosing principles. At times, this
equilibrium requires the revision of one‘s principles even if the theory does not conform
precisely to his or her judgments.220 Other times, it requires a radical shift of one‘s moral
vision. Nevertheless, Rawls insists that the two-fold political conception of justice would
be chosen. But in doing so, he also notes that the conception which meets this criterion of
reflective equilibrium is the one that is most reasonable. In Rawls‘ work, this conception
is singular; in Walzer, it seems to be manifold and situational.
To the second point, because justice is determined by context, Walzer claims that
substantive accounts of justice are necessarily local in scope.221 In addition to the
relativity of social meanings, one‘s methodology need not be fixed either. He argues at
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the conclusion of On Toleration that there is a need for a balanced rather than exclusive
method of resolving such cases.222 One consequence of a highly contextualized method
seems to indicate that there is no readymade principle (Rawlsian or otherwise) that covers
every imaginable case. Another consequence, given the willingness for debate and
negotiation, is that all complicated issues are potentially resolvable. This claim is the
reason why ―standard‖ liberalism is inadequate, according to Walzer‘s argument in
Politics and Passion.223 In political liberalism, this negotiation can only take place in the
original position, and then only to describe its conditions. In practice, deliberation takes
place within the down-to-earth context where structures of power are already firmly
rooted in place. As a result, deliberation fails to resolve an issue unless a party can
mobilize its members to engage these sedimented structures of political power, to form
coalitions with likeminded groups, or to negotiate solutions with those in power. In other
words, successful resolution to public dilemmas can be achieved only through something
other than deliberation.
Walzer‘s self-critical understanding of liberalism also affords him the opportunity
to respond to liberalism‘s detractors. MacIntyre is one such writer. He and others who
offer this strand of criticism are often labeled ―communitarians,‖ though few of them are
comfortable with that term. In fact, MacIntyre has explicitly refused the attribution.224
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participation in local community. It is a further mistake to suppose that there is anything
good about local community as such… [without] the virtues of just generosity and of
shared deliberation, local communities are always open to corruption by narrowness, by
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The dissertation briefly analyzes Walzer‘s response to MacIntyre and other critics of
liberalism.

A Response to the Communitarian Critique of Liberalism
Walzer describes communitarianism as a useful contrast with social democracy.
In this essay he highlights two arguments against liberalism, one related to practice and
the other to theory, which he claims are ―deeply contradictory‖ and therefore mutually
exclusive. 225 The first argument holds that liberal political theory accurately reflects
liberal social practices. In this account, humans exist as radically isolated individuals.
There are no necessarily shared values among them. The concrete absence of value
exhorts one to disintegration of any social fabric through exit, utility (understood as
personal utility), and especially choice.226 Moreover, choice and utility are not governed
by any rational criteria; society is fragmented not only in values but also in practice. The
second argument claims, contra the first, that liberal theory radically misrepresents real
life. In reality, as Walzer has already noted in Politics and Passion, human beings are
caught up in entire networks of relationships, power, and communities. If this claim is
true, then all societies, even liberal ones, are deeply communitarian in structure. Here, the
communitarian argument further asserts that liberal theory distorts this reality, blinding
its members to the social ties that bind them. Thus, on the communitarian critique, an
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explanation can be offered for the liberal inability to form ―cohesive solidarities‖ and
―stable movements,‖ and also accounts for the dependence on a central state. 227
To these arguments, Walzer responds first by stating that
Liberal theory now seems to have a power over and against real life that has been
granted to few theories in human history. Plainly, it has not been granted to
communitarian theory, which cannot, on the first argument, overcome the reality
of liberal separatism and cannot, on the second argument, evoke the existing
structures of social connection. In any case, the two critical arguments are
mutually inconsistent; they cannot both be true.228
Based on Walzer‘s own critique of ―standard liberalism,‖ he claims that both arguments
are partially true. In recovering the positive aspects of the communitarian critique, he
admits that Americans live in an ―unsettled society.‖ He grounds this argument on four
types of mobility: geographic, social, marital, and political. A sense of place is weakened
by the voluntary migrations of individual members. Movement is usually a logical
necessity as a result of upward social mobility, as individuals move to make a better life
for themselves and their families. Insofar as home is the first community, the relative ease
of contracting and dissolving marriage disintegrates the ―first school of ethnic identity
and religious conviction‖ represented by the home. Lastly, with its emphasis on
autonomous choice, liberal citizens make for a volatile independent electorate, and local
politics is as liable to upheaval as federal elections. 229 Taken together, these four
mobilities can weaken a sense of community and its vitality.
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These several points of agreement notwithstanding, there is simply nothing else
besides liberal society, according to Walzer.230 As such, he offers three ways to offset
communitarian arguments against liberalism. The first is the insistence on a fuller
conception of voluntary association. As demonstrated in earlier discussion, patterns of
association are not the product of the will alone. Liberalism is more concerned with exit
from the group, and disrobing oneself from its social identity than with the freedom to
form groups. 231 The second is the liberal possibility of what he calls ―cooperative
coping.‖232 Pluralism allows communities to deal with its various crises through a variety
of means. By contrast, the imposition of a unitary way of life offers no escape for those
who would find such a scheme oppressive. While there is a danger of erosion, Walzer
argues that the local community must always be at risk.233 But communitarian tendencies
are no help here. Tradition requires the risk of traditionalism or fundamentalism. Thus, if
the first communitarian argument were true, then there would be no communities or
traditions to place at risk in the first place. The third way involves the constitution of the
liberal self. Walzer claims that contemporary liberals do not have a presocial notion of
the self. Instead, liberalism ―is best understood as a theory of relationship, which has
voluntary association at its center and which understands voluntariness as the right of
rupture or withdrawal.‖ With regard to the four types of mobility, liberal citizens are in a
state of perpetual motion. For instance, if marriage is truly voluntary, there must be a
permanent possibility of divorce. Seen in this light, liberal selves are not pre-social, but
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post-social, insofar as they can choose to depart only after coming to an opinion about the
current set of relationships to which they are bound. 234
By contrast, an illiberal amelioration of these risks would deny the very
possibility of rupture, withdrawal, or divorce. There could only be shunning,
excommunication, and disfellowship. And few communitarians, especially MacIntyre,
would advocate such measures. Nonetheless, the communitarian critique is prophetic,
insofar as liberalism tends toward dissociation. A communitarian critique enjoins liberal
society to reflect on and reinforce its internal binding capacity, but cannot overcome
these risks entirely.
Before leaving this discussion of Walzer‘s work, it is helpful to conclude with a
few words about its relevance for Cahill‘s writings. Chapter Four analyzes Cahill‘s
participatory bioethics, which includes strategies consistent with Walzer‘s principles
described in this section.235 In fact, these pages of her book also include an analysis and
subtle critique of the argument from Gutmann and Thompson, whose argument Walzer
rejects in Politics and Passion. Furthermore, Cahill‘s later work also makes a strong
connection to the complex of social relationships, from which a free choice is no mere
abstraction.236 Finally, Cahill argues similarly with Walzer that justice itself is
contextualized. 237 This is not to say that she has abandoned an attempt at a universal
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principle. For now, perhaps it is more precise to say that she seeks an understanding of
justice that is universally but differentially applicable in any context. Cahill argues that
the bioethical application of Rawlsian principles are laudable to the degree that they
attempt to promote the common good, but that they fall short in the end as they tend to
embrace the status quo of market-based approaches to medicine.238 Political liberalism is
not radical enough in its pursuit of an equitable solution to these issues. As technology
drives on, absent a moral or even political compass, it becomes imperative to find a
method of engagement that slows its relentless march, or at least steers it toward its least
harmful conclusion. As Walzer notes in Politics and Passion, activism frequently arouses
the negative passions of envy and resentment. However, if the theological voices engaged
in this future public discourse are successful, then the technological achievement of
human engineering (to be discussed in the dissertation‘s Epilogue) can be conducted in a
manner that leaves open the way to forgiveness and reconciliation, should the end result
prove to be harmful. Finally, Walzer also provides a response to the critique of liberalism
by MacIntyre and others who are commonly labeled ―communitarians.‖

Summary and Conclusion to Chapter Two
This chapter has attempted to relate three recent philosophical accounts of justice
that are most relevant to understanding Cahill‘s context, which will be analyzed in the
Chapter Four. Because of her emphasis on participatory moral discourse, Cahill often
addresses thinkers outside of her Roman Catholic tradition particularly and apart from
religious communities generally. This theoretical exploration opened with the work of
John Rawls, who offers a contemporary liberal account of justice as fairness which is
238
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derived from freely-chosen principles. These principles maximize liberty while
restraining unjust socioeconomic differences. Rawls‘ theory is clearly reasonable and
internally coherent. At the same time, this chapter raised two problems about its
applications to current and future bioethical dilemmas. One is his rather ―thin‖ notion of
the common good, which seems to refer mostly to legal and political systems that secure
the rights of the people. Lacking a compelling reason to do otherwise, competition
overrides mutual disinterest. Given the market-based ethos of medicine, Rawlsian
principles are not strong enough to constrain the differences that might arise from
biotechnologies. The other is his requirement to meet ―basic needs.‖ Without a thicker
notion of the common good, it seems difficult to determine what constitutes the meaning
of ―basic.‖ Cahill‘s later work, informed by Catholic Social Teaching, already provides
such a notion of human rights, but the fourth chapter will explore her claim that they can
rarely be absolute.
Next, Alasdair MacIntyre criticizes Rawls‘ Theory and other liberal views (like
Robert Nozick), claiming that justice might be rational but not necessary in liberal
society. He argues that Rawls and other liberals have no rational way to adjudicate their
opposing claims because they have no overriding sense of the good. Rooted in the
classical traditions of Aristotle and Aquinas, MacIntyre insists that the political nature of
goods in ancient societies means that actions are expressive far more than autonomous
choice, but are tethered to communal life, which is not possible in a political structure
free of a singular comprehensive doctrine. MacIntyre calls for a return to a traditionbased sense of Aristotelian telos, even though he is pessimistic about the possibility of
such a recovery. Nonetheless, he offers a way for local communities to participate in
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public discourse, with a strong caveat against an overzealous commitment to toleration.
Similarly, Cahill insists that all intellectual and religious voices speak from a tradition.
By contrast, it is through toleration of all voices that public discourse can be endeavored.
Cahill grounds this call in a collaborative effort to increase justice in society.
The third account comes from Michael Walzer, who claims to remain firmly
within the liberal tradition even while critiquing what he calls ―standard liberalism,‖
which is represented in this dissertation by Rawls. Walzer‘s ―complex equality‖
overcomes the necessity for constant government intervention to achieve the equity
envisioned by Rawls. At the same time, it demonstrates that justice is relative to social
meanings and is necessarily local in scope. Like Rawls, he is concerned about the
stability of the political community over time. For Walzer, freedom and equality are still
possible within the context of select involuntary associations. More importantly, Walzer
allows room for social action beyond ―public reason.‖ Disagreements can be negotiated
within a reasonable yet passionate setting. Cahill‘s later work resonates with Walzer‘s
analysis insofar as both address the complex of social relationships, from which a free
choice is no mere abstraction.
Now, the dissertation returns to some of Cahill‘s more familiar dialogue partners
in the Roman Catholic moral tradition. It is better to begin with the philosophical
movements because, while these philosophers have generally not addressed the
theologians in the next chapter, the opposite cannot be said. The Catholic social tradition
looks especially toward the common good and social justice, which are especially
addressed by Rawls and Walzer. As Chapter Three demonstrates, both James Keenan and
Jean Porter rely – heavily at times – on MacIntyre. Similarly, Catholic Social Teaching
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leans heavily up a communal understanding of human dignity in a manner not
inconsistent with MacIntyre. Catholic bioethicists also navigate the complexities of
meeting individual needs with balancing social realities.
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CHAPTER 3
JUSTICE IN THE CONTEMPORARY ROMAN CATHOLIC MORAL TRADITION

Toward the task of specifying what is meant by the Catholic tradition, toward which
Cahill often refers, this chapter focuses on influential scholars and church documents
written since the Second Vatican Council (hereafter Vatican II). There is both a clear
development in the theological language and also an evolving understanding of justice
expressed in the Council‘s documents. To cite one salient example, the council reflects
upon human createdness in God‘s image, which grounds the essential equality of
persons.1 Equality is rooted in a human ―dignity,‖ which transcends racial,
socioeconomic, and even religious differences.2 In taking this position, which is based on
human dignity over social or ecclesial identity, the council expressed the church‘s desire
to enter into public conversation as a dialogue partner, rather than a dictatorial voice. This
willingness to engage the world is a clear departure from the polemical writings from the
church‘s hierarchy during the Modern period.3 Furthermore, it demonstrates a general
acceptance of religious and political plurality that may have been understated in the past.
Moreover, this position is emblematic of Cahill‘s primary task of participation in public
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moral discourse – a critical self-understanding of one voice‘s own collective context, as
discussed in Chapter One.
Since Cahill writes from within a Roman Catholic context, the first section
focuses exclusively on scholarship from within that tradition. This approach does not in
any way intend to denigrate the weighty contributions of Protestant writers, or scholars
writing from Jewish and other non-Christian religious traditions. In fact, as demonstrated
in Chapter One, Cahill often mentions the influence of Protestant writers like James
Gustafson and Stanley Hauerwas in her own writings. To reiterate what was introduced in
the first chapter, and what will resonate throughout this chapter, public discourse brings
together disparate intellectual positions that represent particular contexts. But contexts
themselves are rarely monolithic, either. Thus, this chapter analyzes diverse writings
from Catholic scholars and church documents that clarify what is meant by this Catholic
context, and how Cahill significantly engages each representative part of the tradition.
This chapter is divided under three major headings, which analyze three postconciliar accounts of justice in the Roman Catholic tradition. The first part surveys three
modes of the church‘s hierarchical teachings in the wake of the Second Vatican Council,
to include the Pastoral Constitution on the Church, various social encyclicals of the postconciliar popes, and a pastoral letter from the United States‘ National Conference of
Catholic Bishops. The second account analyzes the recent recovery of virtue ethics in
Catholic moral tradition, including some interesting proposed developments. The final
part discusses justice within the particular context of Catholic bioethics.
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Recent Statements from the Catholic Hierarchy Related to Justice
In analyzing these statements, the research is presented in three segments. Starting
with Gaudium et Spes, the first segment examines the aforementioned development of the
church‘s voice: one as dialogue partner with the modern world. This trend continues in
the social encyclicals of Paul VI and John Paul II. The second considers the 1985
statement from the United States Catholic Bishops, Economic Justice for All. This
document is significant to the present study for several reasons: its explicit definition of
―basic justice,‖ its principles of participation, and its balanced approach toward justice for
individuals and the community. Economic concerns give rise to questions of distributive
justice, which, in Cahill‘s later bioethical writings, is often identified with social justice,
but at times is at odds with the papal social encyclicals.4 The third segment studies
Benedict XVI‘s 2009 encyclical Caritas in Veritate, which is the most recent papal
statement that addresses Catholic Social Teaching. It focuses on his conception of justice
as prior to charity, as well as his attempt to define a spirituality of technology as a vehicle
for human development.

Justice in the Documents of Vatican II and Subsequent Papal Social Encyclicals
The first chapter summarized at length the influence of Catholic Social Teaching
on Cahill‘s later work. Now this section analyzes the understanding of justice that
developed in the documents of the Second Vatican Council (hereafter Vatican II) and the
papal encyclicals in its wake. This section has two parts. The first analyzes Vatican II‘s
Pastoral Constitution on the Church, Gaudium et Spes, which derive the anthropological
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principles from which the council‘s conception of justice is formed. It begins with a brief
analysis of Leo XIII‘s seminal encyclical Rerum Novarum in order to demonstrate the
development of Catholic Social Teaching in the intervening years between this document
and the council. The second studies three papal social encyclicals were written in the two
decades after Vatican II. These are Paul VI‘s Populorum Progressio and John Paul II‘s
Laborem Exercens and Centesimus Annus. Drawing from these sources, and especially
from its commitment to dialogue with the modern world, Vatican II‘s conception is most
precisely called ―social justice.‖ Later papal social encyclicals demonstrate continuity
with the conciliar understanding of social justice.

Leo XIII‟s Rerum Novarum and the Roots of Distributive Justice
The Catholic Church already expressed a vibrant social teaching tradition for
nearly seven decades prior to Vatican II. Modern Catholic Social Teaching is said to have
germinated from Leo XIII‘s Rerum Novarum, a groundbreaking encyclical on the rights
of workers. There, he urges employers to pay a living wage within the context not of
justice but of charity – ―a duty not enforced by human law.‖5 Compensation should
support the survival of the employee‘s family, which is the first natural society.6 In other
words, commutative justice, that is, the obligations between persons in the context of
contractual duties, is not at stake here. Or, more precisely, commutative justice is not
sufficient to meet the needs of working class families, according to Leo.
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While commutative justice is not an issue in Leo‘s encyclical, distributive justice
initially seems to be vital in the context of the ―natural right‖ of private ownership.7
Ownership and labor both serve the good of all. 8 However, Leo does not mean the
―common good,‖ as it is used in later magisterial writings. Instead, he locates the
common good squarely within the government of civil society. 9 That is, Leo understands
the common good to be served only by persons and not by material goods.
Furthermore, Leo‘s notion of justice as a virtue seems to be utilitarian in scope.
Against the extreme collectivism of socialist governments, Leo writes that leaders must
allow their citizens free reign. The upper limit to that liberty is the conflicting claims of
others and the needs of the state, which is identified as the common good. He writes, ―We
have said that the State must not absorb the individual or the family; both should be
allowed free and untrammeled action so far as is consistent with the common good and
the interest of others.‖10 It is incumbent upon every citizen to contribute to the common
good. Thus, the common good, as Leo understands it, is a matter of contributory justice.
Moreover, it is a grave offense against the common good for individuals to seize
the property of others. To take forcibly what belongs to another ―under the futile and
shallow pretext of equality‖ serves neither justice nor the common good. 11 It is
significant here that Leo bifurcates these two terms, because they converge in the later
social tradition. He insists that fair wages should go beyond commutative justice to
7
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charity.12 More importantly, this charity is a virtue found in individuals, and never in a
state bureaucracy. He equates government-run relief agencies with paganism.13 Taken
together, the common good, in Leo‘s estimation, is separate from distributive justice.

Vatican II‟s Pastoral Constitution on the Church
With the exception of contributory justice, Vatican II categorically rejected Leo‘s
claims about justice in Rerum Novarum.14 Instead, they insist that justice is determined
by its impact on the well-being especially of the poor.15 They ground this idea of justice
on a two-fold premise. First, they argue that human beings are the ―center and summit‖ of
creation. This claim implies a fundamental dignity that discloses both a special
relationship with God and the essential equality of all persons.16 Next, in light of human
dignity, the council insists that human beings are social by nature.17 Thus, the person is in
relationship not only with God, but also with each another. The evidence of human
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sociality is borne out in the interdependence that is expressed in family life and the
political community.18
It must be noted that the lexical order here is significant to the Council‘s
argument. Sociality is dependent upon human dignity. Initially, it can be said that the
council follows Leo, insofar as they claim that every individual has a duty to contribute to
the social order.19 However, the council‘s vision of the common good in Gaudium et Spes
is also at odds with Leo‘s perception of it in Rerum Novarum.20 According to Vatican II,
the common good serves both individuals and groups within society.21 Because
participation presupposes dignity, the council asserts a series of necessary positive rights
in order to effect this contribution from individuals.22 Consequently, the common good
not only requires contributory justice from its members, but also demands distributive
justice toward them. Thus, Vatican II has some continuity with respect to contributory
18
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justice, but the council radically departs from Leo with its understanding of the common
good.
Furthermore, the council describes the ideal conditions of the common good as
―social justice.‖23 While there are tolerable inequalities among persons, equal dignity
demands that society strive to ameliorate social conditions. To fail to address vast social
and economic disparities constitutes an offence against social justice. In contrast to Leo,
who insists that government is incapable of providing charity, Vatican II calls upon
public and private organizations to avail themselves in service of human dignity. The
pursuit of equality and justice also requires advancement beyond individualistic morality
to participatory ethics that strive for the common good.24
Finally, Gaudium et Spes expresses tension between universal and particular
concerns.25 After laying out these principles of dignity, equality, and the common good,
the Council turns to the role of the Catholic Church in applying them.
All we have said up to now about the dignity of the human person, the community
of men and women, and the deep significance of human activity, provides a basis
for discussing the relationship between the church and the world and the dialogue
between them.26
In this dialogue, the church summarizes its service to individuals and to society. On the
one hand, the church helps to protect human dignity from shifting opinions by upholding
consistently the primacy of conscience and the importance of charity. The church also
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proclaims human rights, which regulate all social and activity in light of the Gospel.27 On
the other hand, the church does not provide clear answers in the political, economic, or
social order. As a universal body, the church is not beholden to a single cultural mode of
existence. Instead, it insists on a universal dialogue in support of the basic rights of
persons and of the family, which are the requirements of the common good.28 Similar to
Rawls‘ position, Gaudium et Spes envisions the church‘s participation in public discourse
not only as a demand of Christian faith to be involved in the world, but also as a
requirement of reasonableness in light of these universal principles.29 The church thereby
can engage in public discourse while remaining faithful to the Gospel.30
In summary, there is a clear development in the Catholic social tradition at
Vatican II. Rooted in the notion of the equal human dignity of persons, coupled with its
understanding of human sociality, the council enjoins all individuals to contribute toward
the common good. While this call is consistent with the origins of the church‘s social
tradition, it is not unidirectional. The common good also requires that the individual‘s
needs be met in order to facilitate participation. Radically departing from Leo‘s
teachings, Vatican II claims that these needs fall under the auspices of justice, not charity.
Further still, they describe the common good in terms of social justice. These
anthropological tenets, upon which their notion of justice is based, are universal in scope
and general in principle. As such, they require a fuller account of how they are applied at
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the local level. One such account, offered by the United States bishops, will be analyzed
later in the chapter. But now, further warrants for this particular application are provided
in some papal encyclicals that followed Vatican II. The dissertation turns now to them.

Paul VI‟s Populorum Progressio
Paul VI‘s 1967 encyclical on economic and social development is significant to
this dissertation for two reasons. One, it affirms and extends Vatican II‘s teachings on
social justice while implying a greater need for subsidiarity, which, curiously, was
understated at the council. The most important aspect to this first point is the ―option for
the poor,‖ which was taken up zealously by Catholic bishops in the local contexts of
Medellín and, later, of Washington, D.C. Two, and conversely, while focusing on the
local situation with respect to direct assistance, Paul VI amplifies Leo‘s principles
regarding wages to cover agreements among nations. This section briefly summarizes
these two points because they factor into the oscillation between universal and particular
concerns in Cahill‘s writings on justice, which will be addressed in the next chapter.
First, Paul VI calls for greater attention to be paid in the Catholic Church to
listening in addition to teaching, which he also affirms in his subsequent writings.31 On
the one hand, this attending to the ―signs of the times‖ is wrought by increasing
industrial, economic, and political developments throughout the world at the time of the
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encyclical.32 These developments were signified by rapid communications, increased
travel, and widespread decolonization, which together resulted in unprecedented global
awareness.33 On the other hand, there were two kinds of polarization that threatened both
peace and justice in the 1960s. One was the Cold War, which pitted the United States and
other North Atlantic countries (often called NATO countries) in an arms race against the
Soviet Union and other nations of the Communist Bloc, which was formed by the
Warsaw Pact Treaty in 1955. The Cold War often spilled over into proxy wars, which
were usually staged in ―third world‖ nations, i.e., those poor countries that were not part
of NATO or the Warsaw Pact.34 The other was the unrivaled post-war prosperity in the
West that occurred through vast economic expansion, thanks in large part to the
aforementioned increase in industrialization, communications, and travel. However, this
prosperity encouraged a widening gap not only between rich and poor individuals within
particular countries, but also between the nations themselves. Thus, the 1960s might be
characterized as a time of both hope and crisis. While the documents of Vatican II remain
firmly optimistic in this context, Populorum Progressio takes a somewhat more somber
tone.

In fact, the United Nations calls this period as ―the decade of development.‖ See
United Nations Children‘s Fund, ―The 1960s: Decade of Development,‖ The State of the
World‟s
Children
1996.
n.d.
Online
Document,
http://www.unicef.org/sowc96/1960s.htm, retrieved August 4, 2011.
32

33

The political and ecclesial context of Populorum Progressio is summarized in
Allan Figueroa Deck, ―Commentary on Populorum Progressio (On the Development of
Peoples),‖ in Kenneth R. Himes ed., Modern Catholic Social Teaching: Commentaries
and Interpretations, 293-296.
34

For a concise analysis of this polarity at the end of the twentieth century, see
Robert J. Schreiter, The New Catholicity: Theology between the Global and the Local
(Maryknoll: Orbis Books, 1997).
160

Next, Paul VI describes the interplay between the global and the local situations,
and the church‘s role in both. The church‘s mission is universal in proclaiming the
Gospel. The principles of Catholic Social Teaching are also universal insofar as they are
accessible to all reasonable persons. Consistent with social encyclical tradition, though,
he argues that both are concerned especially for the poor.35 In continuity with the
teachings of Gaudium et Spes, the church can offer guiding narratives regarding human
persons and their relationships with one another.36 While this mission and vision remain
global in scope, the encyclical points to specific, local ways that the church has fostered
human progress, like the construction of schools and hospitals.37
Later in the document, Paul affirms the teachings of Vatican II as they pertain to
advancement of the common good.38 He lauds industrial and technological innovations
that gave rise to prosperity, but he also cautions against ―unbridled liberalism‖ that
paradoxically leads to tyranny. This political system is rooted in an equally unfettered
capitalism, and results in the ―international imperialism of money.‖39 In contrast, Paul
turns to Vatican II‘s principles on the judicious use of private property.
Now if the earth truly was created to provide man with the necessities of life and
the tools for his own progress, it follows that every man has the right to glean
what he needs from the earth. The recent Council reiterated this truth: "God
destined the earth and all it contains for all people and nations so that all created
35
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things would be shared fairly by all humankind under the guidance of justice
tempered by charity."40
Free trade and property rights are thereby subordinated to the council‘s principles of
social justice. Since there is a common right to a sufficient amount of the earth‘s goods
for each family, the state should justly delineate the terms of their transfer.
Moving to international trade, Paul VI returns to Leo‘s principles outlined in
Rerum Novarum, and augments their application to include obligations between nations.
Paul conceives of wealthier nations as analogous to Leo‘s employers and landowners.
Prosperous nations have a great deal of bargaining power over nations who are less well
off. As such, the sole criterion of mutual consent (i.e., the liberal notion of contract) does
not ensure fair conditions when applied to international trade agreements. Instead, Paul
insists that the demands of natural law are superior to those of the contract‘s provisions.
In Rerum Novarum this principle was set down with regard to a just wage for the
individual worker; but it should be applied with equal force to contracts made
between nations: trade relations can no longer be based solely on the principle of
free, unchecked competition, for it very often creates an economic dictatorship.
Free trade can be called just only when it conforms to the demands of social
justice.41
Thus, wealthier nations are subject to the needs of poorer nations when they come to
terms on trade and other economic endeavors with one another. The open market does
not need to be eliminated, but it must be constrained by demands of social justice.42 The
dictates of natural law regarding human dignity, sociality, and the common good generate
40
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PP, 61. Cahill makes a similar case in the context of biotechnology. A social
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by a sense of the common good. See Cahill, ―Stem Cells and Social Ethics: Some
Catholic Contributions,‖ in Nancy E. Snow ed., Stem Cell Research: New Frontiers in
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within more affluent countries a three-fold obligation: mutual solidarity, social justice,
and universal charity.43 They work synergistically to promote peace for the future.
Finally, Paul VI calls for collaboration about the best course of action to take in
cultivating the common good through social justice. He challenges individual families,
professional organizations, and cultural institutions to ―friendly rivalry‖ with one another
to implement the best ideas.44 Implied throughout the encyclical‘s middle paragraphs is
the principle of subsidiarity, a consistent focus on and respect for local schemes that build
particular communities. Paul also hints at the need for public discourse in resolving this
urgent social concern of development. Collaboration includes not just other Christians,
but all groups who are likewise committed to the cause of human development. Pressing
social needs can sublimate ideological differences. 45 As Chapter One and earlier
discussion in this chapter point out, parties can come to terms on immediate issues
without accord on comprehensive notions that ground commitment to public discourse.
In conclusion, Paul VI‘s Populorum Progressio takes a realistic perspective on
social justice in the wake of the Second Vatican Council. In the context of increasing
global economic development, he notes the widening gap between wealthier and poorer
nations. Using the seminal social principles of Leo XIII and coupling them with the
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Paul defines each in its turn. ―1) mutual solidarity—the aid that the richer
nations must give to developing nations; 2) social justice—the rectification of trade
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global vision of Vatican II, Paul transforms the obligations of wealthy individuals into the
duties of affluent nations. Guided by the virtues of solidarity, justice, and charity, nations
can cooperate as well as compete with each other. Peace becomes the fruit of this
synthesis. Like the documents of Vatican II, Populorum Progressio subtly describes the
need for subsidiarity by enjoining the smaller units of society to attend appropriately to
the common good. He also makes an explicit case for collaborative strategies, the kinds
of which are envisioned in the later chapters of this dissertation.

John Paul II‟s Laborem Exercens and Centesimus Annus
Traditionally, a papal encyclical or apostolic exhortation has commemorated the
significant anniversaries of Leo XIII‘s groundbreaking promulgation: Rerum Novarum.
In them, the pontiffs rehearse Leo‘s principles in Rerum Novarum, and then apply their
remarks to the current situation in which they write. One such encyclical is Pius XI‘s
Quadragesimo Anno in 1931. This eponymous letter addresses the world on the fortieth
anniversary of Rerum Novarum as it suffered through a global economic depression. In
1961, John XXIII‘s Mater et Magistra addressed the impact of Leo‘s document to
address the timely concerns of health care, education, and housing. A decade later, Paul
VI marked the eightieth anniversary of Rerum Novarum with an apostolic exhortation to
Maurice Cardinal Roy, serving at the time as president for the Pontifical Council for
Justice and Peace. In addition to summarizing the foundational precepts laid out in Leo‘s
encyclical, and recapitulating reflections on social justice from both the Second Vatican
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Council and his recent letter, Populorum Progressio, Paul addresses environmental
concerns for the first time in the history of papal encyclicals.46
During John Paul II‘s long reign, he had the opportunity to write two
commemorative encyclicals, both of which are briefly addressed in this section. The first
is Laborem Exercens, which discusses the meaning of human work and the role of labor
unions (a major element in Rerum Novarum) vis-à-vis the struggle against Communism
in his native Poland. The second is Centesimus Annus, which notes that class struggles
have persisted in the age of industrialization and addresses the recent fall of Communism
in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. This section focuses on Laborem Exercens‟
conception of justice in light of the received Catholic social tradition, and briefly
discusses the continuity of its teaching on the subjectivity of workers in Centesimus
Annus. In addition to their significance for the analysis of justice in the next chapter, John
Paul‘s spirituality of work in Laborem Exercens has further relevance with regard to the
meaning of human achievement in a genetically-enhanced world, which will be discussed
in the dissertation‘s conclusion.
In many ways, Laborem Exercens is consistent with the received tradition of
Catholic Social Teaching. For example, the third section reiterates Leo‘s teachings on the
struggle between labor and capital, emphasizing the need to place the rights of ownership
in relation to the common good.47 The fourth section outlines the rights of workers.
Proceeding from the premise that labor takes priority over capital, John Paul argues that
workers‘ rights have their basis within the larger context of human rights.48 As such, they
46
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have the right to demand living wages and to bargain collectively. As noted in previous
sections, while Leo perceived the wage issue as a matter of charity, subsequent
magisterial writings see them as constitutive of social justice. John Paul‘s teaching in
Laborem Exercens is consistent with the latter part of the tradition. There are also two
noteworthy features in the document that will bear upon the later chapters of the
dissertation. The first is John Paul‘s exposition on the meaning of work. The second is his
implicit identification of social justice with the common good, which Catholic Social
Teaching has usually treated separately.
First, John Paul‘s theological reflection on the meaning of human work offers a
few insights that make explicit what was only implied in Leo‘s seminal encyclical. Rerum
Novarum claims that social teaching is grounded in the meaning of work. As previous
discussion demonstrates, Leo located its significance in terms of sustainable wages,
warranted by the theological virtue of charity.49 There is an implicit notion of human
dignity, which is filled out in later social encyclicals and at Vatican II. In fact, church
documents locate the right to employment under the aegis of dignity.50 John Paul takes
this analysis further by grounding work and human dignity in the opening chapter of
Genesis.51 This analysis is juxtaposed sharply against the punitive toil of accursed
humanity (Genesis 3:17-19 – NRSV), and from the meaninglessness of human work, for
which only grief and anxiety are its fruits (Ecclesiastes 2:17-26). Instead, John Paul
insists that work is part of a prelapsarian schema. It is located in stewardship, a gloss of
which is found is found in God‘s blessing upon humans in Genesis 1:27-28.
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This claim is warranted by prioritizing the subjective dimension of work (the
worker– the human agent) over its objective counterpart (the type of work).52 Humans
work in myriad ways, and often they are labeled by the nature of their work: blacksmith,
economist, farmer, physician, etc. In the past, technology has been a key ally to workers,
and provides tools with which they produce more efficiently, but in recent decades,
machines have replaced human workers. This trend does not obviate the essential
subjectivity of the worker. It simply raises different ethical questions and, less simply,
presents other employment opportunities for displaced workers.
Turning to the subjective dimension, the encyclical discusses the ancient world,
which divided its kinds of labor according to social class.53 Christianity brought about
some social change in this regard. For example, the previous chapter described Cahill‘s
analysis of the New Testament community as transforming social roles within larger
society.54 Using Jesus‘ occupation as a carpenter as his prime illustration, John Paul
argues similarly that the value of work is not found in its type, but in the one doing it.
This leads immediately to a very important conclusion of an ethical nature:
however true it may be that man is destined for work and called to it, in the first
place work is "for man" and not man "for work". Through this conclusion one
rightly comes to recognize the pre-eminence of the subjective meaning of work
over the objective one. Given this way of understanding things, and presupposing
52

LE, 4-5. Seen in this light, the negative connotations of human labor in Gen 3
and Eccl 2 can be understood more clearly against the objective dimensions of work. In
Genesis, the man and woman are no longer stewards of a bountiful land. Their social role
has changed; they must now be sharecroppers. In this light, Qoheleth‘s lament can also be
explained. The toil of labor is meaningless if it only remains under the objective
dimension. He hates the work, ultimately, because he must pass on his role to someone
else. In many ways, the objective dimension mirrors the Marxist metaphor of laborers as
replaceable cogs in a machine. John Paul describes that danger in these paragraphs, too.
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that different sorts of work that people do can have greater or lesser objective
value, let us try nevertheless to show that each sort is judged above all by the
measure of the dignity of the subject of work, that is to say the person, the
individual who carries it out.55
This dignity is brought out further in his closing remarks, which express three elements
of a spirituality of work. The first is drawn from Gaudium et Spes, which roots human
dignity in creation.56 In light of this teaching, all human work participates in God‘s
creative activity. The second turns to Jesus as exemplar for a ―man of work.‖ Human
labor contributes not only to earthly progress, but when it is engaged in vocational
activity, it also builds the reign of God.57 Finally, all work has an element of toil. As
such, it links to the redemptive value of suffering and the virtue of commitment to
excellence in one‘s efforts. Christian discipleship can transform the simplest or harshest
labor into a wide contribution of saving activity.58
Furthermore, questions on the meaning of work will be raised again at the
dissertation‘s conclusion in the context of human germline enhancement. Bioengineering,
when aimed at enhancing human function, has the power to ―transform the moral
landscape.‖59 Current appreciation for human achievement and personal struggle might
erode into the pure fulfillment of a (humanly) ordained purpose. There is broad
disagreement on the extent to which this future technology might affect these elements of
human work, and they will be discussed in the coming chapters. For now, the meaning of
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work should be tied to the common good that is sought in resolving the matter. When
they participate in future debate about enhancement, John Paul‘s spirituality of work is
one resource from which Catholic voices can draw.
Next, John Paul begins implicitly to identify social justice as the common good.
In his discourse on labor unions, he calls organized labor a mouthpiece in the struggle for
social justice.60 It is significant that this struggle is not ―against‖ others; he conceives a
unifying relationship between labor and management. This vision of solidarity is twofold. On the one hand, there is solidarity among workers as they bargain collectively and
work together. On the other hand there is solidarity with workers, as owners strive to
outfit their employees with the necessary tools in order to build their own businesses.
It is characteristic of work that it first and foremost unites people. In this consists
its social power: the power to build a community. In the final analysis, both those
who work and those who manage the means of production or who own them must
in some way be united in this community. In the light of this fundamental
structure of all work-in the light of the fact that, in the final analysis, labour and
capital are indispensable components of the process of production in any social
system-it is clear that, even if it is because of their work needs that people unite to
secure their rights, their union remains a constructive factor of social order and
solidarity, and it is impossible to ignore it.61
John Paul sees this unity as necessary to endeavor toward what he calls the ―just good.‖
He defines it in the present case, as ―the good which corresponds to the needs and merits
of working people associated by profession.‖62 On closer examination, this ―just good‖
seems to be a ―local version‖ of the common good. More generally, if ―profession‖ were
taken to mean ―vocation,‖ as Gaudium et Spes describes the singular calling of humanity
toward divine unity, then social justice and common good can well be considered one and
60
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the same.63 This potential identification between the common good and social justice has
implications for the analysis of justice in Cahill‘s later writings, which often privileges
the common good over the other two affirmations in Catholic Social Teaching.
Finally, John Paul takes yet another turn to the subjective in Centesimus Annus.
As stated in previous sections of this dissertation, Catholic social thought attempts to plot
a moral course between the extremes of libertarian individualism and socialist
collectivism. On the one hand, John Paul reflects upon the class struggles that persist in
spite of the fall of Communism in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Taking aim at
socialism‘s objectifying tendencies, he claims that its most egregious error is
anthropological in scope; socialism insists that the good of the individual can be achieved
independently of autonomy.64 On the other hand, John Paul makes his strongest criticisms
against unrestrained capitalism. Regarding the use of private property, he employs Leo
XIII‘s precepts in Rerum Novarum and Vatican II‘s teaching in Gaudium et Spes as his
foundation, claiming that there is a natural but not inalienable right to property. God
offers the earth‘s riches for all.65 John Paul calls this reality the ―law of the common
purpose of goods.‖66 Later, he identifies this law as the foundation for the universal
destination of the earth‘s good.67

63
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However, John Paul‘s universal destination of goods is inconsistent with Leo‘s
understanding of private property, which is described as an inviolable right in Rerum
Novarum.68 Instead, John Paul insists that limits on the exploitation of privately-held
goods should be determined by its effect on the common good, especially to the
disadvantage of the poor. The law of the common destination of earthly goods is rooted
in the social quality of private property.69 Furthermore, the common good is achieved
only when individuals and local political groups are understood as subjects.
According to Rerum novarum and the whole social doctrine of the Church, the
social nature of man is not completely fulfilled in the State, but is realized in
various intermediary groups, beginning with the family and including economic,
social, political and cultural groups which stem from human nature itself and have
their own autonomy, always with a view to the common good. This is what I have
called the "subjectivity" of society which, together with the subjectivity of the
individual, was cancelled out by "Real Socialism".70
John Paul‘s account of subjectivity is multi-layered, and in some ways similar to Michael
Walzer‘s description of complex equality. This subjectivity is expressed by (although not
reduced to) the variety of social relationships in which each person engages, including
both involuntary and freely-chosen associations. Persons must participate within each
organization according to its internal workings. Property may be owned, but exchanges
may be blocked according to their deleterious effects on the common good.
Another difference with Rerum Novarum is found in John Paul‘s discussion of the
various forms of property. While Leo conceived of ―property‖ as commercial real estate
and industrial machinery, John Paul widens this understanding to include intellectual
property: know-how, technology, and skill. In fact, John Paul claims that these latter
68
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forms of ownership constitute the wealth of industrialized nations far more than natural
resources.71 By extension, intellectual property also possesses a social characteristic that
allows its use for all in service to the common good. As the next chapter demonstrates,
Cahill locates her understanding of social justice in the context of biotechnology along
this line of thought.
To conclude this brief sampling of John Paul‘s social teaching, three significant
points influence the remaining chapters of the dissertation. One, his theological reflection
on work locates its positive meaning within the created order, though this meaning may
be compromised in the future due to the development of enhancement technology. Two,
he implies identity between the common good and social justice, as Cahill frequently is
wont to do. Three, his complex understanding of subjectivity and extension of the social
nature of private property in service of the common good has further implications for the
futurist technology of human engineering. Now, the study turns to the American context,
with a consideration of the United States Bishops‘ statement on economic justice.

The NCCB‘s Pastoral Letter: Economic Justice for All
This section analyzes Economical Justice for All, a 1986 pastoral letter from the
United States National Conference of Catholic Bishops (NCCB) on Catholic Social
Teaching in light of the economic policies that the U.S. government was pursuing at the
time.72 It is arguably one of the most influential documents that this episcopal assembly
71
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has written since it was published. In the quarter century since its publication, the precise
economic conditions described by the bishops do not necessarily apply in the post-Cold
War era. With regard to this dissertation, though, the document remains significant for
two reasons. One, the NCCB offers a definition of ―basic justice,‖ and outlines justice‘s
role in serving the common good. Two, the letter attempts to synthesize many of the
various hierarchical resources summarized in this section thus far with regard to
participation in order to describe the unique American context with respect to social
justice. The first point provides a useful working definition within the setting of the
liberal values of the United States, and the second point warrants further participation in
public discourse to provide pragmatic solutions to pressing issues.

Basic Justice
Drawing from the received Catholic social tradition, the NCCB claims that ―basic
justice‖ is a virtue that lends itself to full and active participation in society, which itself
is a basic right of all people.73 It establishes a ―floor of material well-being on which all
can stand.‖74 There are three interpenetrating spheres of basic justice: commutative
justice, distributive justice, and social justice. Anthropologically, basic justice is
consistent with the received social tradition insofar as it is founded on Catholic Social
Teaching‘s three affirmations of human dignity, sociality, and the common good, but the
pastoral letter emphasizes the first two affirmations over the last one. The NCCB also
holds a somewhat different view of solidarity as a guiding virtue. Instead, they prefer to
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uphold hope and courage as the leading virtues that lend themselves to achieving basic
justice.
First, the NCCB‘s view of commutative justice is located primarily within the
realm of employment. The virtue of industriousness facilitates commutative justice.75
Diligent work is demanded of employees and fair wages are expected from employers for
their work.76 To this point, the NCCB upholds the church‘s support for labor unions to
maintain this aspect of basic justice.77 They call for a less adversarial posture between
labor and management. In doing so, labor unions must make a positive contribution over
and above a protectionist stance.
Labor unions themselves are challenged by the present economic environment to
seek new ways of doing business. The purpose of unions is not simply to defend
the existing wages and prerogatives of the fraction of workers who belong to
them, but also to enable workers to make positive and creative contributions to the
firm, the community, and the larger society in an organized and cooperative
way.78
In light of the unique situation for American workers in the 1980s (i.e., loss of
manufacturing jobs and President Ronald Reagan‘s anti-union policies), the bishops
encourage increased cooperation within industries between labor and management.
Next, the NCCB claims that distributive justice is another essential aspect of basic
justice. Built upon libertarian notions of desert, the American polity is frequently
uncomfortable with redistributive schemes, preferring religious and charitable
organizations over government-run bureaucracies to meet the basic needs of the poor.79
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By contrast, following the words of the Second Vatican Council, basic justice requires
that all distributive schemes be evaluated by its effect on the poor. 80 Toward this end, tax
policies should be reformed to support working families and non-commercial farming as
they compete in the marketplace.81 Furthermore, the NCCB conceives of distributive
justice as more than the exchange of material goods. Following John Paul II, they see
employment itself as a fundamental good that is constitutive of human dignity.82 In turn,
they support equitable policies to curtail discrimination and increase opportunities
especially for disenfranchised social groups.83 These endeavors require considerable
government intervention.
Third, they envision social justice as encompassing the organization of all social
and political institutions. The institutions are also composed of individuals. As such,
there is a corresponding demand of contributory justice from individuals to participate
actively and effectively toward the common good. Citing Pius XI, contributory justice is
the ―very essence of social justice.‖84 Its teaching focuses on individual rights and
responsibilities. At the same time, it casts these responsibilities against the backdrop of
the common good. Thus, the bishops‘ view of social justice attempts to reconcile the
liberal values of Western democracy with the communitarian values of Catholic Social
Teaching.
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Anthropologically, the document privileges human dignity and sociality over the
common good. In keeping with the Catholic social tradition, they avoid both extremes of
individualism and collectivism. As mentioned in the preceding paragraph, they focus
upon individual action, but their outline of urgent problems emphasizes their effects at
the local levels of society, especially the family.85 The bishops claim that the common
good redounds to the individual and local good.86 For example, in their discussion of
employment as a basic right, a healthy economy serves the common good, but it
especially lends itself toward achieving the self-actualization of persons and meeting the
basic needs of families.87
Finally, the NCCB offers two guiding virtues that help to achieve basic justice.
Catholic Social Teaching is grounded in a firm belief in the inestimable worth of persons,
in light of their dignity as human subjects. They claim that hope and courage are the
primary virtues in order to engage in building up the kingdom of God on earth.
This conviction gives Christians strong hope as they face the economic struggles
of the world today. This hope is not a naïve optimism that imagines that simple
formulas for creating a fully just society are ready at hand. The Church‘s
experience through history and in nations throughout the world today have made
it wary of all ideologies that claim to have the final answer to humanity‘s
problems.88
This hope engenders courageous action on behalf of the kingdom by transcending the
blighted vision of the present situation, and looking ahead toward a better future. Courage
helps to overcome the difficulties that contribute to the present bleakness.
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In the previous chapter, solidarity was described in Catholic Social Teaching as a
fundamental virtue to achieve and maintain the common good. To be clear, the NCCB
also find solidarity important, as the word appears over thirty times in the pastoral letter.
However, solidarity is not necessarily a virtue in their estimation. Rather, it is more of a
pragmatic value in that it is useful for building a community. 89 Alternatively, perhaps
they mean solidarity as a ―first principle‖ in a liberal democracy like the United States. In
a nation of strangers bound together by choice and free association, solidarity offers a
way of relating to the other. It gives rise to a sense of civic commitment, which in turn
demands one‘s contribution to the common good. While it is certain that solidarity plays
some role in the bishops‘ letter, it is not clear that they use the term in a manner
consistent with the tradition.
The analysis of Economic Justice for All now turns to the NCCB‘s discussion of
participation, which reiterates previous calls for engagement in public discourse and other
cooperative strategies. There is also an element of pragmatism in their writing that must
be considered in light of the epilogue of this dissertation, which offers a practical
resolution to a future public dilemma about human engineering.

The NCCB‟s Interpretation of the Principle of Participation
Participation is one of the principal themes of the pastoral letter. It is elemental to
the common good, since individuals must contribute to its advancement. By the same
token, society must ensure that all are able to contribute appropriately. Therefore,
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―Solidarity is another name for this social friendship and civic commitment that
make human moral and economic life possible,‖ EJA 66.
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participation is prior to the common good. Due to this priority, society has an obligation
to enumerate the fundamental conditions of participation.
These fundamental duties can be summarized this way: basic justice demands the
establishment of minimum levels of participation in the life of the human
community for all persons. The ultimate injustice is for a person or group to be
treated actively or abandoned passively as if they were nonmembers of the human
race. To treat people this way is effectively to say they simply do not count as
human beings.90
The bishops imply that there is a basic right to participation.91 This right is derived from
human dignity and sociality, which are affirmed by Catholic Social Teaching.92 In one
sense, they argue in a manner consistent with Walzer‘s view of justice, in that
participation connotes membership in society, which is the primary distributive good,
according to Walzer.93 Participation thereby allows individuals to select a life plan and
contribute to the common good in their own way. The NCCB‘s view of basic justice is
also an instance of Walzer‘s simple equality. Participation can easily become a dominant
good, since membership includes all of the goods demanded by basic justice. Thus,
frequent government intervention is required to ensure that goods do not become
monopolized over time.
Nonetheless, their insistence on participation as a basic right is aimed at
improving living conditions for those who, due to unfortunate and especially unjust social
arrangements, have been excluded from contributing to the common good. The
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overcoming of marginalization is not complete, but is gradually decreased. The bishops
strive for what they call ―biblical justice,‖ which they understand as a society fully
expressive of ―love, compassion, holiness, and peace,‖ but they understand that in light of
human sinfulness, guidance is required toward this ideal aim. 94 As such, they see great
value in finding practical solutions, perhaps in the form of a modus vivendi, that
ameliorate conditions gradually over time, as they continue to strive for ideal, biblical
justice.
Our approach in analyzing the U.S. economy is pragmatic and evolutionary in
nature. We live in a ―mixed‖ economic system which is the product of a long
history of reform and adjustment. It is in the spirit of this American pragmatic
tradition of reform that we seek to continue the search for a more just economy.95
The bishops seek to achieve increased participation through cooperative strategies. In the
context of this dissertation, their goal is significant with respect to arguments about
resource allocation for human genetic engineering. According to the norms spelled out in
the pastoral letter, basic justice remains as an overriding concern. The principle of
participation calls for a right relationship between research and development in genetic
technology and the economic situation and basic needs of the larger community.96
Before leaving this section, it is important to note that the virtues played some
role in the bishops‘ letter. For example, basic justice is the primary societal virtue. It
empowers individuals to participate actively in order to contribute to the common good.
Like Paul VI, John Paul II, and Cahill, the NCCB argues that it is incumbent upon society
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to ensure that every individual possesses the material wherewithal that facilitates this
participation. They depart somewhat from the Catholic social tradition by reducing the
scope of solidarity, but this discrepancy is more pragmatic than epistemological. Instead,
hope and courage are the guiding virtues that serve the advancement of basic justice. Due
to the recent recovery of the virtue tradition in Catholic moral theology, a discussion of
virtues warrants further analysis, which is forthcoming in the next major part of the
chapter. The dissertation now analyzes Benedict XVI‘s accounts of justice, charity, and
the common good, which is found in his 2009 encyclical Caritas in Veritate.

Benedict XVI‘s Caritas in Veritate
Located within the context of a recent global financial crisis, Benedict‘s first
social encyclical outlines his vision of global economic development in light of the
message of Paul VI‘s Populorum Progressio.97 Written in 2009, it represents the most
recent papal encyclical in the tradition of Catholic Social Teaching. There are two facets
of Benedict‘s encyclical that are pertinent to the aims of this dissertation. First,
Benedict‘s accounts of charity and justice overcome the implied dichotomy between
them described in earlier social encyclicals, especially Leo‘s Rerum Novarum. Second, he
offers a few incisive comments on the proper use of technology, especially in the realm
of bioethics.
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Benedict considers Populorum Progressio ―the Rerum Novarum of the present
age,‖ Benedict XVI, ―Caritas in Veritate,‖ Origins 39, no.6 (July 16, 2009), 129-159,
paragraph 8 (hereafter CV).
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The Relationship between Charity and Justice
In the opening paragraphs of Caritas in Veritate, Benedict seems initially to take a
regressive approach to the received social tradition. Whereas social justice has been at the
heart of Catholic Social Teaching since the time of Pius XI, Benedict argues that caritas
in veritate is the guiding principle of the tradition.98 As his argument develops, though,
Benedict insists that justice and the common good are intrinsically linked to charity. In
fact, justice is prior to charity. Conversely, charity transcends justice in that it offers a
strategy of giving and forgiving, going beyond the ―minimal duties‖ of justice. 99 He adds
that the common good is a requirement of both justice and charity. This duty is found
especially within the local context. Securing the common good in the political order
discloses love for one‘s neighbor.100 This charity is also found in an increasingly
globalized society, as the human family works together to achieve the universal common
good.
Moreover, Benedict calls for a greater appreciation of the meaning of charity. He
points out several problems raised by a misunderstanding or reduction of its meaning.
I am aware of the ways in which charity has been and continues to be
misconstrued and emptied of meaning, with the consequent risk of being
misinterpreted, detached from ethical living and, in any event, undervalued. In the
social, juridical, cultural, political and economic fields – the contexts, in other
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words, that are most exposed to this danger – it is easily dismissed as irrelevant
for interpreting and giving direction to moral responsibility.101
Benedict attempts to resolve this problem by linking charity with truth. He sees two
advantages to this strategy. He bases these benefits upon a two-fold conception of truth
that is informed both by reason and by faith. One, reason allows charity in truth to
advance beyond mere emotivism. Truth allows for a disinterested charity without
reducing the latter to sentimentality, which he perceives as a danger that makes charity
irrelevant and morally superfluous. He implies a natural law approach, though his
evidence here is largely scriptural.102 Nevertheless, he does argue that the pressing social
and economic questions are in the final analysis questions about human nature. Two,
charity has both a personal and public dimension when it is informed by faith.103 Charity
in truth demands a personal commitment to human development in light of each person‘s
vocation toward fulfillment in the created order.104 Following Paul VI‘s argument in
Populorum Progressio, a lack of material goods is not the primary cause of
underdevelopment. It is first of all a lack of personal will that neglects one‘s duties of
solidarity, and second of all an absence of thoughtful reflection that fails to properly
guide the will.105 There is also a public dimension of charity in truth.106 Given the
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She perceives his attention to the political and economic realm as a significant
development in his later pontificate. See Cahill, ―Caritas in Veritate: Benedict‘s Global
Reorientation,‖ Theological Studies 71, no.2 (June 2010): 317.
182

tendency toward relativism in the social context, Benedict insists that truth, which he
identifies as ―the values of Christianity,‖ is essential for building a good society.107
Benedict‘s idealism here is at odds with the NCCB‘s pragmatism in Economic
Justice for All. Benedict‘s importunity also has consequences with respect to discourse in
a diverse society. On the one hand, he argues that a Christianity of charity without truth
would become reduced to a helpful set of sentiments, but ultimately irrelevant. For that
reason, he decries coercive government family planning policies that promote
contraception and impose abortion. ―Respect for life‖ cannot be detached from questions
about human development. 108 Benedict also takes a ―common good‖ approach to finance.
Investors are not a company‘s only stakeholders, but also include workers, suppliers,
consumers, the natural environment, as well as society at large.109 On the other hand, he
remains committed to seeking ―satisfactory solutions‖ to the socioeconomic problems
that have persisted since Paul VI‘s encyclical.110 For instance, he calls for a reform of the
United Nations, and seeks a global political authority with what Benedict calls ―real
teeth‖ to ensure compliance with its decisions. 111 But it is that same world political
authority (namely, the United Nations) that institutes the family planning policies that he
denounced in his previous paragraphs.112 Furthermore, Benedict calls for redistributive
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policies and public welfare in order to increase an ―openness to forms of economic
activity marked by quotas of gratuitousness and communion.‖113 His proposed policies do
not square with the socioeconomic ethos of the current American context. As the next
election cycle for president and Congress draws near, there seems to be little political will
to undertake such intervention.
Nonetheless, Benedict makes a strong case for tying charity to a truth that is
rooted in human reason and Christian faith. Benedict‘s account of the human person
insists upon both personal development in one‘s own life and public engagement with the
world. This strategy also warrants a uniquely Christian way of participating in public
discourse about social, economic, and moral issues. Further still, justice remains at the
fore in these debates. While Benedict‘s proposed answers seem to fall short for the
current American situation, Caritas in Veritate makes a convincing argument for
continuing to seek such practical solutions in the tradition of Catholic Social Teaching.

Technology and Development
Turning to the impact of technology on development, Benedict follows John Paul
II in his claim that technology is the objective side of human action.114 More importantly,
there is a danger in the context of globalization that ideologies could be replaced with

thinkers in the Curia‘s Pontifical Council for Peace and Justice. See George Weigel,
―Caritas in Veritate in Gold and Red,‖ National Review Online (August 29, 2009), 1-2.
Online Document. http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/227839/i-caritas-veritate-igold-and-red/george-weigel?page=1, accessed August 20, 2011.
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technology. Benedict argues that technology must not become a substitute for human
freedom.
The development of peoples goes awry if humanity thinks it can re-create itself
through the ―wonders‖ of technology, just as economic development is exposed as
a destructive shame if it relies on the ―wonders‖ of finance in order to sustain
unnatural and consumerist growth. In the face of such Promethean presumption,
we must fortify our love for a freedom that is not merely arbitrary but is rendered
truly human by acknowledgment of the good that underlies it. To this end, man
needs to look inside himself in order to recognize the fundamental norms of the
natural moral law that God has written on our hearts.115
Instead, technology must refer to the subjective dimension, i.e., to the moral agent at
work. With subjectivity comes moral responsibility, especially with regard to
technology.116
Benedict also worries that technology might become a dominant good if it
benefits only those who possess it. The current logic of business practice submits to the
maximization of profit as its sole criterion for action. While the drive for profit reaps a
short-term benefit, overall human development is diminished.117 His claim is similar to
John Paul II‘s in that technology must serve the common good.118 More importantly, men
and women must be ―finely attuned‖ to the requirements of the common good. 119 The
sharing and exchange of technology are now a vital component of diplomacy in the

115

CV, 68.

116

CV, 70.

117

Cahill also makes this argument in several different essays. For instance,
pharmaceutical research and development is finding cures for ―profitable‖ diseases. See
Cahill, ―Biotech and Justice: Keeping up with the Real-World Order,‖ Hastings Center
Report 33, no.4 (2003), 34.
118

cf. John Paul II, Centesimus Annus, 32.

119

CV, 71.
185

world. Thus, a common-good approach to technology lends itself to peace-building
strategies.
Next, Benedict moves explicitly to the realm of bioethics.120 He is pessimistic
about the current technocratic ethos, and names the field of bioethics a ―battleground.‖
The combatants locked in this pitched skirmish, according to Benedict, are the supremacy
of technology and human moral responsibility. He sees expressions of this technological
supremacy especially in embryonic research and in vitro fertilization. He envisions the
―systematic eugenic programming of births‖ just below the horizon.121 It is not enough
that Christians avoid these technological advancements; they must offer convincing
reasons to others about their objectifying tendencies.
Toward this end, Benedict claims that a faith informed by reason will avoid
deluded thoughts of human omnipotence on the one hand, and irrelevant fundamentalism
on the other.122 Just as John Paul sought to develop a spirituality of work, so Benedict
attempts to produce a spirituality of technology.123 One aspect of this spirituality is a
renewed appreciation of mystery in nature, something over and above the empirical
datum.
The development of individuals and peoples is likewise located on a height, if we
consider the spiritual dimension that must be present if such development is to be
authentic. It requires new eyes and a new heart capable of rising above a
materialistic vision of human events, capable of glimpsing in development the
―beyond‖ that technology cannot give. By following this path, it is possible to
120
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pursue the integral human development that takes its direction from the driving
force of charity in truth.124
Building on the common-good approach to technology and the subjective dimension of
work, Benedict asserts that a spiritual appraisal of technological advancement lends itself
to fruitful human development. From this perspective, technology is not neutral, but it
does not necessarily have to be ominous, either.
Benedict‘s cautious appraisal of technology in Caritas in Veritate is a timely work
on the vital priority of human freedom and responsibility as subjects. Cahill has also
commented favorably on Benedict‘s encyclical, in light of what she perceives as a
significant development in his attention to social concerns during his pontificate.

Conclusion to the Analysis of the Catholic Hierarchy‘s Statements on Justice
This lengthy opening part of Chapter Three has attempted to highlight a few of
the perspectives on justice from the Catholic hierarchy. Vatican II‘s Pastoral Constitution
on the Church captured the development about justice in the Catholic social tradition
from its inception in Leo XIII‘s Rerum Novarum through the pre-conciliar social
encyclicals. Rooted in the essential notions of human dignity and sociality, the justness of
human action must be evaluated with regard to its impact on the poor. Moreover, the
common good, which is the third affirmation of Catholic Social Teaching, is
bidirectional. All individuals are called to serve the common good; this is a matter of
contributory justice. In turn, society, which also must serve and is served by the common
good, is enjoined to provide each person with the material goods necessary to facilitate
his or her contribution; this is a matter of distributive justice. Vatican II describes the
124

CV, 77.
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ideal conditions, when all can most readily serve (and are best served by) the common
good, as ―social justice.‖
The social encyclicals of Paul VI and John Paul II build upon the council‘s
teachings on justice and apply them in a variety of ways. Paul VI argues that free trade
and property rights are subordinated to the council‘s principles of social justice. He also
applies Leo‘s relationship between labor and management to the analogous relationship
between nations in terms of international trade. The guiding virtues of human solidarity,
social justice, and universal charity dictate that wealthier nations should negotiate
commerce agreements with poorer nations by principles in excess of commutative justice.
John Paul argues that workers‘ rights are derived from human rights. He also provides a
spiritual reflection on the meaning of work, perceiving it as a fundamental good in the
created order. There may be a further development in the tradition, as John Paul begins to
identify the common good as social justice. Here, the conditions are not simply an ideal;
social justice ought to be the norm. The conditions can be said to be contextualized in
what he calls the ―just good.‖ Furthermore, John Paul‘s claims about property are
consistent with the post-conciliar social tradition insofar as they are relativized by the
demands of social justice. But he also outlines a fuller account of property to include its
intellectual dimensions. Skills and technology thereby fall under the jurisdiction of the
common good, a theme that Benedict takes up in his encyclical.
The National Conference of Catholic Bishops offers a definition of ―basic
justice,‖ which encompasses three interrelated spheres of commutative, distributive, and
social justice. They argue similarly to the Pastoral Constitution that participation is a
human right, and call for concrete action to help each person contribute toward the
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common good. They express a desire for pragmatic solutions, found through cooperative
strategies, toward facilitating that fundamental right.
Finally, Benedict XVI‘s encyclical opens with the theme of charity. He clearly
demonstrates that justice is prior to charity, but also wants to present a fuller account of
charity as a theological virtue. Charity must be informed by both reason and faith.
Without reason, charity is reduced to sentiment. Without faith, charity becomes
irrelevant. Moreover, he presents a spiritual reflection on technology that hearkens back
to John Paul‘s subjective dimension of work. Technology should not master nature, but
instead should open up the subject to ponder nature‘s mystery‘s further. Technology
ought not to be used as a tool of oppression, but should serve the common good.
Taken together, these theological perspectives on justice from the hierarchy
highlight a circuitous trajectory toward a terminus that can be called social justice or the
common good. All aspects of justice discussed thus far seem to find their realization in
one or the other. Sometimes its conditions are presented ideally, as in Vatican II, Paul VI,
and Benedict XVI. Other times, they are described in situational or pragmatic terms, as in
John Paul II and the NCCB, respectively. Looking ahead to Chapter Three, Cahill‘s
conception of justice is similarly complex. Part of her context is rooted in the Catholic
Social Tradition, which emphasizes social justice as an overarching principle.
The dissertation now turns to the idea of justice as a personal virtue. Virtue ethics
has a longstanding prominence in Catholic moral theology, though for many years its
influence was somewhat understated. The first section described virtue in philosophical
terms, with its analysis of Alasdair MacIntyre. Recently, there has also been a palpable
return of virtue in theological ethics, too, though its impact thus far is difficult to discern.
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The next section outlines some of the features of the recovery of virtue ethics and
considers a few representative writings from scholars within the contemporary virtue
tradition.

Recovery of Virtue Ethics in the Catholic Moral Tradition
The first chapter briefly outlined the Natural Law tradition, where the virtues play
a vital role. The previous chapter already explored Alasdair MacIntyre‘s account of the
virtues and its connection to the living tradition of a community. Now, this part briefly
considers writings from American moral theologians Jean Porter and James Keenan as
representatives of a strand of Catholic moral theology that attempts to reunite virtue with
Catholic Natural Law ethics. A treatment of virtue is required because justice is included
as one of the four cardinal virtues, along with courage, self-control, and prudence. In the
Catholic tradition, these volitional, affective, and intellectual attitudes have been
understood as virtues upon which all the others hinge (Wisdom 8:6-7).125 They ground
human action, orienting the person toward those ends which are considered ―worthy of
praise‖ (Phil 4:8-9). For their part, Keenan and Porter demonstrate that there is neither a
complete nor an uncritical recovery of the classical Thomistic tradition. Moreover, even
in a critical reclamation and outright revision of the virtue tradition, justice remains
indispensable.126
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This discussion of the contemporary virtue tradition proceeds in three parts. First,
a cursory examination of ethical method since Vatican II reveals a reinvigoration of
Natural Law ethics, with brisk exchanges among several contrasting approaches. As these
debates waned, it seems that a conceptual space had cleared for greater attention to
personalist ethical methods. Among these, a rediscovered virtue tradition is prominent.
After this brief excursus, Jean Porter‘s work on Natural Law is analyzed in light of her
reliance on MacIntyre‘s account of the virtues. She concludes that virtue ethics cannot be
universal in scope, a point disputed by Cahill (see Chapter Four). Third, the work of
influential American Jesuit moral theologian James Keenan is explored in the context of
his attempts to root moral discourse more deeply in scripture while continuing to reflect
the realities of the contemporary world.

Excursus: Moral Theology in the Wake of the Second Vatican Council
It is interesting to trace the renewal of Catholic moral theology since Vatican II,
especially when viewed from a wider perspective which includes the Council‘s sixteen
major promulgations. It seems strange that the oft-cited warrant for reinvigorating moral
reflection in the church comes from a relatively minor document on priestly formation,
where the Council calls for greater attention to the revision of ecclesial studies, especially
philosophy and scripture, as they lend themselves carefully to the ―perfection of moral
theology.‖ 127 This approbation is underwhelming in light of the Council‘s dramatic
announcement of a both a universal ―priesthood of believers‖ and ―call to holiness.‖128
Vatican II seems to retain a view that moral theology, albeit a ―perfected one,‖ was solely
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for the confessional, as its renaissance is located in a document that deals with the
ministerial priesthood alone. Thus, it is surprising that so much literature has been
produced from this narrowly-focused decree.
Nevertheless, the sheer amount of scholarly and ecclesial work in moral theology
requires at least a brief historical examination of them as they pertain to the dissertation,
and warrants this departure from the discussion of justice in the Catholic moral tradition.
As this section demonstrates, Catholic ethical method clearly developed in the wake of
the Second Vatican Council, but for the most part, it also remained firmly anchored
within natural law reasoning. Some of the contrasting and sometimes vehement
exchanges seem initially to vindicate Alasdair MacIntyre‘s lament about the
incommensurability of rival traditions which have both lost their tether to the predecessor
culture. By the same token, it can also be a sign of development within that rich culture;
it is making room for mature, individual, and responsible decision-making on pressing
moral issues. Instead of seeing it as a dysfunctional dialogue that wrongly uses
vocabulary from the forgotten past, perhaps it is a healthy disagreement within an
evolving tradition about the purpose of moral action. In either case, it proceeds in a
MacIntyrean way; Porter‘s and Keenan‘s work especially bear out this claim.
First, a brief look at the taxonomy of ethical methods is helpful to navigate the
writings of Porter and Keenan in the next two parts. Porter describes the traditionalist
post-conciliar efforts in moral theology as ―new‖ natural law theory.129 She uses this
designation to refer particularly to American writers like Germain Grisez and John
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Finnis. In turn, they call their own method the ―Basic Goods Theory.‖ 130 By contrast,
Keenan sees them as contemporary examples of ―neo-manualists.‖131 In fact, the structure
of Grisez‘s three-volume work, The Way of the Lord Jesus, resembles classical moral
manuals in that it introduces basic principles, then exhorts Christian living, and finally
considers hard cases. With an appreciation for its several aliases, the following
paragraphs focus on Grisez‘s work.
The Basic Goods Theory (hereafter BGT) attempts to give content to Aquinas‘
first principle of practical reasoning: the good is to be sought, while the evil is to be
avoided.132 While initially seeming to connect his theory with the classical tradition,
Grisez‘s account of the basic goods describes them as a priori and self-evident. In other
words, they do not, as Aquinas does, derive these goods from observed knowledge of the
natural order, and do not depend on any particular comprehensive doctrine. Grisez lists
seven basic goods: human life (to include health and procreation), knowledge/aesthetic
appreciation, skilled performance, self-integration, authenticity/practical reasonableness,
justice and friendship, and religion/holiness.133 Later, Grisez adds an eighth good:
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marriage.134 Even though they are free from experience, they stand in no serial or lexical
relation to one another.
After listing the basic goods, the BGT further explains that human actions must
reflect a ―will toward integral human fulfillment.‖ Grisez names this the first principle of
morality. 135 This principle is further explained by eight modes of responsibility, which
demand that the agent should not be moved by ―a stronger desire for one instance of an
intelligible good to act for it by choosing to destroy, damage, or impede some other
instance‖ of them. Hence, the basic goods are also incommensurable. 136
The BGT is not the only natural law theory to develop since Vatican II. Other
theologians have used the natural law as a starting point for specifying moral norms,
though they have attacked the issues in a manner at odds with the BGT. As with the
BGT, they are also called by various names: revisionism, proportionalism, and
consequentialism, among others. For instance, moral theologian Todd Salzman uses
―revisionism‖ to describe the natural-law methods that have developed in contrast to
BGT.137 Bernard Hoose utilizes the term ―proportionalism‖ to describe methods that
generally accept the basic goods as formal norms. However, he insists that in concrete
action, a right relationship must be realized among them in order for an act to be
considered morally good.138 Still others like Richard McCormick and Charles Curran
employ the word ―consequentialism‖ to emphasize the goodness in the act, which is
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found by looking to the reasonably foreseeable consequences as they affect the human
person, adequately considered. However, consequentialism is a label often used
pejoratively by McCormick‘s opponents. Grisez, for example, equates the term with
utilitarianism, as ―efficiency in promoting measurably good results,‖ and calls it
―dangerous nonsense.‖139 American Jesuit Paul Quay describes consequentialism in a
manner consistent with MacIntyre‘s emotivist, consumerist culture: as a ―mercantilization
of values,‖ which are to be ―balanced, exchanged, and traded off for one another.‖140
McCormick‘s writings from the 1970s are especially attacked by his critics, though his
work develops significantly until his death in 2000. 141
Through the early 1990s, the BGT-proportionalism debate seemed to be an
exemplar of MacIntyre‘s claim to the interminability of rival arguments.142 In fact, they
mirrored the debates among Enlightenment thinkers. On the one hand, the BGT insists on
a set of universal, rational, a priori norms, which must always be upheld and never
undermined directly. More importantly, there are some acts which are excluded from
moral choice by the nature of the acts themselves. They are called intrinsically evil; no
good intention can ever overcome the badness in such acts. But such acts are problematic.
What happens when one is faced with a choice of undermining truth in order to protect
innocent life? On the other hand, proportionalist arguments counter that the goodness of
139
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an act cannot be determined without attending to all aspects of the act. It must hold a
right relationship among the goods, both proximate and remote. Furthermore, these ends
are most readily discovered by looking toward the consequences of the act. Still, while no
proportionalist writer would ever justify murder, they have difficulty in claim that murder
in se is wrong from within their context. If some imaginably (if improbably) better
consequence could be proposed, could such a terrible act be found more tolerable than
something else?143 Space does not permit a fuller treatment of these debates, but they
remain very interesting for the recent history of moral theology and significant for the
field today.
Suddenly, the debate seemed to have dissipated in the 1990s. In one recent study,
American theologian Aline Kalbian proposes that these ―deontology vs. teleology‖
debates were certainly fierce and seemingly unrelenting, but in the end they were the
undercard to the main conflict in Catholic moral theology. Instead, proportionalism was
ultimately successful ―in influencing the development of Catholic ethics by encouraging
a reappraisal of the methodology for evaluation moral action in a direction that was more
hospitable to concerns about the particularity of the context of the agent.‖144 While their
sometimes myopic focus upon consequences is perhaps unwarranted, they facilitated a
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shift toward personalist thinking in three ways.145 First, the emphasis on agency is
consistent with Vatican II‘s universal call to holiness. As such, the striving of the moral
agent becomes the source and context for deliberation, a point driven home by
proportionalism‘s representatives. At the same time, a rejection of intrinsically evil acts
arouses fears of relativism; one example is urgently described by John Paul II. 146 Kalbian
argues here that proportionalists in fact agree that exceptionless norms can be stated as
universals, but that they are not so solely by virtue of the object.147 Instead of looking to
the intrinsic nature of moral acts, proportionalists acknowledge the complex environment
of human intentions. Every act contains within itself values and disvalues. Aquinas‘
elegant account of the procession of human action backs Kalbian‘s claim. Curiously,
Aquinas‘ reflections here are ignored by Grisez.148
Third, proportionate reason was first described in Chapter One of the dissertation.
Here, Kalbian refers the four-conditioned principle of double effect. Drawing on seminal
essays from German theologian Peter Knauer149 and the work of Richard McCormick,
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she claims that the associated goods of an act must be commensurate when allowing
physical evils to occur.150 On McCormick‘s account of proportionate reason,
consequences have a determining role, but they are not the only one. Moreover,
proportionate reason is not identical with a utilitarian calculus. As Alasdair MacIntyre
has complained, one cannot determine best outcomes without a prior and determinant
notion of the good.151 In proportionate reason, McCormick already has a notion of the
good, rooted in his firm commitment to the Christian tradition. Thus, the problem is not
that there is a calculus; it is that the calculus must be ―truly adequate and fully Christian.‖
152

Finally, Kalbian applies proportionalism‘s contributions in the context of three
contemporary, contrasting streams of Catholic ethics – virtue ethics, case studies, and
feminist ethics. While in no way implying that these three developing methods are
basically proportionalist, she demonstrates that proportionalism‘s vanguard attempts to
problematize more traditional ethical methods have cleared a conceptual space that
allows for a more holistic, personalist reflection upon human action. 153 A proportionalist
approach does not capture the richness of virtue, but still requires the virtue of practical
wisdom implied in proportionate reason. A contemporary ethic of virtue builds upon the
context of the striving moral agent, thereby coinciding with a central component of
proportionalism. The reinvigoration of casuistry, described in the work of Albert Jonsen
and Stephen Toulmin in Chapter One, ascribes vital importance to context and
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circumstances. Citing Jonsen and Toulmin, Kalbian connects proportionalism to casuistry
by noting that in both instances, ―moral knowledge is essentially particular.‖154 Thus,
contemporary casuistry offers no deductive principles to dictate proper action in all future
cases, but instead affords an inductive method to aid reflective discernment in light of
particular circumstances. While acknowledging the wide range of feminist thought,
Kalbian focuses on one common strand: feminist critiques of natural law physicalism. 155
By rooting feminist method in human experience, rather than given norms derived from
natural law, one can more readily evaluate moral action in a manner consistent with
proportionalism.
Before moving on to an analysis of the contemporary virtue tradition, a brief
consideration of this part‘s relevance to Cahill‘s work is in order. As mentioned in
Chapter One, Cahill‘s earliest scholarly work focused on McCormick‘s consequentialism.
In several essays, she attempts to defend McCormick against his critics by distinguishing
between his teleological method and crass utilitarianism. For instance, she anticipates
MacIntyre‘s insistence on foundational notions of the good to make human action
intelligible by pointing out that proportionalists (and especially McCormick) advance ―a
telos whose substance is not circumscribed.‖ More importantly, proportionate reasoning
must be evaluated as ―the consistency of an action or pattern of action with the life of
virtue, understood by Christian authors as a life consistent with the will of God.‖156 A
truly good action must bear fruit that resonates with this telos. Thus, McCormick‘s
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emphasis upon consequences is intelligible because it is rooted in the Christian command
to love God and neighbor (Matt 22:34-40).
Many writers, including Kalbian, describe Cahill‘s writings under the banner of
―feminist‖ theology. While this dissertation hesitates to label her work strictly as such, it
is true that Cahill‘s understanding of natural law is consistent with Kalbian‘s feminist
analysis.157
A commitment to an objective moral order, knowable by reasonable reflection on
human experience, especially of the goods which are constitutive of human
flourishing, and the institutions necessary to secure, protect, and distribute them.
158

In other words, Cahill‘s method is rooted in human experience, and this contextual
givenness is far from static. It stands in a mutually-informative relationship to both the
past and present. More significantly, it generates a mutually-corrective thrust toward a
more just future. Further still, Cahill seeks to transgress the marked boundaries of
tradition, to form coalitions with likeminded representatives of other religious and secular
traditions to achieve that end.
Now the dissertation analyzes two representatives of the new virtue tradition, both
of whom engage in academic exchanges with Cahill in their respective works. First, Jean
Porter‘s account of the virtue tradition is considered with respect both to her
interpretation of the natural law (with a strong affinity to Kalbian‘s analysis) and to the
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earlier exploration of MacIntyre‘s work. Then, a brief survey of James Keenan‘s work
will help to locate Cahill‘s understanding of justice as a virtue in the next chapter.

Jean Porter‘s Thomistic Accounts of Natural Law and Justice
After a brief introduction to Porter‘s account of traditional understandings of the
natural law, this part analyzes her critique of Grisez‘s conception of the natural law. She
claims BGT is at odds with these traditional descriptions. Next, it explores Porter‘s
recovery of the natural law tradition and her strong commitment to personal virtue within
it. Her account of the natural law also departs from traditional understandings of it,
though in a much different manner than Grisez. Lastly, this part turns to her treatment of
justice, which stresses the personal aspect of this cardinal virtue over and above its social
applications.

Natural Law and a Critique of the Basic Goods Theory
On the traditional view of natural law, which Porter claims is also endorsed by the
Catholic magisterium, moral norms are ―grounded in the processes and inclinations of the
human person, including sensual, rational, and spiritual inclinations.‖159 Furthermore,
these norms are seen as intrinsically teleological and universally binding. They dictate
that humans should act in a manner consistent with these normative purposeful functions,
which are discerned through reasoned observation of human life.160 Traditional moral
rules that prohibit murder, theft, lying, and the like are considered expressions of the
natural law, and are therefore universal and exceptionless.
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Porter claims that the BGT is innovative, in that it departs from this traditional
understanding of the natural law as rooted in the physical nature of human persons.161
Grisez attempts to overcome criticisms of naturalistic fallacy by detaching moral
significance from physicality in human action. For instance, he distinguishes between
direct and indirect action, especially with regard to killing, without interpreting the action
in terms of causality.
As Grisez explains, an act involves an evil will in the moral sense if either of two
conditions is met: If the bad effect is the very point of the act, or if the good
sought can only be attained through some further action, either by the agent, or by
someone else. 162
Porter argues here that eschewing traditional language runs the risk of reducing the
agent‘s intention to the act itself, so described. Killing a patient can be described simply
as seeking the good of ―pain relief.‖163 Furthermore, human action is not often as
indivisible as Grisez would like. Complexity in human action, as described by Aquinas,
demonstrates that an evil will rises to the surface in deliberation and choice regarding the
means to achieve some desired end.164 Grisez simply bypasses this stage of action by
locating the unity in the act within the good to be sought.
In the end, Porter suggests that the whole reason Grisez and other ―new‖ natural
law thinkers approach these moral questions in such a manner is that they seek to justify
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the institutional agenda of the Catholic magisterium with regard to moral teachings.165 In
fact, she argues that Grisez‘s influence is particularly pronounced in John Paul II‘s
subsequent encyclical dealing with the natural law.166 Other American moral theologians,
like Salzman and McCormick, have made similar claims.167 As Porter notes, the problem
is not with upholding the norms of a community. Rather, as a comprehensive doctrine, it
limits the scope of what can be reasonably demonstrated to those outside that tradition.168

Particularity in Porter‟s Conception of Natural Law
In other words, Porter is arguing that moral norms derived from natural law are
not universal. In subsequent work, she develops and advances this claim by pointing to
the inherently theological manner by which medieval natural law theologians employed
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their methods. This entrenched theology is especially prominent in Aquinas. 169 In his
Summa, he frequently turns to the sources of revelation and the Christian tradition which
grew from them. Moreover, he does not compartmentalize them, but instead oscillates
between his intelligent observations and the revelatory texts. He offers no ―hermeneutics
of suspicion‖ with regard to scripture, but seems to envision them as justifying his claims
about the natural law. This affinity among revealed scripture, reasoned observation, and
the natural world is a hallmark of the Summa.
Porter sees natural law as germinating from and shaped by a religious tradition.
Human reasoning about nature or anything else is also shaped by the particularities of
human experience. The sources of revelation and tradition thereby inform one‘s personal
experience to the degree that they constitute a major component of a community‘s selfunderstanding. In light of contemporary pluralism, though, any moral claims necessarily
arise from within a local context. Porter sees insuperable difficulties in achieving
universal moral consensus.
The claim that all moral traditions share a fundamental core, which amounts to a
universally valid morality, appears to me to be defensible only if the core in
question is described at such a high level of generality as to be virtually empty,
and even then, it is difficult to arrive at a statement of principles that would be
universally acceptable.170
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The ubiquity and pervasiveness of pluralism seems to militate against any meaningful
claim of universality. Any argument about a good to be achieved must begin from ―the
particular convictions and practices of the communities out of which they emerge.‖171
At first blush, this line of argument raises a large problem for anyone who speaks
from a religious tradition. In fact, it seems to encourage theologians to relinquish their
strongest symbols and practices in order to participate in public discourse. But Porter
does not go this far. In fact, she argues that particularity is problematic only ―if we
assume that rational inquiry must be purified of all historical and cultural
contingencies.‖172 By contrast, she claims that natural law offers ―a way of thinking about
the theological significance of human nature and the moralities stemming from
nature.‖173
In this vein of diversity within a community‘s moral tradition, Porter reveals her
indebtedness to Alasdair MacIntyre with respect to virtue. She argues that virtues
―operate in and through the pursuit of the goods proper to human life.‖174 Following
Aquinas, she further claims that happiness is best understood as the ―ultimate perfection
of a rational nature.‖175 And since for Aquinas, this perfect happiness is only realized
within the beatific vision, Porter makes the case that the practice of the virtues lends
themselves to this aim. Virtues also help individuals to strive toward attainment of the
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ends of humanity‘s ―natural principles of operation.‖176 Still, virtues remain
―paradigmatic‖ rather than universal in scope.177
Porter‘s analysis of virtue is undergirded by a commitment to the wide communal
context, which she claims is lost in new natural law theories like the BGT. Once again,
her reliance upon MacIntyre becomes apparent. The content of the natural law draws
upon the ―collective processes of experience, debate, and reflection,‖ all facilitated
through prudent examination of the community‘s purpose.178 In turn, those norms
constitute the paradigmatic point of departure from which individuals discern proper
human action.
It is one thing to say that we are naturally oriented toward certain desiderata, and
this orientation provides a natural starting point for practical reflection and moral
action. It is something else again to say that we have a rational grasp of certain
basic goods, elemental enough to be regarded plausibly as self-evident to all and
yet provided with enough content to provide an immediate basis for practical
reflection.179
In short, natural law provides at most a basis for moral reflection, rather than readymade
answers for moral action, as the BGT claims it does.
Despite Porter‘s reliance upon MacIntyre, she departs from him with regard to
modern rights language, though not radically so. Whereas MacIntyre cannot see rights as
existing in the current state of grave disorder, Porter sees them as potentially functioning
in a community of common material and emotional needs.180 Moreover, she argues that
human rights can serve Christian purposes. But she accomplishes this task by tracing the
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idea of rights to their roots in medieval natural law thinking.181 Of course, MacIntyre‘s
argument that rights do not exist turns on his premise that an Aristotelian or Thomistic
foundation has been lost, and these are the only traditions that could have supported a
healthy notion of rights.182 In the end, her claim is not so much at odds with MacIntyre
with regard to rights, as it is to the possibility that a recovery of the Thomistic tradition is
not so far off as he presumes.
Yet a different problem emerges for Porter. She summarizes her argument by
claiming that setting forth normative behavior is a fundamental necessity. At the same
time, she claims that these norms are provisional at best. And even with a theological
foundation, it cannot be known with certainty ―whether in a particular case they are
informed by grace, reflective of the unconditional will of God.‖183 A particular Christian
community is constituted by the prior understanding that it stands in relation to a triune
God who has acted in human history. It would seem strange then that the community
envisioned by Porter would lack the necessary tools to discern moral action with regard
to divine guidance, given that these resources give rise to the paradigm in the first place.
Nevertheless, her compelling case for a richer recovery of the Thomistic natural law
tradition and her subtle contrast against MacIntyre‘s problems with rights language allow
for a more precise analysis of Cahill‘s theological writings on justice in the next chapter.
In fact, Cahill offers a critical response both to Porter‘s pessimism regarding a universal
ethic and to her agnosticism with regard to particular cases. For the moment, the
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dissertation analyzes Porter‘s conception of justice, and its implications for the next
chapter.

Porter‟s Thomistic Account of Justice
Porter‘s fullest treatment of justice as a personal virtue is found in her 1990 book,
The Recovery of Virtue, where she offers a lengthy analysis of Aquinas‘ exposition on
justice from the Summa.184 Her Thomistic understanding of justice remains a large part of
her subsequent work. Thus, this section draws largely from this earlier essay, while
noting its lasting influence throughout her later work. After a short introduction to
Thomistic justice in relation to other virtues, this part turns to Porter‘s claim that Aquinas
is not a one-sided communalist. This argument is supported by Aquinas‘ notions of harm
to others, equality among persons, and justice in community, all of which she discusses at
length in the essay considered here. Her work on justice is significant toward the aims of
this dissertation because she emphasizes the importance of the individual good over that
of the common good in Aquinas. This is a major point of contrast between Porter and
Cahill, as introduced in Chapter One and to be further analyzed in the next chapter.
To begin, justice consists in giving to others what is due to them. It contrasts with
the other cardinal virtues in two ways. First, it is a volitional virtue, unlike the intellectual
virtue of prudence, and the affective virtues of temperance and fortitude. Because
Aquinas sees the will as naturally inclined toward the good, it needs no further
orientation toward the good of the moral agent. Correlatively, justice, coupled with
charity, directs action toward the good of others. Justice thereby is ―exhibited in terms of
184
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external actions which embody right relations among individuals, or between individuals
and the community.‖185 Justice, then, is aimed primarily toward the right functioning of a
well-ordered society.
This conclusion would seem to have the common good as its goal. Indeed,
Aquinas claims that the common good takes precedence over the good of individual at
several places in the Summa.186 Porter argues that Aquinas‘ emphasis on the common
good results from his anthropology. Human beings are inherently social; they can flourish
only within a communal setting. Part of this flourishing comes through the necessary
exercising of humanity‘s natural capacities. 187 The larger community is also necessary to
help in providing material support, even more so than the family, which is the basic unit
of the community.
At the same time, Aquinas‘ anthropology insists upon the fundamental equality of
persons. This egalitarian precept places limits upon a community‘s coercive capacity over
the individual. For instance, the wrongness of theft is founded on the legitimation of
private property, which itself is developed from a notion of human dominion over
creation.188 As such, the community has a normative obligation to punish theft as a crime
against the natural order. Nonetheless,
When the institution of property threatens its own raison d‟être by preventing
individuals or the whole community from having access to the necessary means of
life, then the institution itself breaks down, or at least the claims that it guarantees
under ordinary circumstances must give way to more exigent claims. It is on this
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basis that Aquinas justifies the seizure of property by private individuals who are
pressed to do so by urgent need.189
While the community must provide for the protection of private property as a basic right,
there is a limit to this right. Hence, communal needs redound to the individual. Moreover,
the example of property demonstrates conflicting claims with regard to harm. An
individual has seized the property of another individual out of an urgent desire for
survival. The presence of this need reflects poorly upon the community that is charged
with the just distribution of the materials required for meeting basic necessities. In
Aquinas‘ estimation, the community must forego the punishment of individuals in these
circumstances. The harm incurred by the property owner is also considered in relation to
the needy individual‘s situation.
Porter‘s analysis of Aquinas‘ account of distributive justice demonstrates his
complex interplay between the individual good and the communal good. Another
example of this intricacy is found in her discussion of the Thomistic distinction between
murder and justifiable homicide. On the one hand, capital punishment and wartime
killing can be morally justified under stringent criteria.190 In both instances, the state
accomplishes the killing through its authorized agents. On the other hand, vigilante
killings or remorseful suicides both ought to be condemned as murder, since no private
individual has authority over the life of another or even oneself.191 Once again, the
difference is found in the essential equality of persons and a presumed immunity from
harm. In the latter cases, it is not for individuals to decide who may be killed. In the
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former cases, a further distinction can be made. In the case of capital punishment, the
condemned has forfeited his or her protection from harm by some prior action for which
he or she is found guilty. In the case of killing in war, there are also presumptions of just
cause and means of last resort. In both cases, an unjust aggression against the order of the
community must be answered with a definitive response.
Aquinas‘ account of killing in self-defense provides yet another instance of his
preference for the individual good over the common good. Since the killing is being done
by a private citizen, it seems to contradict the aforementioned cases of justifiable
homicide. However, so long as the actor‘s sole intention is the preservation of her or his
life, killing is vindicated because ―no one has a duty to take more care of another‘s life
than his own.‖ 192 Like the example of acquiring another‘s property in times of urgent
need, killing another in self-defense is morally justified by analyzing the agent‘s
circumstances in light of communal notions of survival and flourishing. The just
community agrees that all citizens are equal with respect to protection from harm. By the
same token, the aggressor‘s grave action de facto forfeits his or her security. Thus, the
immediate and extraordinary circumstances which threaten one‘s survival override the
ordinary criterion that would identify this act as murder.
Finally, Porter analyzes Aquinas‘ brief treatment of distributive justice in the
context of these three notions of harm, equality, and community. Aquinas specifies two
kinds of justice: commutative and distributive. Commutative justice concerns exchanges
between private individuals, and distributive justice concerns the sharing of common
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material (and spiritual goods).193 Both are rooted in equality, but they reflect different
forms of it.194 Commutative justice insists on equality with regard to contractual
exchanges; distributive justice describes the due proportion an individual receives from
the community. Porter describes his account of distributive justice as ―too abstract to
provide for much substantive guidance‖ for at least two reasons.195 For one thing,
Aquinas distinguishes among the various systems of government in which distribution
takes place in a descriptive sense. He offers no opinion on which would provide the most
just forms of distribution. Correlatively, there is no difference between merit and desert
with regard to distribution. Desert seems to have a more direct application in matters of
distributive justice, at least with regard to the ―necessities of life.‖196 Justice, therefore, is
completed by the virtue of prudence in giving definitive content to the concrete principles
of justice.
This last point raises another problem that was introduced in previous discussion
of MacIntyre‘s work. Questions about distribution can be paraphrased: ―Whose justice?
Whose prudence?‖ Aquinas‘ account of distributive justice seems to fit any distributive
scheme, but this versatility offers little resolution to today‘s pressing issues. It does not
follow that prudent deliberation will result in just principles of distribution, as
demonstrated by the varieties of disagreement outlined in the first part of this chapter.
Without a more complete rendering of the good, Thomistic notions of justice are no more
or less problematic than any of the others offered thus far.
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Porter has anticipated this problem through a prior analysis of Aquinas‘
discussion of the human good.197 There, she describes his first principle of practical
reason – ―good is to be done and pursued, and evil is to be avoided‖ – as a self-evident
claim.198 Through a complex discourse, Porter builds a case that actions can be discerned
with respect to the human good, though it is only an overture to a fuller account of the
virtues. Following Aristotle, Aquinas claims that all action is aimed at some perceived
good. In fact, the ultimate goal of action is grounded in the pursuit of the good life. While
most human action does not attend directly to this remote end, immediate ends are
sufficiently similar to render it intelligible.199 Thus, Aquinas‘ account of the good allows
for pursuit of many ends that harmonize with the comprehensive good, but this ultimate
happiness is found in the proper exercise of virtues.200 It is not enough that a moral action
be good; the moral agent must also be so.
This examination of Porter‘s work concludes by summarizing her description of
the permanent significance of Aquinas‘ theological reflection. He synthesizes the
received tradition up to his time, and addresses the ongoing arguments that constituted
that tradition. His work remains foundational for the current rival arguments within the
Catholic moral tradition today.201 Moreover, his thought sheds light on ecumenical and
political discourse in light of the development of his work by others inside and outside of
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the Catholic context.202 Porter retains her claim that Aquinas‘ work is most suited for
ongoing discourse within the tradition. In fact, Catholic thinkers would do well to
consider the claims of modern science and American pragmatism in order to dialogue
more fully with these rival traditions.

James Keenan‘s Account of the Virtues
The dissertation now moves to the writings of American Jesuit James Keenan, an
influential moral theologian whose work in virtue coincides with some of the
considerations suggested by Porter. Like Porter, Keenan claims that the virtues are
largely paradigmatic in function, though he uses the term ―heuristic‖ to demonstrate the
individual‘s role in learning or discovering virtue.203 Keenan‘s tradition-dependent
account of the virtues over a principle-based approach is also consistent with MacIntyre‘s
and Porter‘s work.204 While he engages the classical tradition, his work is also
characteristically post-conciliar insofar as he uses scripture as the source and milieu of
his virtue ethics rather than a reminder or confirmation of it.205 His work also contrasts
with Porter in at least two ways. First, he emphasizes a common good approach to justice,

202

Ibid., 174-176. Here, Porter points to the work of Gustafson and Hauerwas,
among others, who have analyzed Aquinas‘ claims in light of their respective traditions.
203

Daniel J. Harrington and James F Keenan, Jesus and Virtue Ethics: Building
Bridges between New Testament Studies and Moral Theology (Lanham: Sheed and Ward,
2002), 122. Note: While this text is coauthored, each writer helpfully labels his respective
contribution at the opening of each section. Unless otherwise noted, my dissertation deals
exclusively with Keenan‘s work in this particular book.
204

Keenan, ―Virtues, Principles and a Consistent Ethics of Life,‖ in Thomas
Nairn, ed., The Consistent Ethic of Life: Assessing its Reception and Relevance
(Maryknoll: Orbis Books, 2008), 48-60.
205

Keenan, Jesus and Virtue Ethics. See also Keenan, A History of Catholic
Moral Theology in the Twentieth Century, 77, hereafter A History.
214

one that has a closer affinity to Cahill‘s work than Porter‘s, at least in the texts considered
thus far. Sometimes, justice can compete with one or more of the other cardinal
virtues.206 This conflict comes from Keenan‘s relational anthropology and encompasses a
globalized perspective which is emphasized especially in his most recent work.207
Second, for almost two decades he has expressed dissatisfaction with the classical list of
cardinal virtues, due in part to his anthropological concerns. In proposing new virtues,
justice still heads the list.208
This section briefly examines Keenan‘s account of the virtues, and explores his
proposed revision of the cardinal virtues. In continuity with the aims of the dissertation,
this segment focuses upon his writings on justice. It is presented in two parts. The first
includes a general discussion of Keenan‘s analysis of goodness and rightness in the
Summa and his work on the virtues in recent scholarship. The second explores his
Thomistic interpretation of justice, and its place in his new list of cardinal virtues.

Intellect and Will in Keenan‟s Analysis of the Virtues
Keenan points out that the goodness/rightness distinction is vital for post-conciliar
moral methodology.209 Goodness means that the agent strives out of love to live and act
rightly; rightness means that ―our ways of living and acting actually conform to rational
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expectations set by the ethical community.‖210 In human action, goodness‘ goal is to
become more rightly ordered, and rightness‘ aim is to behave in accord with reason.211
With rich attention to the development of the Summa, Keenan notes that Aquinas‘
writings after 1270 implicitly contain this distinction, while it is absent in his prior
work.212 He claims that in Aquinas‘ discussion of the relationship between the will and
the intellect, the former moves toward goodness of a specification of the act proposed by
the latter.213 Failure to act in accordance with reason or to submit to its dictates is a moral
failure.214 Thus, an agent‘s good will redounds to right reason.
Keenan argues that rightness is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for
goodness. This difficulty stems from several examples, among them the case of the lying
Egyptian midwives (Ex 1:15-21).215 Aquinas, uncomfortable with calling their lie
meritorious, must deal with the fact that their actions were rewarded. He resolves the
problem by distinguishing between two acts: one of truth telling and another of saving
children. It was for the latter act and not the former that God rewarded the midwives.
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Keenan further claims that the contemporary goodness/rightness distinction represents
this later Thomistic bifurcation.216
If Keenan‘s claim is true, then justice becomes the comprehending moral virtue,
with prudence as its evaluative measure.217 The object of justice is life‘s needs. Without
prudence, the virtues can only be habits or inclinations. Prudence formalizes justice and
the other moral virtues by directing them toward their achievement in the mean of action.
Prudence, then, is ―the form, rule, and measure‖ of justice.‖218 At the same time, the
moral virtues cannot be perfected without the infused virtue of charity.219 With the
exception of charity, the intention, end, and even virtuous striving by the agent are
located within rightness, not goodness.220 Keenan explains that charity alone pertains to
goodness because this virtue‘s final end is union with God. It remains imperfect during a
pilgrim‘s life until it is achieved in Beatific Vision.221
Keenan describes the task of virtue as the ―acquisition and development of
practices that perfect the agent into becoming a moral person while acting morally
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well.‖222 Following MacIntyre, he also claims that specific cultures employ paradigmatic
practices that disclose and inform their sense of virtue.223 Within this culturally- and
historically-informed context, Keenan expresses dissatisfaction with the received list of
cardinal virtues that lend themselves toward this worthy end. He argues from the premise
that the virtues are not prescriptive in an absolute sense.
Rather than being definitive expressions of character, the cardinal virtues perform
a heuristic function to answer broadly the three questions of MacIntyre. These
three questions are extraordinarily general; they do not fill in the claims of either
culture or the individual. Thus we pursue the cardinal virtues because they
express what minimally constitutes a virtuous person.224
On the one hand, Keenan‘s proposed changes acknowledge the same difficulties as Porter
does regarding universal consensus on moral norms.225 The virtues sketch the general and
basic conditions of the virtuous person. On the other hand, Keenan argues that justice and
prudence are in fact universal in scope, and can be articulated with a greater degree of
specificity than Porter allows.226 Thus, the next section analyzes Keenan‘s proposed list
of new cardinal virtues and the role of justice within it.
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Justice and New Cardinal Virtues
While the cardinal virtues rightly direct an agent‘s actions, they do not necessarily
inform one‘s faith life. Because virtuous habits can be acquired by all persons regardless
of their religious identity, they can be applied in a wide range of social contexts.
In scholastic language they are the acquired virtues and not the infused ones
which, like charity, God gives through grace. Certainly these cardinal virtues can
be "informed" by a community's faith life. But the virtues can be pursued by
anyone who intends and exercises them rightly. Thus we can urge each other to
acquire them whether we are sitting in the same pew or on the same park
bench.227
For this reason, the traditional list of virtues is called cardinal because they order human
life in its many activities. In fact, in a different context, Keenan notes that virtue ethics
serves as a connection between theologians and pastors and their worshipping
communities by offering a practical response to the call of Christ.228
Nonetheless, Keenan argues that the received list is inadequate to serve the
contemporary needs of moral agents.229 His argument rests on three premises. First, he
claims that it is ―deceptively simple and inadequate.‖ Aquinas‘ structure of the virtues
does not admit of conflict. Since each virtue has its own sphere of operation, there are no
shared grounds that require them to challenge one another. Even if there is an overlap,
Aquinas insists on a hierarchical distinction. As the previous section described, prudence
is the most important acquired virtue, and justice is the chief moral virtue.230
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Next, Keenan describes an emerging relational anthropology that admits of the
possibility of conflict among the cardinal virtues.231 Correlatively, he points to a trend
that bears out this anthropological claim. Citing the diverse thought of theologians like
Walter Burghardt, Margaret Farley, John Paul II, and Stanley Hauerwas, Keenan claims
that human relationality has rendered the Thomistic understanding of human action
problematic.
Like others, I believe that to have a viable anthropology is to understand ourselves
as agents and not as objects; moreover as agents we are always relational. Thus
virtues do not perfect what we have or what we do; rather they perfect who we are
in the mode of our being, which is as being in relationships.232
Keenan‘s relational anthropology is especially founded upon love.233 Building upon this
claim, he proposes a new list of cardinal virtues: justice, fidelity, self-care, and prudence.
Rather than perfecting ―powers‖ in the Thomistic sense, these virtues are built on
Keenan‘s understanding of relationality. He claims that persons are relational in three
ways, and each moral virtue corresponds to a relational sphere of operation. One, humans
are relational in a general manner, and so justice is the comprehensive virtue that dictates
all interpersonal interaction. Two, they are also relational in a specific way. Fidelity helps
to sustain particular relationships. With love as a formal principle, faithfulness helps to
determine right action in the concrete operations that involve those familial and affective
ties common to humanity.234 Three, humans are uniquely relational, in that they can relate
to themselves. Self-care attends to this sphere of relationality. This intrapersonal
relationship is complex, and animates all aspects of the person: affective, cognitive,
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physical, and spiritual.235 Finally, prudence serves the same role as it did in the classical
list. It integrates and connects the other virtues, fixing the mean of right action according
to circumstances.
Finally, as cardinal virtues, they order the web of human relationships. In the
Christian context, they are founded upon the love that is idealized in Jesus Christ.
In fact, I think we can say that it was precisely because Jesus knew the virtues of
fidelity, justice, and self-care that the agony in the Garden was so painful. He was
a man who loved God, humanity, his friends, and himself: his conflict, like all
true conflicts, was to determine which relationship made the greater claim on
him.236
Thus, for the Christian, Keenan‘s new list of cardinal virtues helps to balance the
competing claims not only to live authentically in imitation of Jesus‘ loving example, but
also to strive virtuously toward one‘s human self-actualization.
In conclusion, this limited exploration of virtue ethics closes with a few points
that are germane to the forthcoming analysis of Cahill‘s writings on justice. First, it
should be noted that she does not often use the vocabulary of virtue. Instead, she tends to
privilege the conciliar discourse of rights described in the previous section. Unlike Porter,
moreover, Cahill believes that substantive universal consensus can be achieved regarding
human goods through passionate dialogue and collaborative action aimed at justice. Her
faith commitment gives rise to this participatory strategy, and shapes the contours of her
contribution to such involvement. At the same time, Cahill‘s work, which emphasizes the
intricate nature of human persons and the complex dynamics of their relationships, has a
harmonic resonance with the writings from Keenan considered in this section. Keenan‘s
classification of justice as the virtue that operates in humanity‘s general relationships fits
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well with Cahill‘s firm adherence to equal personal dignity. She also attempts to recover
a sense of universality in human nature and objectivity in moral reasoning, while
critiquing both abstract reason in Enlightenment philosophy and ahistorical universalism
in natural law.237
Now, the final section of this chapter examines justice in theological bioethics. In
this highly specific context, elements from these analyses of philosophical and
theological ideas of justice can be discovered. Notions of natural law, liberal principles,
human rights, communal concerns, and virtue ethics can be discerned throughout this
discussion.

Justice in Recent Catholic Bioethics
Since the goal of this dissertation is to demonstrate how Cahill‘s commitment to
justice undergirds her call for participatory strategies toward justice, it is necessary to
locate her concept of justice within the specialized field of Catholic bioethics. To
accomplish this task, this final section of the chapter briefly surveys writings about
justice from American scholars Thomas Shannon and Margaret Farley as they relate to
theological bioethics. Their contributions are important to the goals of this dissertation
not only due to the depth and breadth of their individual scholarship, but also because of
their occasional collaboration with Cahill in bioethical writings.238 Shannon‘s approach to
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bioethics tends to integrate the ―principlism‖ of Thomas Beauchamp and James Childress
that was highly influential during the 1980s and 90s with Catholic proportionalist
arguments, especially those of Richard McCormick.239 Farley‘s methodology employs a
clear feminist perspective that emphasizes personal freedom in pursuit of the common
good. While Shannon‘s and Farley‘s methods contrast considerably with one another,
there are elements in their respective works that resonate at various points with Cahill‘s
bioethical essays.

Thomas Shannon: Justice and the Idea of Human Nature
This section briefly analyzes select writings in Shannon‘s essays that bear upon
the notion of justice in Catholic bioethics. This portion of the dissertation is outlined in
three parts. First, an early sketch of his account of justice is similar to the principle of
justice described by Beauchamp and Childress. At the same time, Shannon exhibits a
preference toward proportionalist moral reasoning in his project. Second, an important
component of this discussion of justice is Shannon‘s differentiation between human
persons, who are the subject of rights (and, by extension, of justice), and human nature,
which is the subject of value. His distinction is problematic for an examination of
germline interventions, because his ethical reflections do not allow adequate room to
consider their impact on future persons. Third, Shannon‘s later ethical analyses of the
medical applications of the Human Genome Project and its potential implications for
and Farley also critically engage Cahill‘s later essays at times, and these examples will be
discussed in the next chapter.
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human nature demonstrate a development in his own understanding of justice. In this last
part, two similarities to Cahill‘s work can be also be discerned. Like Cahill, Shannon‘s
bioethical work is influenced by a turn to Catholic Social Teaching. The other is his
retrieval of casuistry as a part of his lasting commitment to proportionate reasoning.

Justice in Shannon‟s Scholarship
In the Introduction to his bioethics reader, Shannon relies heavily on
Beauchamp‘s and Childress‘ categories of bioethical principles to outline the necessary
ethical framework for analyzing the articles in this volume. Eighty percent of the citations
come from their essays.240 Shannon also utilizes McCormick‘s account of proportionate
reasoning as a crucial determinant for the obligation to nonmaleficence in bioethics.241
References to McCormick‘s works comprise the other twenty percent of the citations
from his introductory chapter. Taken together, these three scholars form the foundations
not only for an informed reading of Shannon‘s anthology, but also for the major claims of
his later arguments regarding human persons and human nature.
Regarding justice, Shannon employs an overarching theme of distribution and
allocation, both of which are vital considerations in medical ethics. He describes two
modes of thinking about justice.242 The first is comparative justice, by which the goods
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received by one person or group are determined by consideration of completing claims
from others. Comparative justice implies competitive strategies for the same, scarce
resource (as access to health care is often depicted). Applications of comparative justice
are manifold, and generally embody material principles of justice. That is, distribution is
usually determined on the basis of medical need, social worth, individual desert or some
combination of the three.243 The other is non-comparative justice, which is rooted in a
formal principle of justice. In this scheme, goods are distributed through some
determined procedure. While non-comparative justice offers a clear rule, and upholds a
clear respect for the equality of persons, it generally does not specify a moral component
to its procedures.
Shannon points to a hybrid strategy between comparative and non-comparative
types that entails allocation strategies that emphasize equality of opportunity. This
approach satisfies the formal principle of justice by employing a randomized lottery or
triage system into which all can enter during a time of medical need. At the same time,
equitable material distribution can be achieved according to the momentary severity of
each patient‘s need. Shannon argues that its strengths lie in the emphasis on respect for
persons and building of trust in the health care system. Additionally, the distributive
system avoids thorny questions of social worth. Unfortunately, this last point could
threaten to undermine this system as it ignores three important factors.244 If there is no
required screening to be admitted into the randomization process, it removes questions of
personal responsibility from the situation. Thus, lifestyle choices that increase risk factors
(like diabetes, cancers, and sexually-transmitted diseases) are essentially irrelevant. This
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compromise position also overlooks the condition of the patient in the overall context of
health. ―That is, if a fifteen year old is more likely to benefit from a procedure than an
eighty year old, should the eighty year old have an equal opportunity for treatment?‖245
Correlatively, this mode of distribution presumes boundless resources, since the ―only
relevant criterion‖ is apropos of nothing, excepting equality of opportunity.

Human Natures, Human Persons, and Human Rights
Moving from the classical discussion of distributive justice to a modern discourse
of rights language, Shannon outlines five major understandings of rights.246 Essentially,
rights fall into one of two categories: positive or negative. Positive rights express one‘s
claim to action upon another person, and negative rights describe an obligation to
noninterference by others. It is here that the question of the subject of rights becomes
especially relevant for this dissertation. Shannon argues that persons alone can be the
bearer of rights (as opposed to non-human animals or non-sentient life forms). In itself,
this claim is uncontroversial. For the purposes of this dissertation, other considerations
outside of human rights are unnecessary. However, Shannon‘s conception of personhood,
introduced in this text and further analyzed in the next few paragraphs, raises a number of
problems with regard to genetic manipulation. He sets a very high standard by describing
a person as a moral agent ―with an enduring concept of self and capable of autonomous
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actions.‖247 While he tempers this view of personhood in later essays in light of its
implications for abortion and embryonic research, it remains a troubling issue for the
concept of justice in the context of genetic interventions.
Throughout a series of articles spanning the 1990s, Shannon – sometimes as an
individual scholar and others as co-author – makes a consistent argument that the
protection afforded to human life is relative to its developmental stages.248 One catalyst
for these writings is the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith‘s (CDF) 1987
Instruction on Respect for Human Life in Its Origin and on the Dignity of Procreation.
The document describes life as a ―gift‖ given from God, for which each human person is
responsible for its promotion.249 Moreover, it calls human life an inviolable right ―from
the moment of conception until death.‖250 Still another major claim from the Instruction
is the ―immediate animation‖ of the human person.
From the moment of conception, the life of every human being is to be respected
in an absolute way because man is the only creature on earth that God has
―wished for himself‖ and the spiritual soul of each man is ―immediately created‖
by God; his whole being bears the image of the Creator. Human life is sacred
because from its beginning it involves ―the creative action of God‖ and it remains
forever in a special relationship with the Creator, who is its sole end.251
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Through a careful study of developmental biology, Shannon raises problems with both
the idea of a ―moment of conception‖ and the theory of ―immediate animation.‖252 He
claims that a zygote (i.e., the fused gametes that concludes the process of conception)
does not possess sufficient genetic information to develop into an embryo, which is the
―precursor of an individual member of the human species.‖ Furthermore, an embryo lacks
individuality because it has the potential for fission and recombination following
twinning. These distinct biological features have no explicit moral implications for at
least three weeks after fertilization, when embryonic totipotency and twinning are no
longer possible.253 Even after individuation, there is a further problem of the ―rational
soul.‖ On a contemporary interpretation of the Aristotelian formula that form is ―educed
from the potency of matter,‖ Shannon insists that the structures necessary (i.e., a ―fully
integrated‖ human nervous system) for such actuality do not develop until at least eight
weeks after fertilization.254
While Shannon‘s primary purpose of the article in the current analysis is to
achieve an irenic resolution to contentious debates about abortion, there are further
implications for manipulation of the human genome. Shannon builds upon these
conclusions in two later works about the morality of genetic research and its
consequences for understanding human nature.255 In theological terms, the ethical use of
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science and technology are rooted in human nature, understood as part of the created
order.256 As such, the core principle of ethical genetic research lies in its prior respect for
human dignity.257 Thus, there is a ―positive value‖ in this kind of scientific exploration
but not an ―absolute right‖ to it. The good of knowledge from genomic inquiry thereby
must be placed in due proportion with regard to the good of protecting persons from
undue risk of harm.258
Here again, Shannon‘s understanding of personhood is a decisive component of
his qualified approbation for embryonic research and subsequent manipulation of the
human germ line. He distinguishes between ―dignity‖ and ―value.‖ Persons have dignity;
natures have value.259 Human nature deserves value, but it is not identical with a human
person, which deserves protection. He turns to proportionate reasoning as the justification
for embryonic research.
The destruction of embryos is indeed always a significant disvalue because they
are killed. Nonetheless because they are prepersonal, such killing is not murder.
However, such a premoral disvalue needs to be offset by equally significant
premoral and moral values.260
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Shannon argues that current embryonic stem cell techniques have not sufficiently
advanced to be applied with safety and efficacy. This caution notwithstanding, he claims
that protocols can be developed by investigators and funded by the government.261
He closes with an appeal to Catholic Social Teaching by attempting to locate the
debate about genetic research within the larger needs of the U.S. healthcare system.
Given the expense of such research and the limited resources to be allocated, there must
be further discussion regarding the social justice aspects of funding embryonic research.
While Shannon claims that this argument is separate from that of the moral status of the
human embryo, it also seems to qualify further his use of proportionate reasoning to
resolve the matter. These social justice considerations give him pause to weigh the shortand long-term consequences of genetic inquiry.

Embryonic Research and Human Transcendence
The analysis thus far might raise the question: does Shannon‘s account of ―human
nature‖ have any impact upon his notion of justice? He seems that hold that nature ought
to be justly valued to some degree, but that it has no decisive role in questions about the
moral status of the pre-embryo. In another writing though, Shannon comments on the
influence of the Human Genome Project for understanding human nature. Reacting to
claims from scientific materialists (represented in this essay by evolutionary biologist
Richard Dawkins and sociobiologist E.O. Wilson), Shannon cautions them against
limiting the range of discourse about human nature to mere biological reduction. In other
essays, he focuses on the individual act of embryonic research. But here, he concentrates
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on the larger implications of freedom for moral analysis as a continuous, ongoing
endeavor.262
Utilizing insights from medieval Christian theology and contemporary
transcendental methods, Shannon argues that the natural world disclose a possibility of
transcendence beyond any claim of scientific materialism. He builds this case upon three
foundational analyses. The first is that materialistic investigations of nature do not
adequately explain the whole. For example, Wilson describes genes as ―holding culture
on a leash.‖ As such, cooperative strategies must be essentially selfish, and any altruism
that is unilaterally directed toward others is the ―enemy of civilization.‖263
Sociobiological accounts of freedom and altruism describe behaviors, which are
indicative of, but not reducible to, natures.264
The second is a Ressourcement of John Duns Scotus‘ concept of nature. Shannon
claims that Duns Scotus‘ concept of nature is determinative and has explanatory value for
behavior. But in the will in which those behaviors are realized, two further distinctions
can be made to reflect a human nature behind one‘s choice, which is not predetermined
by biology. One is affectio commodi, by which the agent seeks the good for himself or
herself. The other is affectio justitiae, by which the agent seeks the good for its own
sake.265 Both aspects have a bearing on justice. The affectio commodi lends itself toward
the perfection of an individual. According to Duns Scotus, while affectio commodi
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essentially seeks one‘s self-interest, it is nevertheless part of a divinely-created order.266
The affectio justitiae, or affection for justice, goes beyond an understanding of freedom
as simple choice for one‘s own benefit. In other words, affectio justitiae allows the agent
to value another being irrespective of personal or social utility.267 In this sense, affectio
justitiae transcends the ―natural state‖ that is indicated by affectio commodi.
The third foundation of Shannon‘s argument concerns the limitation of genetic
knowledge that has been outlined in the previous essay, and the tendency to overestimate
the moral clarity that comes from that information. Using the transcendental theology of
Karl Rahner, Shannon insists that all matter is part of a dynamic system, and that human
persons are beings ―in whom the basic tendency of matter to find itself in the spirit by
self-transcendence arrives at the point where it definitively breaks through.‖268 This
perfection is an addition, rather than a transformation, and is mediated through the
―historical patterns of God‘s self-communication.‖ By contrast, naturalistic accounts of
human nature fall short because of their refusal to admit any transcendence in reality.
In synthesizing these three parts of Shannon‘s argument, two points can be made.
One, Duns Scotus‘ affectio justitiae ―checks‖ human nature, but not as an opposing force.
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Instead, it gives direction to human action beyond self-seeking behaviors. Medieval
understanding of freedom does not reduce choice to a particular event and contrasts with
normative ―American expressions of freedom.‖269 By the same token, this orientation
should not be confused with Aristotelian accounts of ethics. The free moral agent is not
concerned only with self-perfection, but can act toward others in ways that include
charity, forgiveness, reconciliation, and mercy. In short, human freedom is the stuff of
―grace and glory‖ in which self-actualization can take place.270
Before leaving this discussion of Shannon‘s work as it relates to justice, it is
useful to point out two similarities and one contrast to Cahill‘s methodology. Like Cahill,
Shannon‘s later work is heavily influenced by Catholic Social Teaching.271 While he does
not share the tradition‘s concern for nascent human life, Shannon nevertheless envisions
medical care as part of an overall structure of a health system that privileges human
dignity and social interdependence over and above its technological aspects. His
appropriation of Duns Scotus‘ categories of affectio commodi and affectio justitiae
supplies a foundation for human dignity beyond social worth. Shannon also utilizes
casuistry as an illuminative strategy in resolving hard moral cases. As discussed in
Chapter One, casuistry is not an endeavor for its own sake, but is set within the context of
the moral striving of the agents involved and their moral community. Cahill sees
casuistry as an inductive and dialogical method for achieving the common good.272
Shannon argues similarly that casuistry does not solve a problem, but helps a moral agent
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to recognize the importance ―of the development of moral character and a theology of
love.‖ The traditional sources of moral wisdom shed light on the situation in a relevant
way.273 By prudently appreciating a situation, one can use casuistry to resolve a hard case
in a virtuous manner.274
Even though Shannon and Cahill employ similar methods in their respective
bioethical inquiries, they come to opposing conclusions regarding genetic research and
intervention. Shannon‘s concern for social justice does not dissuade him from arguing
that further research and implementation of genetic protocols should be more widely
pursued and publicly funded. However, his argument seems to overlook the consumerist
culture which is prevalent in North Atlantic countries. By contrast, Cahill fears that the
distribution of new germline technologies will be accomplished through market forces.275
While Shannon is optimistic that human self-transcendence can be aided by genetic
interventions, Cahill worries that genetic ―shortcuts‖ can undermine the social practices
that elucidate such prized human traits.276 The dissertation will address Cahill‘s view of
genetic technology more pointedly in the Epilogue.

Margaret Farley: Justice and Compassionate Respect
Chapter One introduced the idea of local and global concerns within the context
of public discourse, and the potential value that a natural law approach might bring to that
endeavor. Natural law, which is rooted in the complexities and commonalities of human
273

James F. Keenan and Thomas A. Shannon (Ed.), The Context of Casuistry
(Washington: Georgetown University Press, 1995), xxii.
274

Ibid., 229.

275

Cahill, ―Germline Genetics, Human Nature, and Social Ethics,‖ 159.

276

Ibid., 156.
234

experience, can advance a moral argument that transcends the particular values of each
community whose voices are represented in the larger debate. Cahill‘s critical analysis of
the natural law tradition has noted that both ―public sphere‖ and ―human experience‖
have been rooted historically in male paradigms. Likewise, Enlightenment thought was
dominated by men‘s experiences and those experiences were often amplified into
universal norms. By contrast, feminist ethics attempts to deal with the polarity of
particular versus universal concerns by including women‘s perspectives into
considerations of human experience.277
This final chapter portion briefly sketches the contributions of controversial
American feminist scholar Margaret Farley toward this greater cognizance of women‘s
experience as it relates to justice in Catholic bioethics.278 Her attempts to wrest moral
norms from abstract and essentialist universals are a constant theme in essays that span
four decades of her academic career. At the same time, she avoids falling prey to what
Cahill calls a ―nagging relativism‖ in feminist thought that insists there are no universals
by rooting her ethical writings in an obligation of respect for concrete persons within a
real context, no matter how diverse or particular it may be.279 This section analyzes three
interdependent elements in Farley‘s conception of justice. The first is personal freedom,
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which is found in the context of the second, the common good. The third, a common
morality, is the foundation for both.280 Together, they resist tendencies to bifurcate justice
into ―personal‖ and ―social‖ forms. They also spur further reflection upon the kind of
public discourse analyzed in Chapter One.

Personal Freedom and Embodiment
The Catholic tradition has insisted that human freedom and autonomy define
moral agency. Moral analysis, which includes the object, intention and circumstances,
presumes that an act must be free. The same tradition also claims that humans are also
social beings. Because both are a significant part of Catholic social thought, Farley
contends that there must be an interdependence of individual relations and social
institutions that are part of the meaning of justice.281 But this relationship is rendered
prima facie problematic because of the wide historical exclusion of women from public
life. Utterances about human universals, even as they apply to individuals, are difficult to
maintain because of ―the historical, the particular, the situated, the contingent‖ upon
which all experience is bound.282
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Farley employs the free human agent as her point of departure. Autonomy and
relationality are the obligating features that ground her universal requirement to respect
persons in all ways they relate to one another as ends in themselves. This practical
method is built upon her inquiry of whether it is even possible, given the perspectival
nature of knowledge, to identify common elements in any human experience (male or
female) that does not suppress ―voices different from one‘s own and without mistaking
the contingent for the essential.‖283 It is practical because human relationality demands
the task, no matter how wary, to sketch the contours of human nature at least be
undertaken.284
The obligating features of Farley‘s argument deserve further analysis. First,
Farley sees autonomy as the capacity for free choice, and it is constitutive of respect.
Why? Because freedom of choice as we experience it is a capacity for selfdetermination as embodied, inspirited beings, which means a capacity to choose
not only our own actions but our ends and our loves. It is a capacity therefore to
determine the meaning of our lives and, within limits, our destiny.285
To respect autonomy means not only to acknowledge one‘s ability to set her or his own
agenda, but also to refrain from violating another‘s autonomy by unfairly absorbing him
or her into that agenda. Second, the idea of respect itself already implies relationality at
work. Farley understands that this human capacity for relationship is not simply
instrumental in scope, insofar as persons must depend on one another for their survival.
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Rather, it is obligating because it is an ability to open oneself to others while

simultaneously reaching out to them. Freedom, then, has as its end the sake of
relationship.287
Farley‘s obligating features of respect for persons are mediated by her concept of
embodiment. Respect for persons as a universal moral principle has been advanced
especially by Kant as a grounding premise for his Categorical Imperative. While it is a
laudable rule to treat others as ends in themselves in all situations, the universality offers
only one way to respect others as ends in concrete situations. Or, as Farley puts it, the
problems of Kantian autonomy stem from the understanding of a ―disembodied self.‖288
Contrasting with Kantian respect for persons, Farley‘s understanding of embodied
autonomy allow for a universal principle to be applied differentially and contextually. 289
Cognizance of the particularity and diversity of others provides ―the content of the
obligation to respect persons,‖ which in turn provides the norms for ―true caring.‖290
Embodied agency gives rise to universal claims to rights, and recognizes that they can be
fulfilled in manifold ways.
Farley‘s notion of embodiment transcends the Enlightenment dualism that she
often criticizes in her work. The body transcends mere instrumentality for the sake of free
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choice. Her account of autonomous embodiment as a vehicle of self-transcendence also
contrasts with Thomas Shannon‘s discussion of the topic in the previous section.
Shannon, following Karl Rahner, sees the capacity for transcendence arising from within
the matter of the universe. Moreover, the process of perfection is additive rather than
transformative in Shannon‘s view; a new creation is not born. But Farley claims that
The capacity for free choice is the capacity to introduce something new into what
one is – as when we ratify love in a new way, nurture an attitude that is only
partially formed, develop talents in this way or that, attempt to gain possessions or
to let them go, respond to a call that still beckons, or chooses against all calls and
all loves and hence end up alone.291
The implication here is that a free choice generates a new context, and hence a fresh
opportunity for the embodied agent to determine oneself. Part of this new context entails
the relationships that one has formed with others.
Farley‘s concept of an embodied, contextualized person deserving of respect is
the foundation of her formal ethical principle of justice: ―persons and groups of persons
ought to be affirmed according to their concrete reality, actual and potential.‖292 Once
again, capacity for freedom engenders a call to relationality. It is necessary, then, to
analyze the other two elements of Farley‘s work. The next portion describes her
description of the common good, and its role in providing better understanding of her
notion of justice.

The Common Good and Its Relation to Justice
Since her earliest writings, Farley has resisted attempts to dichotomize the
personal and social aspects of justice. She employs a concept of the common good,
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gleaned from Catholic Social Teaching, to demonstrate the complementarity between
justice as fairness and justice as rightly-ordered social relations.
From the standpoint of the Roman Catholic ethical tradition, it is a mistake to pit
individual good against the good of the community, or the social good, when what
is at stake is the fundamental dignity of the individual. If it is the case, then, that
the reality of woman is such that a just love of her demands that she be accorded
fundamental personal rights, including equality of opportunity in the public world,
then to deny her those rights is inevitably to harm the common good.293
Farley‘s notion of the common good provides meaning for justice in social relations that
does not neglect the individual good. One is not reducible to the other; both remain
independent from one another. At the same time, they are not isolated from each other,
either.
In the realm of bioethics, Farley‘s continues to apply this complementary concept
of the common good to the HIV/AIDS pandemic, especially in Africa. In this real
context, justice can be applied in at least three ways. Regarding the moral norms from
Catholic teaching on sex and gender, Farley insists that a woman lacks personal justice
due to the ―uncritical imposition of traditional rules.‖294 If anything, it has added to the
shame and stigmatization associated with AIDS. Moreover, it may even contribute to its
spread by refusing to allow infected partners to use condoms or other ―safer sex‖
practices.295 A distinct but related issue to the first is the institutionalized victimization of
African women.
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Stories abound, for example, of the exile or even stoning of women infected by
their husbands, and of unmarried women raped and infected by men who think
that sex with virgins will prevent or cure their own infection by the AIDS virus.296
Just and compassionate social policies, rooted in the Preferential Option for the Poor,
should seek to protect and empower women. This goal can be accomplished by reflecting
upon sexual norms within the larger milieu of societal function and dysfunction.297
Thirdly, justice is applied to both individuals and the community through a concerted
effort to allocate the necessary life-saving medicines to combat HIV. Farley has argued at
length that current ethical methodologies like ―principlism‖ and ―ethics of care‖ stumble
in their efforts to resolve the issue justly for opposite reasons. The former cannot
reasonably relate to patients as unique persons, and the latter cannot formulate adequate
criteria for ―true caring.‖298 Reiterating the demand to respect persons, Farley calls for a
collaborative, cross-cultural approach toward allocation beyond market capitalism.
In fact, Farley has attempted to put the Preferential Option for the Poor into
practice by leading one such cooperative effort: All-Africa Conference, Sister to Sister
(AACSS).299 The product of a long collaboration with academic, government, and
religious organizations, AACSS provides collegial and financial partnerships to gather
women for training in the religious dimensions of the struggle against HIV/AIDS.300
AACSS represents not only a drive to develop the personal freedom and empowerment of
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African women, but also a commitment to advance the common good in their societies.
One might ask how these various disciplines can hope to collaborate effectively with
their disparate methods, values, and goals. Within these interdisciplinary bonds of
relationships, there is in Farley‘s project yet a third element – a concept of common
morality – which requires further analysis.

Common Morality and Public Discourse
Farley‘s notion of the common good places limits on what can be accomplished
externally from a particular social context. It is unjust to impose externally any action
purporting to be help that does not arise from a respect for other persons within their
concrete situation. Historical examples include various forms of paternalism and
colonialism. It is problematic to know ―what is good‖ for someone without having a prior
relationship with that person. How, then, can one understand the criteria for just caring in
light of the perspectival nature of knowledge? Farley describes her attempts to answer the
question as a ―chastened realism:‖
One that acknowledges the partiality of all knowledge and the influence of social
constructions of meaning on all that we know, but that nevertheless keeps looking
to understand things as they are, as best we can.301
The criteria for just social practices are essentially dialogical, and require the
participation of all who are affected by them.
Given the wide diversity of human experience, Farley is challenged to find a
common ground that roots morality in some universal experience. As Michael Walzer
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notes, there must be some degree of sameness before one can recognize otherness.302
Farley attempts to locate demand for respect in the experiences of love and suffering.
Unlike the Kantian idea of respect for persons, grounded firmly in reason, Farley insists
that suffering gives rise to compassion as the primary component of respect. Whereas the
cognitive faculty can identify the poor circumstances of another, it is the affective part
that discloses ―an assumption of more acute access to knowledge of the concrete reality
of others.‖303 While it is not likely to generate a detailed list of justice‘s requirements,
compassionate respect can detect unjust social practices across cultures. Farley‘s efforts
in support of the AACSS are emblematic of her commitment to this common morality.
Expanding these three-fold elements into the church‘s political agenda, there is a
clear connection to be made between theology and public discourse. Farley sees three
major problems with the church‘s myopic focus upon abortion as the axial public issue.304
Taken together, they undermine the effectiveness of the church‘s witness in the public
forum. The first is a lack of credibility regarding abortion. Besides its staunch opposition
to most forms of contraception, the church has generally excluded women‘s issues from
its considerations surrounding abortion. The church must address its own relation to
women before it can be effective in combating overly-permissive abortion policies. The
second is what Farley calls the ―extreme politicization‖ of abortion and related issues.
Here, she refers to attempts to recriminalize abortion. At the same time, she criticizes the
church‘s lack of nuance regarding its rhetorical use of the ―moment of conception.‖
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Following Thomas Shannon, she claims that embryonic biology admits no such
moment.305 The third is the opportunity cost of a near-exclusive emphasis on abortion.
Alluding to the United States Bishops‘ 1996 statement, ―Political Responsibility,‖ she
lists eighteen pressing issues for the nation, with abortion at the top of the alphabetical
list. She wonders at the possibilities of success if all of them received the same attention
as abortion.
Farley also notes the tension between the internal discourse of the Catholic
Church and the external arena in which it speaks. Echoing a few of the sentiments raised
in analysis of the post-conciliar documents, Vatican II represents a turning point in the
life of the church insofar as it engaged the problems of the modern world. Farley claims
that this development was received with ―trust and confidence‖ by those outside the
church.306 Unfortunately, as previous sections of this dissertation have also noted, there
has been a general repression of internal debate over moral issues. Theologians have
found themselves at odds not only with local bishops and other representatives of the
church‘s magisterium, but also with ―self-appointed groups of lay and clerical monitors
of Catholic orthodoxy.‖ 307 She argues that the damage to the church‘s credibility is more
than a matter of bad press. It also limits the church‘s capacity to participate effectively.
Farley moves toward a potential resolution of the conflict by urging the church‘s
hierarchy to place abortion within the complex of other pragmatic and pressing concerns.
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Founded on her three-fold obligation to respect persons, she claims that participation in
the public forum entails requires a spirit of humility, respect, and compassion.308
Finally, two comparisons can be made between Farley‘s and Cahill‘s respective
projects. On the one hand, Farley seems to emphasize to a greater degree the internal
strife of the ongoing debates that constitute the church‘s living tradition. Her concern is
that the church‘s role in the open forum will be undercut by what she perceives is a
destructive force of suppression. On the other hand, Cahill is more focused on the
valuable external contribution that theological voices can make toward public discourse.
This is not to say that Cahill ignores the internal debate. Instead, she identifies the interior
arguments as part of the self-critical and self-limiting aspects of the community which is
participating in the discourse.309 In spite of this difference, both conclude that there is a
prophetic aspect to the church‘s participation in the public sphere. There is also a
legitimate role that offers reasons for political action that can be rationally defended to
those outside the tradition and beyond standard liberal accounts of free choice.
Moreover, there is a shared concern for the common good which in turn
influences each scholar‘s notions of justice. It is further interesting to note how they
differ with regard to locating the meaning and content of justice in their respective
accounts of the common good. In Farley‘s case, it offers a general meaning for justice in
social relations, while particularity provides the content of justice‘s demands through
compassionate respect. In Cahill‘s work, the common good provides justice‘s content,
while ancillary notions of solidarity and equality help to define justice‘s meaning in
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particular contexts.310 This difference might account for their contrasting emphases in the
context of public discourse. For Farley, it is scandalous to engage it political discourse
when she perceives so much injustice within the church. Unless the church can
effectively address these problems, its message will necessarily be weakened. By
contrast, Cahill argues that the common good demands the participation off all peoples,
and that this is not just an ideal but an incipient form of life. Thus, it is unjust to exclude
oneself from the liability to serve the common good.

Summary and Conclusion to Chapter Three
Because of the vast diversity and history of Catholic thought, it was necessary to
limit the scope of the theological views on justice to three general categories: select
statements from the Catholic hierarchy since Vatican II, recent reinvigoration of the
Catholic virtue tradition, and a brief analysis of justice in Catholic bioethics. In analyzing
these magisterial documents, there is an overwhelming emphasis on ―social justice‖ and
―the common good.‖ In her later writings, Cahill‘s conception of justice is rooted within
the Catholic social tradition. Like the U.S. Bishops‘ Economic Justice for All and John
Paul‘s social encyclicals, Cahill is concerned with pragmatic yet just solutions to pressing
ethical issues.
The accounts of justice also explored writings from American moral theologians
Jean Porter and James Keenan, who represent the reinvigoration of virtue ethics within
Catholic Natural Law tradition. Dissatisfied with novel post-conciliar interpretations of
the natural law from Basic Goods theorists, Porter argues that virtues are paradigmatic
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rather than universal in scope. Relying upon MacIntyre‘s work, she envisions the
community as the point of departure for individual discernment of right human action.
The natural law provides a space moral reflection, rather than readymade answers to
moral questions. Her notion of justice underscores the individual good over the common
good in Aquinas, which contrasts with Cahill‘s work in several ways to be discussed in
the next chapter. Additionally, Keenan argues that the traditional list of cardinal virtues is
inadequate to guide contemporary moral agents. Building upon a relational anthropology
founded upon love, he proposes a new list of virtues: justice, fidelity, self-care, and
prudence. Because humans are relational in a general manner, justice is the
comprehending virtue that dictates correct interpersonal interaction. Keenan‘s
anthropological claims are very similar to Cahill‘s, which argue similarly that justice
ought to be the overriding principle that determines right action.
Finally, since this dissertation concludes by way of analysis of Cahill‘s work in a
bioethical context, it was necessary to sketch the contours of scholarship on justice in
Catholic bioethics. The works of Thomas Shannon and Margaret Farley were selected
because of their resonance with Cahill‘s essays, and because of their occasional scholarly
collaboration with her. Shannon‘s work emphasizes distributive justice in medical ethics.
He employs methods from the Catholic social tradition to place genetic research within
the larger context of the needs and goals of American medical care. Moreover, his
Ressourcement of Duns Scotus‘ idea of affectio justitiae allows the agent to value another
being beyond one‘s personal or social utility. In spite of similar points of departure,
Shannon and Cahill arrive at opposing conclusions regarding genetic research and
intervention. Margaret Farley‘s obligation to respect persons is founded upon three,
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interdependent concepts: free choice, the common good, and a shared morality. Farley
finds this common ground in the face of the experience of suffering, which gives rise to
compassion. Compassionate respect allows the moral agent to help the individual sufferer
in a just manner and to criticize the unjust situation in solidarity with him or her. Farley‘s
thoughts on the church‘s role in public discourse are also emblematic of her tripartite
foundation of respect. While the church has much to offer in the political realm, it creates
scandal because of its poor treatment of women and its exclusive focus on abortion.
Cahill‘s and Farley‘s separate interpretations of the common good locate the meaning and
content of justice at different points. For Cahill, the common good supplies the content;
for Farley, it provides the meaning. This contrast may be two sides to the same coin,
since both require supplementary notions of particularity, solidarity, and equality to fill
out the complementary aspects for justice‘s meaning (for Cahill) and content (for Farley)
in their respective accounts.
In the next chapter, the dissertation employs a chronological reading of Cahill‘s
work to analyze several significant developments in her ideas about justice over time.
The six accounts of justice under consideration in these two preceding chapters will serve
as guideposts to help find points of continuity and contrast with her own. As will be
demonstrated, there are many points during her writing career where her notions of
justice resonate with one or more of the scholars represented here and in Chapter Two. At
the same time, Cahill‘s complex notion of justice seems to transcend all of them. While
she has not yet put forth a fully-developed theory of justice, her various applications of
justice – as cardinal virtue and as a theological or political principle – can be constructed
into a coherent unit. This dissertation refers to this unified, synthetic whole as
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―collaborative justice.‖ In turn, this holistic, synthetic account, gleaned from the wide
range of her scholarship, can offer a method for theological voices to participate in future
public discourse about bioethics in an effective manner.
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CHAPTER 4
JUSTICE IN THE WRITINGS OF LISA SOWLE CAHILL

With the aid of the examination of significant philosophical and theological accounts of
justice from Chapters Two and Three, the present chapter builds upon those analyses to
explore Cahill‘s writings on justice within her intellectual context. As the previous
chapter demonstrated, the various referents for ―justice‖ in recent scholarship are clearly
divergent. Even individual scholars understandings of justice expand or narrow over
time. For instance, Rawls‘ thought develops considerably between his broadly-conceived
Theory of Justice in 1971 and its focused refinement two decades later in Political
Liberalism. Similarly, it is unsurprising to discover that Cahill‘s scholarly reflections
have shifted foci throughout the course of more than thirty-five years of inquiry. Like
many Catholic ethicists of the mid-1970s, Cahill‘s early work engaged the contentious
methodological debates over post-conciliar applications of natural law theory. In the
1980s and 90s, her research turned to pressing and persistent issues of the day like sex,
gender, war, and poverty, among others.
Cahill‘s most recent work attempts to construct theoretical and foundational
frameworks that are applicable across a broad range of ethical and theological issues. In
bioethics, she designs participatory and collaborative strategies aimed at achieving
equitable health-care access for all, especially among the most vulnerable populations of
the world‘s diverse societies. In fundamental moral theology, she formulates a Christian
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political and economic worldview for the twenty-first century, emphasizing personal and
societal responsibility toward the common good. In foundational systematic theology,
Cahill‘s latest work exemplifies a vital shift toward Christology and spirituality not
explicitly found in her previous thought. 1 It remains to be seen – indeed, anticipated –
precisely how this Christological turn will influence her future reflections on ethics.
A chronological reading elucidates a few consistent motifs in Cahill‘s essays on
ethics. One of them is the feminist perspective that she brings to Catholic natural law
ethics. Another is her firm commitment to justice, which is also informed by her feminist
standpoint. While it is clearly a prominent theme throughout her work, her conception of
justice – like that of other thinkers considered in this dissertation – has evolved over time.
This development seems to correspond with some of the shifts in her research interests,
which were previously mentioned. Her early view of justice is mostly consistent with a
Thomistic understanding of the virtue tradition. Later essays develop an idea of justice
that is not only a personal virtue that guides a moral agent‘s action toward others within
an interpersonal context, but is also an ongoing enterprise that engages social action with
others toward the common good. It is also important to note that this latter view of justice
is conjunctive rather than disjunctive with her earlier work; she does not abandon
personalist ethics so much as situate it within a wider milieu. Therefore, an historical
analysis of Cahill‘s writings is warranted in order to discover the context and significance
of this development in her notion of justice.
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The research for this chapter divides Cahill‘s ethical writings into three temporal
units in order to synthesize them into a coherent whole. The first section considers her
early writings, spanning from 1976 until roughly 1990, in which her prevailing notion of
justice is related to her deconstruction and critique of Catholic personalist ethics.
Influenced by feminist and ecumenical interpretations of the natural moral law, Cahill‘s
project strives for greater inclusion of women‘s experience and communal referents for
ethical decision making. While she premises her arguments upon Catholic values such as
fidelity to scripture and love of neighbor, she rarely cites the Catholic social tradition
during this part of her scholarship.
The second part describes a ―transitional‖ period in Cahill‘s thought from 1990
through 1996. During this time, her writings in ethics and her notion of justice expand
beyond strictly confessional issues (i.e., Catholic moral theology) toward concerns within
the larger American political order. While she remains firmly rooted in the Catholic
moral tradition, her project focuses greater attention to an American context in which,
sadly, the voices of Catholic leadership seemed to have become less and less relevant.
Much of this ground has already been covered in Chapter One‘s discussion of public
moral discourse, but here it is integrated with and bolstered by Cahill‘s thoughts on
justice. If there is a countercultural Catholic voice, it will resound more clearly as
communitarian critic of a myopic focus upon autonomous choice as the decisive indicator
of justice, rather than constabulary monitor of sexual matters and other moral norms. As
Cahill and other Catholic theologians have exemplified, these concerns also remain the
subject of ongoing debate within their own tradition.
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The third unit analyzes Cahill‘s move from ―local‖ communal concerns to
pressing global issues from 1996 to the present. While her work continues to address a
largely American audience, Cahill rarely writes without a purposeful eye toward
international contexts, especially those of developing nations. This trend, which is at
times implicit in her previous work, moves to the forefront in her most recent essays. She
never loses a grasp on the particular, though, as she calls special attention to the plight of
women across cultures. It is also during this latter period that her concept of justice
expands most clearly from a nexus of personalist-local ethics toward a widely inclusive,
immanently participatory schema. She also fully integrates the Catholic social tradition
into her work.
Ultimately, the dissertation refers to Cahill‘s holistic, inclusive, and cooperative
framework as ―collaborative justice.‖ As this chapter will demonstrate, Cahill‘s
collaborative justice resonates to some degree with all of the accounts of justice
considered in Chapter Two while simultaneously transcending them. As her notion of
justice evolves, she begins to apply it futurist genetic technologies like human cloning
and germline enhancement as a part of her participatory strategy of bioethics.
Collaborative justice provides pragmatic answers to moral issues of wide social import
more readily than the liberal, communitarian, and other theological justice concepts
presented so far. These writings will be considered in the dissertation‘s Epilogue.

Early Writings: Justice in a Personalist Context
This first section analyzes Cahill‘s essays from 1976 through 1989, and discovers
three overarching thematic elements during this part of her academic career. The first is
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an enthusiastic defense of proportionalist ethical methodology, particularly the kind
represented by Richard McCormick. This trend is most evident in her bioethical writings.
The second is an inchoate Christian theory of sexual ethics that is eminently communal in
its foundations. This theory evolves considerably over the next two decades. At the same
time, her account of individual moral agency regarding sexual issues remains firmly
rooted in the ethics of proportionate reasoning. The third major theme is a consistent
assertion of the universality of ―human dignity‖ throughout her early work in both
medical and sexual ethics. Her conception of dignity is founded upon the theological
claims of Catholic Social Teaching, albeit tacitly, over and above liberal notions of
respect for persons. This methodological grounding in dignity serves as a springboard for
the widening scope of her later work, which will be examined in subsequent sections.
During the early part of her career, Cahill rarely addresses the issue of justice per
se and even then her notion of justice is more implicit than overt. Nonetheless, her
inquiries into medical and sexual ethics are far more than a tangential discussion of
justice. She raises related issues like the communal context for Christian ethics,
hermeneutical uses of empirical data, and social implications of gender roles, all of which
impact questions of justice.

Cahill‘s Developing Communitarian Ethic: 1976-1981
Cahill‘s earliest publications employ bioethical and theological principles
developed from her dissertation, which applied the contrasting ethical methodologies of
the Catholic moral theologian Richard McCormick and Methodist ethicist Paul Ramsey
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to the case of euthanasia.2 Chapter One of the present dissertation already described
Cahill‘s 1979 analysis of their exchange regarding biomedical research.3 There, Cahill
argues that their conflicting claims are neither founded upon a comprehensive Christian
faith nor adjudicated by appeals to scripture and tradition. Because the two speak from
related though distinct theological traditions, the outcome must be decided on other,
secular grounds. These resources are provided by what she elsewhere calls ―normative
and descriptive‖ accounts of the human person, referring here to philosophical and
empirical research.4 Though it is clear in the essay that she prefers McCormick‘s
proportionalist approach to Ramsey‘s covenantal-deontological method, she envisions
their debate as an intra-disciplinary matter regarding the role of religious commitment in
medical practice and research.5
Much of her subsequent work further defends McCormick against charges of
utilitarianism. In a 1981 article, her paradigm is McCormick‘s reconsideration of formal
moral norms.6 McCormick suggests that exceptions to abstractly stated moral norms can
be justified by reference to the special circumstances in which an act falling within the
purview of a norm will be performed, and that a due ―proportion‖ must exist between the
2

Cahill, ―Euthanasia: A Catholic and a Protestant Perspective‖ (PhD diss., The
University of Chicago, IL), 1976.
3

Cahill, "Within Shouting Distance: Paul Ramsey and Richard McCormick on
Method," Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 4, no. 4 (December 1979), 398-417. See
also Richard McCormick and Paul Ramsey, ed., Doing Evil to Achieve Good (Chicago:
Loyola University Press, 1978).
4

Cahill, Between the Sexes: Foundations for a Christian Ethics of Sexuality
(Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1985), 4-11.
5

Cahill, "With Shouting Distance,‖ 415.
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Cahill, ―Teleology, Utilitarianism, and Christian Ethics,‖ Theological Studies 46
(1981), 601-629; cf. Richard McCormick, Ambiguity in Moral Choice (Milwaukee:
Marquette University Press, 1973).
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value concretely sacrificed and the value realized by the choice. After providing a concise
historical perspective regarding the development of deontological and utilitarian norms,
Cahill moves to an evaluation of McCormick‘s early work on ―consequentialism.‖
It is during the course of this analysis that Cahill‘s early notion of justice as a
personal virtue becomes apparent. Following the moral taxonomy of the Scottish
philosopher W.D. Ross, she argues that deontological and teleological models can be
construed in terms of the priority they give to principles of justice and beneficence,
respectively.7 Against the charge of ―utilitarianism‖ leveled by McCormick‘s critics,
Cahill counters that John Stuart Mill‘s notion of justice is identified with expediency,
embodied in an ―immediate, empirical, and quantifiable‖ aggregate concerned solely with
maximizing welfare.8 Critics of proportionate reason like Germain Grisez, Paul Quay,
and John Connery (who were mentioned in Chapter Two) have missed the point when
they equate proportionate reason with ―moral mercantilism,‖ and instead refer to the
binding authority of a traditional yet transient list of intrinsically-evil acts. Cahill
counters that absolute moral norms simplify matters, but they do not attend adequately to
potential disproportion between the ends sought and the values sacrificed. Nonetheless,
as part of her critique of McCormick‘s earlier work, she notes that he has provoked his
critics by failing to consider the long-term consequences of his case examples.9

7

Ibid., 604: ―The inclusive or broad teleologist will claim that doing good is the
essence of moral obligation, but that good must be distributed fairly, and that the equality
and rights of all persons must be respected. The broad deontologist will claim that duty,
obligation, and equal respect for persons define moral agency, but that duty contemplates
responsibility for the consequences of one‘s acts.‖
8

Ibid., 605-606.

9

Here, Cahill refers largely to McCormick‘s rejection of absolute norms that
prohibit specific physical acts in Ambiguity in Moral Choice and his responses to critics
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Cahill‘s defense and critique of McCormick are founded upon prior, inherent, and
communal values informed by a Christian tradition, which are found especially in
Thomas Aquinas‘ writings. Cahill‘s approbation for McCormick‘s developing
proportionalism is rooted in Thomistic natural law ethics.
One pertinent and undeniable shortcoming in McCormick‘s sort of innovative
teleology is that, in the absence of a classical or medieval metaphysics and
anthropology, it is no mean task to discern and agree upon the precise relations of
values in the hierarchy upon which the theory depends… It is possible to enjoin or
to prohibit absolutely certain resolutions of value conflicts only in the light of
knowledge of the ways in which such resolutions impinge on human nature. This
is why the achievement of some consensus on the hierarchical relations of
potentially conflicting values, while so elusive, is so vital.10
Cahill claims that Aquinas‘ ethical project is teleological regarding communal welfare
and personal morality, but at the same time protects the inviolability of individuals within
that community.11 In his later work, McCormick‘s concept of telos is more consistent
with Thomistic notions of the common good insofar as it is not founded upon an
exclusive maximization of social welfare. Furthermore, his teleological approach
presumes that ―to actualize human nature through conformity to the ordo bonorum is to
follow the will of the Creator, and in doing so, to approach the summum bonum.‖ Thus,
his account of ―human flourishing‖ refers both to the particular human in concrete moral
agency and to humans generally in the ―universal common good.‖12
A further instance of Cahill‘s applications of the natural law tradition can be
found in a 1980 essay, where she constructs a framework toward a Christian theory of

throughout the remainder of the decade in ―Notes on Moral Theology‖ from Theological
Studies throughout the 1970s.
10

Cahill, ―Teleology, Utilitarianism, and Christian Ethics,‖ 617.
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human rights.13 In the context of human rights, the ―deontology vs. teleology‖ debate is
transcended by God‘s love, which makes a prior moral claim on the agent‘s moral
existence. In the Christian tradition, love of neighbor in light of this priority enjoins the
agent‘s duty to respect and protect another‘s rights, rather than asserting one‘s own
claims.14 Citing Aquinas, she claims that the rational and free intellect is under an
―unconditional obligation‖ toward virtue, whose goal orients human action toward
happiness beyond one‘s rational capacity, that is, friendship with God.15 Thus, human
action is immanently social, constituted by participation with others in the common good.
As such, Cahill affirms the necessity of rights language in postlapsarian morality,
since it must address the conflicts that develop between the free responses of persons to
God in light of the needs of their neighbors. By focusing on the moral agent as
responsible rather than claiming, Cahill believes that a common good approach to rights
is able to avoid moral individualism on one extreme with totalitarian collectivism on the
other.16 Moreover, a natural law approach to rights is privileged over utilitarian liberalism
since the former proceeds from a universal order inclusive of a community in which
individuals live. In a communal context, Cahill admits her argument implies that very
few rights can be absolute. While food, education, and healthcare can be classified as
essential goods necessary for human flourishing, their distribution can only occur in
situations where they realistically can be found. In this early work, she finds only an
absolute right to personal integrity, founded on the inviolable dignity of the human
13

Cahill, ―Toward a Christian Theory of Human Rights,‖ Journal of Religious
Ethics 8, no.2 (Fall 1980), 277-301.
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person. An incomplete list of fundamental goods and a corresponding measure of the
justice/injustice in a particular society are grounds for social criticism and action, but do
not constitute rights in themselves.17
In synthesizing Cahill‘s early vision of moral theology from these articles, it is
very interesting to find two clear, though limited, connections to Alasdair MacIntyre‘s
conception of moral traditions in Cahill‘s insightful analysis of Christian teleology vis-àvis Enlightenment utilitarianism. She takes Richard McCormick to task for reducing
proportionalism to a consideration of mere acts rather than persons with his insufficient
regard to human dignity. Her penetrating appraisal of his early proportionalism is
balanced by her attentive consideration of the later theological development in his
method. She claims that McCormick‘s later work is protected from charges of crass
consequentialism to the degree that justice has taken precedence over beneficence in his
subsequent ethical writings, and that it has attended to the adequate consideration of
human persons.18 Justice is located in a requirement that all persons be treated equally
with respect to social, material, and moral goods. Moreover, a theological grounding
helps to determine just distribution of those goods. Here, Cahill – like MacIntyre –
appeals explicitly to the Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition. 19
17

Ibid., 291-292.
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Cahill, ―Teleology, Utilitarianism, and Christian Ethics,‖ 625.
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Ibid., 627-628: ―In contrast [to utilitarian accounts of happiness], Aristotle and
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distribution only by the receptivity or voluntary congruence to the good of those who
seek it. For Aristotle, happiness consists in a certain way of being and doing available to
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character, the theological virtues, gifts of divine grace, so form reason and will that the
agent is capable of beatitude, friendship with God, or union with God in His essence‖ (at
p. 628).
259

Additionally, her analyses anticipate parts of MacIntyre‘s devastating evaluation
of contemporary ethical discourse in After Virtue. For example, her insistence that the
debate between McCormick and Ramsey is a wholly theological matter is consistent with
MacIntyre‘s understanding that moral traditions are constituted by ongoing arguments
about their purposes.20 This is not to say that MacIntyre would agree with Cahill on this
point. In fact, MacIntyre would likely see Ramsey and McCormick as arguing from two
distinct moral traditions (i.e., covenantal deontology vs. proportionalist revisionism,
respectively).21 By contrast, Cahill does not see their clashing methods as rival traditions,
even though they speak from distinct confessional stances. Instead, she locates their
exchange within the stream of an evolving but unitary Christian moral tradition.22 Within
this tradition, this significant point of difference with MacIntyre is explained by Cahill‘s
widely-inclusive methodology, which will be discussed at greater length in the next
portion of this section.
At the same time, this convergence with MacIntyre‘s thought is limited in two
important ways. In his postscript to the second edition of After Virtue, MacIntyre
concludes with a summary of three critical arguments against his thesis, two of which are
relevant to the present discussion.23 The first questions the relationship of moral
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philosophy to history. Against these critics, MacIntyre argues that moral philosophers
are, above all, proponents of claims of particular moralities to rational allegiance.24 Cahill
argues in a similar fashion throughout her later essays on public moral discourse. She
takes the position that there is no form of philosophical discourse which is any less
tradition-bound than religious ones. However, MacIntyre goes one step further than
Cahill with his claim that one moral theory should transcend the limitations of its rivals.
25

In his case, he clearly privileges the Aristotelian account of virtues as the ground of

morality. By contrast, Cahill builds her argument upon a premise that no method has a
greater claim to rationality or a lesser allegiance to its tradition. Consequently, while
MacIntyre seems to abandon any hope of rational consensus, Cahill sees broad,
substantive agreement on particular issues as a normative expectation for public
discourse. Further parallels and contrasts with MacIntyre‘s thought on this issue are also
evident (especially the manner in which they utilize sociological and empirical data), but
these will become more apparent in the next part of the chapter.
The second criticism concerns the relationship of moral philosophy to theology.
On MacIntyre‘s account, the Aristotelian virtue tradition challenges religious claims of
divine command. Virtue places human action at the center of moral questions. In
reconciling the two components of theological ethics, he argues a religious tradition must
uphold the necessity of obedience to divine law as constitutive of the virtuous life. He
further claims that Aquinas provides such a defense.26 MacIntyre‘s attempt to retrieve the
natural law in this way is somewhat knotty, and other scholars argue that the medieval
24
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tradition seemed to have a broader understanding of law as such than MacIntyre seems to
allow.27 More importantly, Cahill in her earlier work finds difficulties regarding
obedience to the law problematic in light of her proportionalist tendencies. The ―law‖
described by the neo-manualists insists upon intrinsically-evil acts, a position that Cahill,
following McCormick, clearly rejects.
This second limitation is further qualified by MacIntyre‘s response to Cahill‘s
1979 essay, the only time that he has engaged her published work. He claims that Cahill
is ―quite mistaken‖ in equating consequentialist and teleological methods of morality,
especially in light of her references to Aristotle‘s thought. 28 Contrary to Cahill and
McCormick, MacIntyre insists that teleological thinkers must recognize that certain types
of actions are prohibited. He names two categories of precepts that guide the common life
of community constituted by a common understanding of the good. The first type refers
to the virtues required to achieve that good; the second kind prohibits behavior that is
destructive of it.
To violate the second type of precept is to commit an act sufficiently intolerable
to exclude oneself from that community in which alone one can hope to achieve
the good. Thus the absolute prohibition of certain specifiable kinds of actions
finds a necessary place within a certain type of teleological framework; since the
Christian doctrine of ethics appears to be a teleology of just this type, the
existence of Christian theologians who deny that there are any such absolute
prohibitions would be prima facie puzzling.29

27

As we saw in Chapter Two, Jean Porter argues that the natural law is already
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MacIntyre points to McCormick‘s position that certain actions are always
disproportionate simply because of lack of certitude about consequences to act in that
way. If this is the sole criterion, MacIntyre argues, then McCormick is ―a utilitarian who
is more skeptical than most utilitarians‖ about an agent‘s ability to determine outcomes.30
MacIntyre‘s assessment here is consistent with the discussion of Porter‘s account of
Thomistic ethics from Chapter Two. Aquinas could see no conflict among the cardinal
virtues. Prudence fixes the mean for right action, and justice orients those actions toward
others. Thus, MacIntyre rejects proportionalism‘s assertions of conflict among the virtues
on the basis of this Thomistic assertion of harmony among the virtues.
So far, this first part of the section has focused on an emerging communitarian
ethic in Cahill‘s earliest publications. Her germinating scholarship draws significantly
from the research in her dissertation in theological bioethics. She also develops a new
stream of research in sexual ethics during this period, and this inquiry will mature
throughout the 1980s into a theory of Christian sexual ethics.31 The next part analyzes the
interplay between personal and communal issues in Cahill‘s seminal theory of Christian
sexual ethics. In it, she accepts a collective morality in sexual matters as normative, but
she also allows room for departures from this norm within the striving community. Here,
her work continues to contrast with MacIntyre, especially regarding the manner in which
they utilize empirical and sociological data in their respective projects. The next part also
explores Cahill‘s resonance with liberal ideas of justice in the context of sexual ethics. At
30
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the same time, it will examine her feminist reflections on ethics generally and sexuality
specifically.

Cahill‘s Early Work in Feminist and Sexual Ethics: 1981-1989
Cahill‘s research moves beyond strictly bioethical concerns throughout the 1980s.
In addition to her continued work in medical ethics and moral methodology, she delves
into issues like human rights, abortion,32 just war,33 and divorce.34 During this period,
though, she concentrates mainly on sexual ethics. The local community remains her
consistent focus in the area of sexuality. However, her feminist interpretations of natural
law and human sexuality provide a space to discuss matters concerns for individual
persons as well. Though she insists on the importance of an individual‘s autonomous
capacity in sexual ethics, she never reduces it to liberal notions of free choice. Instead,
the relationship between an individual and the community mutually informs the decisionmaking process, with a determinative reference to an objectively-knowable and
theologically-grounded moral order. Her work remains rooted in both Sacred Scripture
and the Catholic Thomistic tradition, but also relies upon normative descriptive accounts
of humanity from the natural and social sciences. This part of the discussion emphasizes
Cahill‘s writings on sexual ethics, especially her book, Between the Sexes, as well as
selected articles on feminist theology from the same period. It will also apply an analysis
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of these essays to her concurrent work in bioethics, especially artificial contraception and
assisted procreation.

Between the Sexes
In her first book-length theory of sexual ethics, Cahill tries to overcome what she
perceives as a duality of sexual experience in the Christian tradition.
[Sexual experience] is physical, urgent, and pervasive. It is also an avenue of
affective and spiritual relations among persons, for good or ill. Yet the human
person is not a duality. At least Western philosophical and religious traditions
have learned to resist dualistic interpretations of the person, even if they have not
overcome them.35
She claims that this dichotomy, present at least since Augustine and evolving throughout
the Patristic era, is at odds with the Genesis creation accounts that disclose the essential
unity of individual humans generally and of sexual partners especially. At the same time,
this harmony is not reducible to atomistic individualism, which is prevalent in today‘s
liberal societies. Instead, the creation stories portend meaningful richness for the life of a
worshipping community and its constitutive members. As such, Cahill outlines four
positive implications for this theological narrative of creation.36 One, sexual
differentiation is aimed toward cooperative modes of procreation and nurturing. Two,
contra modern liberalism, male and female are intrinsically related to the common good.
Three, there is an equal dignity between the sexes, derived from the image of God. Four,
the communal nature of sexuality is a mirror of that divinity. Taken together, these points
give rise to two major claims. First, human sexuality is endowed with a fundamental
goodness as a constitutive element of the created order. As a corollary to this first point,
35
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this theological sense of createdness offers the believing community a telos that produces
a ―harmonious and productive existence‖ in the natural world.37
As part of creation, an agent‘s free response is required to enter into this divinelyordained accord. Sin disrupts this striving toward this harmony and fulfillment.
Employing the work of Reinhold Niebuhr, Cahill argues that humans exist in a dialectical
relationship between freedom and finitude. Sin is constituted in the failure to recognize
the limits of either pole, both of which are given by God as part and parcel of creation.38
In other words, one sins when he or she denies what it is to be human. Thus, historical
systems of hierarchy and dominance regarding gender relations are aberrations from the
original created order, which is marked by equal dignity and cooperation.
It must be noted that Cahill‘s exegesis of Genesis 1-3 is not a ―pure,‖ isolated
reading of this particular literary unit, but is a prologue to the continuing story of the
church tradition. Determining the story‘s ―original audience‖ has an illuminative but not
a determinative function, and does not preclude later normative interpretations of any
biblical text.39 This dialectic between the past and the current state of church teaching is
further informed by her careful inquiry into the New Testament community.
Cahill claims that the ethics of the New Testament is ―thoroughly communal‖ in
its orientation.40 For example, she points out that its most significant discussion of sexual
norms is located within Paul‘s discourse on the Body of Christ, that is, the community
redeemed by Jesus (1 Cor 5:1-8:13). While Paul envisions all preoccupation with
37
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marriage and sexuality as distractions, a position that contrasts with the creation accounts,
Cahill carefully argues that his views are wholly consistent with the norms set forth in
Genesis 1-3.41 She founds this claim upon the communal criterion of the moral life
present in both texts, which depict humans as created by and responsible to God. Paul‘s
text is further informed by the redeeming experience of Jesus Christ, who should be the
central focus of the Corinthian community to whom Paul addresses himself. Instead, they
are distracted by issues of hierarchy and power, all signs of the consequences of sin
outlined in Genesis 3:16-23 (1 Cor 3:1-5). Throughout his letter, Paul insists that the
community is the Body of Christ. As such, he enjoins them to act in harmony with Jesus‘
kingdom message in all matters: legal, sexual, and liturgical.42
Cahill‘s research moves beyond scriptural texts and into Catholic tradition with an
analysis of Thomas Aquinas‘ inquiry into marriage and sexuality. Like Paul, Aquinas
claims that virginity is preferable to marriage. The former is more conducive to ―thinking
on the things of God,‖ which is the telos of human existence, according to Aquinas.43 At
the same time, Cahill underscores two salient features of Aquinas‘ reflections on
marriage that she claims are often overlooked. The first is what Cahill calls Aquinas‘
―honest portrayal‖ of the intense human love between husband and wife. On the question
of whether a man ought to love his wife more than his parents, Aquinas claims that on the
41
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part of the union, a wife ought to be loved more because of the oneness of their flesh.44
There is also the value of partnership in the couple‘s domestic life. This second point
correlates to the first. In this special union, there is a friendship ―of the highest sort.‖45
To this point, even if polygamy could have been justified through Old Testament texts, in
the Christian context it would reduce the friendship of each wife for her husband and turn
to a ―servile relationship‖ that emphasizes procreation alone over this loving friendship.46
Furthermore, Aquinas‘ account of virtue turns on what it means to be ―genuinely
human.‖ Cahill claims that this understanding is ―necessarily empirical.‖ His descriptive
account of humanity is inclined toward an uncritical application of Aristotle‘s
metaphysical biology. Cahill sees three shortcomings in Aquinas‘ Aristotelian
anthropology. One, women‘s capacity for rationality is less than men‘s; two, women are,
by nature, assigned a subordinate place within the household; and three, men‘s aptitudes
are greater than women‘s abilities with regard to wisdom and judgment.47 But Aquinas‘
differentiation in social roles and intellectual capacities is balanced by the essential
partnership of men and women found in Gen 2 and is concomitant with their biological
differences. Aquinas sees far greater relevance in their equal potential for charity, which
Cahill defines as the ―love of God which extends to those God loves.‖ Tying sexual
expression to its communal foundations, Cahill also finds it significant that Aquinas
44
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supports marriage as a ―sacrament,‖ which is what makes Christian marriage a vehicle of
Christ‘s presence.48
In this early search for objective sexual norms, Cahill wrestles with the reality that
Christians not only live within a faith community informed by their religious tradition
(and its requisite virtues), but also live within a larger society constituted by different and
at times competing values (and virtues).
Perspectives on sexuality in both Testaments favor the institutionalization of
sexuality in heterosexual, monogamous, permanent, and procreative marriage that
furthers the cohesiveness and continuity of family, church, and body politic, and
that respects and nurtures the affective commitments to which spouses give sexual
expression.49
With Cahill‘s utilization of the dialectic between the original audience and the current
situation, these normative interpretations give rise to practical problems in applying them
in contemporary, pluralistic settings. The biblical tendency toward standardization in
sexual norms allowed for occasional exceptions.50 The post-biblical tradition also
demonstrates further development with regard to marriage and sexuality. Moreover, these
religious norms are juxtaposed against a liberal societal backdrop that privileges
autonomous choice in sexual matters above all else.
To settle the matter, Cahill turns to the use of empirical data as part of the
enterprise of ethics. In her earlier essay on McCormick and Ramsey, she saw their
exchange as an intra-disciplinary matter, with observed information aiding in its
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adjudication.51 In other words, she seemed to argue that the current trends in the social
and empirical sciences can settle a theological dispute. In this later context, though, she
locates the ―special helpfulness‖ of empirical research in its ―ability to illumine the
reality of situations that the ethicist evaluates.‖52 Much like the normative accounts from
scripture and tradition, empirical data provide still another observable explanation of
human sexuality. However, empirical studies remain wholly descriptive rather than
morally prescriptive, and they are not arranged into categories that are necessarily ―value
free.‖53 Therefore, a faith community can decide its course of action in sexual matters
only through consideration of the full complement of resources at its disposal.
In light of her research, Cahill‘s positive argument suggests two moral criteria
that form the central Christian sexual norm of a lasting, monogamous, heterosexual and
procreative union. First, the community should express fidelity to this norm while
allowing variance in its fulfillment. Second, it is necessary to contemplate rare departures
from these norms, provided they ―represent the most morally commendable courses of
action concretely available to individuals caught in those tragic or ambiguous situations
that agonize the decision maker and vex the analyst.‖ 54 According to her claims, the
Christian tradition might justify some departures such as remarriage after divorce,
occasional avoidance of conception in conjugal sex, and committed homosexual
51
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relationships while prohibiting others like adulterous relationships, non-committed
cohabitation, and coercive or violent sexual acts.
In analyzing these criteria, two observations can be made about Cahill‘s early
notion of justice. The first concerns her commitment to proportionate reasoning in sexual
matters. On the accounts of proportionalism considered here and in Chapter Two, it is
clear that Cahill attempts to maintain fidelity to the objective moral order that she
espouses in the early part of Between the Sexes. By describing the biblical and traditional
teachings on marriage and sexuality as ―normative,‖ she expresses a deeply-held value in
upholding them. She entrusts the wisdom of the faith community to seek a healing and
equitable way for those affected by hurtful situations such as divorce to remain fully
within the church, should a divorced person choose to remarry.55 By the same token, she
rejects the notion of marriage as pure contract. Cahill is not claiming (as Michael Walzer
does) that the constitutive element of voluntary marriage is the permanent possibility of
divorce.56 Instead, she infers that remarriage after divorce should be a rare application of
the ideal of the permanent marriage. Perhaps the striving moral agent now enters into the
second marriage with a fuller knowledge of the pain and difficulty that comes with
maintaining a loving relationship, yet still trusts God‘s grace to help him or her in the
sacrament. Cahill here endeavors to uphold the values of reconciliation and justice with
that of the permanence of Christian marriage.
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The second comment pertains to her significant and qualified use of empirical
data. Cahill points out that observable phenomena related to human behavior have an
impact upon moral judgment.57 But she seems to hold two diverging opinions on the use
of empirical information. On the one hand, she argues that society is obliged to enhance
human life to the greatest possible extent for those that have certain biological or
psychological conditions irrespective of the desirability of those conditions. 58 These
circumstances are gleaned from a careful consideration of observable data. This
sentiment is consistent with her Thomistic understanding of inviolable human dignity
within a community‘s norms, and with a reasoned observation which is a constitutive
element of natural law ethics. It also seems to square with Jean Porter‘s analysis of
Aquinas‘ individualistic context for the common good, described in Chapter Three.59 On
the other hand, Cahill claims that empirical studies alone fail to elucidate what these
factors ought to be. She also admits that the data are arranged and interpreted into
categories that are not value-neutral. Here, there is an implicit resonance with Alasdair
MacIntyre‘s analysis of empirical studies.60 Building on a premise that contemporary
scientific utterances about human behavior must omit all reference to intentions, purposes
or reasons for action, MacIntyre argues that attempts to describe them in purely
mechanical terms must conflict with teleological anthropology. He also makes explicit
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what Cahill implies about the ―value-free‖ façade of empirical data by demonstrating that
the flip side to value-neutrality is manipulative power.61
In Between the Sexes, Cahill does not engage in a critical dialectic with empirical
studies about sexuality to the same degree that she did with scripture and tradition. She
devotes whole chapters to the latter while sparing only a few pages for the former. As a
result, she argues for significant departures from the tradition regarding homosexual
activity with insufficient attention to the novel sources which she introduces to bolster
her argument. By contrast, her claims that pertain to divorce and remarriage, pre-nuptial
cohabitation, and marital contraception do not seem as dependent on her analysis of
empirical data, and are more deeply rooted in her study of scripture and tradition.
Before leaving this discussion of Between the Sexes, it bears repeating that Cahill
does not explicitly discuss ―justice,‖ and this feature is common in her early writings.
Nonetheless, justice is implied in her insistence that all members of the community be
treated fairly with regard to their individual circumstances. If she errs, it is on the side of
inclusion rather than exclusion from the Christian community. Her concept of justice as
egalitarian fairness will be studied further in the next few paragraphs. Furthermore, it is
also interesting to note that she makes no appeal to the Catholic social tradition here. In
fact, her conception of justice seems to develop to the degree that she incorporates
Catholic Social Teaching into her essays family and sexual ethics. These facets of her
work will be introduced in the next major section of this chapter.
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Cahill‟s Feminist Critique
This part of the chapter analyzes Cahill‘s evolving conception of justice as
egalitarian fairness in the context of sexual ethics. Her maturing theological reflections
during this epoch in her career turn upon an identification of feminist theology with
moral theology and ethics.62 As such, defining equality and justice are the primary tasks
of feminist ethics. By examining the normative function of women‘s experience, feminist
theology can transform the community by projecting more egalitarian social
arrangements among its constituents.63 Coupling the perspectival aspect of personal
experience with the historical context of moral agency, feminist criticism is an enterprise
informed by a critical dialectic with the sources of Christian ethics.64 This section
describes Cahill‘s developing feminist critique of two magisterial teachings on sexual
ethics. The first is her early discussion of contraception. The second is the use of assisted
procreation techniques. Permanent, heterosexual marriage is the paradigm for her
theological reflection.
Cahill opens this discussion on contraception by considering the personalist trend
in Catholic sexual ethics since the early twentieth century.65 She points to a change in
definition of marriage from the 1917 Code of Canon Law as ius in corpus that envisions a
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contract which is tied to ―acts apt for procreation‖ to the 1983 Code‘s communio
definition that combines covenant language with the contractual understanding of it in an
interpersonal partnership.66 Building upon this interpersonal understanding of marriage,
she describes the early controversies surrounding the use of oral and barrier
contraceptives. Cahill finds it significant that both supporters and detractors of oral
contraceptives in the Catholic moral tradition focused on potential damage to the
marriage, rather than to the sexual act itself. 67 She claims that moralists had to define a
woman‘s part in sexual acts in terms of traditional roles of domesticity and motherhood.
In Cahill‘s analysis of arguments from the early 1960s against the use of
contraceptives, she includes ―new‖ natural law theorists like Germain Grisez. He seems
to eschew this relational language in favor of an exclusive emphasis on the conjugal act
itself. Because contraception intentionally thwarts life, one of Grisez‘s basic goods, every
instance of its use is inherently immoral.68 Cahill offers two responses to Grisez‘s thesis.
The first questions the incommensurability of the basic goods. Basic goods might be able
to be formulated as universal, exceptionless, and formal norms, but they cannot be so in
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concrete actions which threaten to undermine at least one of them.69 The second more
directly reflects Cahill‘s feminist criticism of a traditional sexual ethic that narrowly
defines morality in nearly-exclusive terms of acts.
Why is contraception (especially within an otherwise procreative marriage)
genuinely an act ―against‖ the good of procreation, rather than a deferment of it to
a more appropriate time? The definition of a contraceptive act as an act violating
the procreative good seems to require that the significance of each act of
intercourse be defined as an isolated event, rather than in relation to a continuum
of events within a sexual, personal, and social relationship. But it is this reciprocal
narrowing of the meaning of sex acts to their immediate contexts, and of the
procreative and unitive goods to single acts which do or do not realize them
concretely, which is precisely the target of personalist revisionism.70
Cahill roots her argument here within the communal context, which was developed in
Between the Sexes and remains a constant theme in her later sexual ethics.71 She is not
making the case that every act of contraception can be morally justified. Citing
philosopher Paul Ricoeur on the symbolic expressions of sex, Cahill is aware that
contraception risks cheapening sex by reducing its significance to become a mere vehicle
of pleasure.72 Instead, she insists the act cannot be isolated from the pursuit of the
common good.73 She also supplies an egalitarian corrective to any personalist ethic that
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neglects the social context of the moral agent.74 Cahill‘s ongoing development of this
theme of the common good will be addressed further in the next section.
Turning to the use of assisted-reproduction techniques (ART), Cahill‘s context is
heavily influenced by the Vatican‘s 1987 Instruction on procreation, which effectively
condemns any attempt to divorce conception from the conjugal act.75 The Instruction
draws largely from traditional natural law understandings of sex, but there are instances
of personalist language that describe the conjugal act in inexorable terms of love,
intercourse, and procreation.76 Cahill offers a qualified approbation for ART on much the
same grounds as her consideration of artificial contraception, that is, a consideration of
the couple within a community of faith. Her cautiously positive analyses of ART during
this period are especially noteworthy because they contrast starkly in later essays with her
explicitly negative assessment of germline interventions, which employ similar methods
to ART.
From the essays considered in this part thus far, Cahill points out that in the
Instruction‟s blanket rejection of ART, the magisterium has ―missed another
opportunity‖ to offer timely and prudent advice to Catholics living in a society that
locates commitment and procreation almost exclusively within the realm of autonomous
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choice.77 She raises a concern that the Instruction has not made a distinction between
donor gametes and homologous fertilization. While she shares the magisterium‘s
objection to third-party donations, she questions whether infertile couples experience
―laboratory conception as a violation of their sexually-expressed love relationship, or as
an assisted fulfilment (sic) of it.‖78 At the same time, her feminist analysis of the situation
recognizes the danger of ―alienation‖ the female body that can arise from conception
achieved through technology and the reification of women‘s social roles as mothers. She
extends this criticism to the larger social context by pointing to the commercialization of
reproduction, the potential exploitation of the poor, and the perception of children
primarily as products rather than persons.79 Nevertheless, she remains committed to a
favorable appraisal of ART on personalist grounds. Moral analysis of ART must be
considered in light of the couple‘s ―total partnership.‖80
The Instruction engendered further scholarship for Cahill. In 1988, she coauthored a reference-style commentary on the document with Thomas Shannon (see
Chapter Three). They argue that the Vatican goes too far in its prohibition of all ART. 81
While the Instruction is a ―rather remarkable statement‖ insofar as it finds homologous
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fertilization less objectionable than heterologous intervention, the authors find the
Instruction problematic because it isolates the sex acts from the loving relationship of the
couple.82 They also claim that these prohibitions are likely to fall upon deaf ears because
it asserts rather than argues its position.83 More importantly, they attempt to rehabilitate
the document‘s importance by changing the focus of its natural law approach. Instead of
using the natural law as a tool of casuistry in ART, Cahill and Shannon attempt to use a
revised natural law approach modeled in Catholic Social Teaching (CST) to demonstrate
the interrelated issues of marital love, parenthood, and sexuality in a contemporary,
pluralistic society.84 This text quickly became outdated because its discussion of
techniques, once on the cutting edge of reproductive technology, are now commonplace
or have been superseded by more efficacious practices. Nevertheless, it remains
significant because it represents one of Cahill‘s early integrations of Catholic social
thought into her larger project.
The following year, Cahill expands on one of the major themes of CST in a
comparative analysis between the Vatican‘s Instruction and a secular American
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document: The Office of Technology Assessment‘s (OTA) Infertility: Medical and Social
Choices.85 In that essay, Cahill argues that the language of natural law ―suggests that a
mediating language like that of ‗rights‘ may depend for its success at least partly on
essential structures of human experience which tradition mediated but which they do not
create.‖86 As she considers these two documents, she first notes the diverging foci on
their respective subjects of rights language. On the one hand, the Instruction focuses on
the rights and welfare of the embryo and the protection of familial integrity. As such, it
rejects all forms of ART that remove sexual acts from procreation. At the same time, it
prohibits surrogate motherhood on similar moral grounds. Furthermore, it urges
governments to legislate protection for embryos as persons with full rights from the
moment of conception.87 On the other hand, the OTA document emphasizes reproductive
freedom and rights of couples. The right to procreate as a principle of liberty is relatively
uncontroversial in the case of fertile couples or individuals, but in the case of infertility, it
becomes difficult to assert a claim against others to realize this otherwise undisputed
right. 88 Thus, the government‘s role is one of quality control in embryo production and
just enforcement of contracts in surrogate parenting.
Despite these differences with regard to premises and conclusions, Cahill points
out three significant similarities that might encourage further dialogue between their
contrasting opinions. First, they are both products of group authorship. Second, both
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represent attempts to moralize within an affluent, well-educated, Western context that has
the resources and will to utilize ART. Most important, they both employ rights language
to advance their respective arguments, and strive to achieve consensus on the same
thorny public issue.
The authors of each seem to assume that their arguments about rights are selfevident, are grounded in values so basic and indisputable that the only
prerequisite to agreement is elucidation and restatement. 89
The Instruction speaks of three ―fundamental rights:‖ to life and physical integrity from
conception until a natural death; of the family and of marriage as a normative institution;
and of a child‘s right to be conceived, born, and raised by his or her parents.90 The OTA
document speaks of a two-fold right: the couple‘s free, autonomous choice to reproduce
in accordance with their own values and the correlative respect for those choices.91
Cahill points to conflicting worldviews as the reason for their diverging
conclusions on the morality of ART. The OTA grounds their arguments within liberal,
democratic values that maximize liberty, while the Instruction is rooted in a Thomistic
view of human nature that emphasizes duty equal to rights. Here, Cahill turns to the work
of Alasdair MacIntyre and Jeffrey Stout to build her argument that a richer consideration
of human nature could serve as a mediating language toward a viable social perspective
regarding ART. Stout insists that the moral philosopher must be ―pragmatic and eclectic‖
by exploiting common vocabularies and reasoning patterns in order to resolve
troublesome social issues.92 He envisions rights as a bridging language for the public
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sphere, allowing for consensus from participants with contrasting and even competing
worldviews.93 Because of its pragmatic nature, only a partial or overlapping consensus
regarding the good is necessary to reach a broad social agreement.94 This method is good
so far as it goes, though it seems more concerned to proximate ends, rather than ultimate
ones. In the case of intentionally making life, it seems a bit imprudent to act rashly on
any superficial notion of the good.
Based upon the consideration of MacIntyre‘s work from Chapter Two, it would
seem that he would reject Stout‘s claims. Common moral vocabulary does not equate
with common meanings, and participants from opposing worldviews are reduced to
―assertion and counter-assertion.‖95 MacIntyre instead maintains the importance of a
unitary tradition as the source of coherent discourse about social practices.96 With regard
to determining which activities constitute practices, and the virtues internal to them,
MacIntyre specifically mentions ―the making and sustaining of family life.‖97 In this
instance, Cahill notices that the practices of family life ―involve different voices,‖ and
make it possible to move toward about ―consensus about the sort of excellence of which a
practice may aim.‖98

93

Stout, 285.

94

Cahill, ―Moral Traditions,‖ 501; cf. Stout, 294.

95

MacIntyre, After Virtue, 8.

96

MacIntyre, Whose Justice?, 400.

97

MacIntyre, After Virtue, 188.

98

Cahill, ―Moral Traditions,‖ 501.
282

Furthermore, despite their diverging conclusions, Cahill demonstrates that both
MacIntyre and Stout locate the centrum of their moral discourse in shared practice.99 In
this context, Cahill suggests that a key theme to moral discourse is ―human nature.‖
Another reason to adopt this vocabulary to critique the practices of family and
reproduction in contemporary North American Culture is that they will be useful
as a corrective to the dominant liberal emphasis. Finally, the vocabulary of
―nature‖ can be made flexible or open enough to accommodate the value in the
liberal position. This is true because appeals to nature are most fundamentally
appeals to human experience and so assume and rely on the praxis so key in
contemporary hermeneutical theory.100
Cahill appeals here to Mary Midgley‘s work (discussed in Chapter One) as backing for
Cahill‘s own ―modest‖ natural law claims, which are rooted within an inductive,
experiential, and critical process.101 She concludes from this process that while
parenthood is ―vastly important,‖ it must remain secondary in marriage to the spousal
union itself. Thus, neither document is true to the experience of married couples. The
Instruction overstates the physicality of individual sex acts; the OTA study exaggerates
the autonomy of the couple.
Cahill closes her essay with a carefully qualified and strictly limited claim that
ART is morally acceptable only when used by committed couples to conceive a child
genetically related to both of them.102 Her argument is warranted by the liberal notion
that a parent-child bond is an embodied and freely-chosen relationship in its formation. It
is further backed by a personalist premise that parenthood is achieved as an extension of
the loving relationship of the couple, rather than a disruption of it.
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Conclusion to the Analysis of Cahill‘s Early Work
This analysis of Cahill‘s early work elucidates three major themes that will give
shape to her work throughout the 1990s. Two are well developed while the third remains
nascent. First, the community is the constant source and context for her moral reasoning.
Sometimes, ―community‖ refers specifically to the Roman Catholic tradition from which
she speaks, as in her analyses of the prohibition of ART from the Vatican‘s Instruction.
Other times, she expresses a more diverse yet unitary Christian moral tradition, as in both
her assessment of Richard McCormick and Paul Ramsey and her first theory of sexual
ethics. Still elsewhere, she reaches beyond the confessional boundaries of Christianity to
larger American society, as with her comparison of magisterial and congressional
documents regarding in vitro fertilization, and even occasionally to the human
community writ large in global context, like her developing theory of human rights.
Second, with a significant appropriation of the Catholic natural law tradition,
Cahill roots her ethical reasoning within an objective and universal moral order created
and redeemed by a loving God. Unlike the new natural law theorists like Grisez, Finnis,
and others, she does not undertake a search for absolute and exceptionless norms. As
introduced in Chapter One and fleshed out further in this section, her utilization of the
natural law is based on an inductive and experiential process. A significant part of it is
informed by a feminist perspective that historicizes and contextualizes the objective order
found in the natural law. These twin resources allow Cahill to embrace and affirm the
Roman Catholic tradition while simultaneously criticizing and transforming it.
Finally, the development of Cahill‘s conception of justice is subtle during this part
of her career. In the earliest writings considered in this first section, justice is a largely
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personal virtue which is located in the striving agent within his or her context. This
narrowly-focused notion is consistent with the Thomistic virtue tradition. As this view is
utilized within a larger theoretical framework, she expresses a natural law vision of rights
founded upon a major presumption of human dignity. She begins to draw into her project
the Catholic social tradition, which was discussed at length in the first two chapters of
this dissertation. The addition of Catholic Social Teaching amplifies her ethical
arguments to a wider audience that includes secular voices and affirms the communal
context that is already present in her writings. As the dissertation moves to the next
period in Cahill‘s writings, it will demonstrate CST is no mere appendage to her work.
Instead, justice becomes more pronounced as a function of her growing tendency to
integrate the social tradition into her essays.

Egalitarianism, Embodiment, and Social Justice in Cahill’s Work: 1990-1996
This section analyzes a ―transitional‖ period of Cahill‘s scholarship in order to
draw out some of the major themes that will comprise her more theoretical projects in the
latter part her career. They also shed light on her conception of justice. As mentioned in
the introduction to this chapter, Cahill‘s work is so often timely and practical.
Throughout these diverse writings on early life, end-of-life decisions, family life, and
sexual ethics, she employs a few concepts that aid her in reaching firm though cautious
conclusions to these and other concerns. This section analyzes three of those notions as
they relate to three corresponding, interrelated segments of her theological inquiry during
this period. The first is equality, especially with regard to sexual and family ethics. The
second is embodiment, particularly as it concerns medical care. The third is justice as it
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relates to social issues like war and poverty. While egalitarianism has been a consistent
theme throughout the early period of her writing, social justice was latent or implied in
her early work. Both have been developed and amplified to become major motifs in later
work, which will be discussed in the final section of this chapter. Curiously, embodiment
seems to fade as a prominent concept in her later work. At least two possible reasons
account for this shift away from embodiment.

Egalitarianism and Sexual Ethics
In Between the Sexes and other early essays, Cahill‘s sense of justice implies
fairness: that men and women of the community be treated as social equals. Egalitarian
considerations are a constant theme throughout her work, and this transitional period is
no exception. Her concept of equality is implicit in every aspect of her research, but
nowhere is it more pronounced than in her writings on sexual ethics. This section
explores this egalitarian theme in two significant texts during this transitional period. The
first is an article, ―Sexual Ethics: A Feminist Biblical Perspective,‖ which seeks to locate
sexual ethics in a more explicitly communal rather than personalist setting.103 The second
is a book-length work, Sex, Gender, and Christian Ethics, which develops a broader
philosophical framework for sexual ethics from her previous work in Between the
Sexes.104
Reprising some themes from Between the Sexes, Cahill‘s perspective here is both
feminist and Christian. It is Christian in that it attempts to demonstrate that the positive,
103
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community-building aspects of biblical teachings on sex have normative value for the
contemporary Christian disciple. It is feminist in its commitment to personal respect and
equal social power for both men and women. As such, her project involves a significant
treatment of the ―egalitarian inspiration of Christianity,‖ which is ―perennially liable to
perversion by powerful authorities.‖105 Cahill points out the New Testament communities
challenged the prevailing sexual ethos of Roman culture, which was characterized by
power, domination, and exclusion with competing values of compassion, solidarity, and
inclusion.106 While the transformative aim of her article is to argue for greater equality in
the social determination of women‘s roles, she insists that a feminist interpretation seeks
equality for both men and women. As such, her analysis focuses less on the control of
sexual behavior and more on the embodiment and social relationships which transcend
sexual ethics.
Cahill‘s concerns are also not unidirectional. She worries that the decline of
traditional Christian sexual morality portends the installation of yet another dominant
social order: one in which autonomous choice is the sole determinant.107 With the
prioritization of individual interests, decisions about sex are cut off from all social
supports.108 She insists that sex is social, even political, in nature, this conviction leads
her to couple this communal notion with the concept of gender. Gender expresses the
social nature of sex in the New Testament, and is the point of departure for feminist
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critique of potential injustice, as opposed to particular sexual sins, which were ―defined
in relation to the unity of the community and to equal consideration of all its members.‖
A feminist biblical sexual ethic does not ―dilute‖ or ―reject‖ the normative force
of the biblical witness. However, it does shift the focus of the Bible‘s
interpretation from specific action-guiding norms, especially exclusionary norms,
to a positive vision and communal practice that is compassionate and
egalitarian.109
The New Testament vision of sex encourages the growth of the new community in their
internal relations. Christian marriage and virginity were once reactions against a
dominant political system that used sex as a tool of control. As the church grew in scope
and power, these positive functions became institutionalized within a new dominant
structure. By recovering the inclusive vision of biblical teachings, the church can
ameliorate these injustices. At the same time, the church can rightly criticize various
kinds of non-marital sexual practices; sex apart from commitment does not symbolize the
solidaristic worldview of the New Testament.110
Today‘s Christian ethicists consider equality, autonomy, and fulfillment as moral
criteria. In fact, Cahill often uses McCormick‘s term ―human flourishing‖ to describe
these three terms collectively. She is aware of the varied practical meanings of equality,
but grants that their employment as moral criteria are generally taken for granted. 111
While the vocabulary of equality and rights is distinctly modern, they are essential to
moral discourse. At the same time, a renewed understanding of practical reason, rooted in
the communal ethics of the Christian tradition, can move these concepts beyond
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theoretical considerations in to ―concrete, effective means‖ toward equitable social
participation.112
Cahill‘s understanding of justice, which is grounded in her Christian context and
coupled with a feminist standpoint, also reflects this sense of equality.
Roman Catholic feminist theology often upholds an ideal of full human moral
agency and well-being which presumes a common standard, and understands
justice neither procedurally nor as protection of individual rights, but as
egalitarian participation of all human beings in the common good.113
Justice as an egalitarian principle does not stand alone. It is also buttressed by her
insistence on participation and the common good. Her vision of justice includes both its
commutative and distributive dimensions.
Justice consists in establishing social relations which are conducive to the
flourishing of all human persons. Justice goes beyond the assertion of their
personal rights by encouraging and supporting each person‘s contribution to all
the conditions of social living which further the common good, including the
fulfillment of duties to other individuals and to the community as a whole.114
Human flourishing, in its sexually-embodied dimension, depends upon the practical
equality of men and women. Departing from the various natural law accounts of sexuality
that tend to establish hierarchical relationships between them, Cahill admits that equality
may in fact be a modern development. But political movements such as abolition and
women‘s suffrage have also confirmed that equality is a ―fundamental form of human
excellence.‖115 As such, the move toward gender equality is not just about the personal
rights of a woman, or even of women in general, but also concerns the good of all in
society.
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As Chapter One pointed out, Cahill argues that sexuality is expressed primarily
through the family. Further analysis of Cahill‘s work will be provided in the third part of
this section, which discusses social ethics. But it warrants a brief consideration here in the
context of egalitarian structures of the family, since Cahill sees that the family situation
and sexual ethics pose similar moral problems in light of Catholic social thought. While
early Christians challenged their social context, they opened the door to spousal and
familial subordination under the aegis of mutual love (see Eph 5:21-33).116 Family, as the
basic unit of society, can help to secure the necessary goods for human flourishing.
Moreover, families are a cross-cultural phenomenon, though they take many different
forms in various places.117 But the form is not ethically neutral. For instance,
contemporary Western societies have narrowed its concept of a domestic household to
the ―nuclear‖ family, yet they demand employed adults to work as if there were a
caregiver at home for their children.118 With the increased attention to marriage as
personal fulfillment or free choice, people also feel less obliged to enter into or remain in
marriage. New Testament tradition can teach modern society about the communitybuilding power of sexual ethics, and it can also provide insights for an egalitarian but
fragmented, isolated nuclear family.119
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Embodiment and Medical Ethics
To be clear, embodiment themes are not relegated solely to Cahill‘s
considerations in medical ethics. In fact, in the essays on sexual ethics discussed in the
previous section, Cahill utilizes anthropologist Mary Douglas‘ idea of the body as symbol
of social organization to demonstrate the social implications of sexual behavior. Citing
Douglas, Cahill claims that the more strongly embedded the social hierarchy is, the more
controlled the bodily movements (including sex) of individuals are likely to be.120 Cahill
returns to the work of Douglas and other contemporary thinkers in her work on
embodiment as it relates to medical ethics, and for many of the same reasons. Whether
one is talking about legalizing prostitution or marketing organs, both refer to a
commodification of the body. In medical and sexual ethics, set within a contemporary
context that prizes autonomy over and above other considerations, there is a tendency to
separate the ―body‖ from the ―self.‖ If the Christian view of the body as a unity of unruly
members in need of control has been historically negative, then today‘s medical view of
the body as ―a site for technical intervention‖ is similarly problematic.
Cahill‘s appreciation for embodiment is implied in her 1991 review of the ethical
dimensions of end-of-life care.121 In the wake of the Supreme Court‘s decision in Cruzan
v. Director, Missouri Department of Health, the Catholic distinction between ordinary
and extraordinary means of life support arose again to prominence in moral debate. Cahill
notes that one of the guiding questions during that period concerns the meaning and
function of ―personhood‖ in decisions for incompetent patients. While some thinkers at
120
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the time may interpret the removal of nutrition/hydration from comatose patients as
―deliberate starvation,‖ others may see it the intentional ―avoidance of a dehumanizing
existence.‖122 Even though she insists that few Catholic authors would argue that quality
of life determines personhood or respect, she admits that it is exceedingly difficult to
describe how these obligations are met in comatose patients. At the same time, there is a
social justice context that bears upon the deliberation surrounding life-prolonging
measures.123 Here, her review turns to age-sensitive treatment policies. Liberal theories of
justice (like those of Rawls and Nozick) have advanced the idea that mutual self-interest
can provide near-limitless access to health care.124 But at the end of life, limited resources
are easily stretched beyond their just distribution. Cahill closes with a clear concern about
the increased medicalization and institutionalization of aging and death that subtly
underscores her growing attention to care for human persons within their community.
In the last two years of this period, she makes an explicit appeal to embodiment as
a means of moral critique. Since ethics is at some level about the body, embodiment
contrasts these dualistic views by integrating the physical nature of the body into the
other non-material aspects of the persons, including the spiritual and the social.125
Philosophical and theological inquiry into the body seems to fall into two camps:
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affirmation of the body as constitutive of personhood and deconstruction of the body as
produced by social discourse.126
In medicine, the concept embodiment attempts to overcome this dualism by
recognizing both the physical and social nature of the body.127 Offering what she calls a
―Christian social perspective,‖ Cahill points out two distinct biblical contributions that
advance an embodied vision of the human person in the context of medical intervention.
A third may be discerned in the classical Thomistic tradition as well. First, the
incarnation provides a path to understanding compassionate care within the patterns of
God‘s self-communication.
One finds, if anything, an anti-dualism about the body in the Gospels. God‘s reign
is realized in the life and ministry of a man formed bodily in the womb of a
woman, a man who in his very walking, sleeping, eating, drinking, talking,
touching, fasting, night-watching, pain and death makes present the compassion
of God for human suffering.128
Jesus, as embodied redeemer, is the centrum of a new community that channels his vision
of the kingdom at least partly in terms of bodily experience. Second, the previous section
and Chapter One highlight Cahill‘s claim that Pauline writings about the body disclose a
reaction against the Roman hierarchy. Even though Paul‘s preference for celibacy may
reflect a hint of dualism, there is a kind of ―egalitarian solidarity of discipleship‖ found in
marriage, where believers ―rule over one another‘s bodies‖ (1 Cor 7:4). There are also
―seeds of alienation‖ for the Christian community as Roman domination is eventually
replaced by ecclesial power. For example, Paul discounts the ―bodily mark of
126
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circumcision,‖ because the practice was used to categorize believers into higher and
lower social statuses within the believing community (Gal 6:12-15).129 In Aquinas‘
perspective, moreover, there are further social considerations insofar as the ―complex
array of needs and capacities innate to our embodied existence‖ roots one‘s moral
perspective and orders one‘s moral obligations.130 In principle, these concerns could be a
matter for deliberation about the just distribution of resources.
Cahill‘s constructive proposal claims that a positive Christian view of the body
offers three valuable recommendations to medical practice.131 The first is a ―stance of
compassion‖ toward those who are suffering. Using the metaphor of the Good Samaritan,
Cahill roots this empathy in ―neighborliness‖ over pity (Luke 10:25-37). The second
point is a call to realize one‘s own future suffering and ultimate mortality. It correlates to
the first in that it requires recognition of human vulnerability. As part of this universal
phenomenon, Cahill points out elsewhere that embodiment is a starting point for
intercultural reflection on shared experiences, values, and norms.132 As Margaret Farley
notes, pain and death are universal experiences.133 In this context, the caregiver and
patient are ―only provisionally set apart‖ by the latter‘s suffering. Finally, a holistic
practice must appreciate the social and spiritual goods of bodily life. In her attempt to
counterbalance the competing goods of autonomy and justice, Cahill sees human
vulnerability as a value rather than defilement.
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All persons in such a community might learn to take their own bodily
vulnerability as an occasion for self-transcendence through compassion for the
vulnerability of others and in openness to the sustaining communion of being
which Christians symbolize as ―resurrection life.‖ 134
This solidarity allows for compassionate care not only in avoiding death when possible
but also in embracing death when it is not.
Two points can be made about Cahill‘s attention to embodiment during this
transitional period. One, there is a conspicuous absence of explicit references to Catholic
Social Teaching as part of her ―social‖ perspective. Outside of a few citations in her
review of end-of-life issues, there are no direct citations of the social tradition. The
opening chapter also pointed out this missing part in her early work on aging.135 This
trend stands in stark contrast to her later writings, which firmly endorse CST. It is
significant because it seems to imply that Cahill ―discovered‖ fruitful research in CST at
some point during this transitional period. As the next portion of this section
demonstrates, it becomes apparent that Cahill is attempting to integrate the social
tradition into various aspects of her work. Two, it is interesting to note that Cahill‘s
consideration of embodiment seems to dissipate after this period. It is not just the case
that she does not write about ―embodiment‖ as such or that the concept is once again
implicit in her work. The word simply ceases to appear in her essays after this period.136
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With its potential value for public bioethical discourse, as the discussion of Farley‘s work
points out, it is surprising that the concept has departed altogether from her lexicon.
At least two reasons can be offered for its disappearance. The first is a practical
consideration. As noted several times in this dissertation, Cahill‘s early writings are
timely reflections of the trends in moral theology. Her range of topics often focuses upon
what is lacking in the current moral discourse. This essay anchors an ongoing discussion
in a text about embodiment and its relationship to medicine. As feminist theologians
continued to write about embodiment, it could be said that Cahill simply began to look
for other ways to express her theological views.137
The second speaks more directly to her methodological shifts during this period.
The previous chapter mentioned the reluctance in this dissertation to label Cahill‘s work
as strictly ―feminist.‖138 Perhaps this hesitance is related to deeper issues of defining
feminism, which is a task far afield of the scope this dissertation. Nonetheless, Cahill has
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described a ―nagging relativism‖ within feminist thought that vexes many thinkers. Her
term refers to the increasing reliance on the unique perspective of women and the
deconstruction of essentialist (and male-focused) worldviews.139 Since she wrote those
words, feminism has been divided into categories like ―woman-centered‖ and ―inclusive‖
(or ―revolutionary‖ and ―recovery‖), and been refined into even more precise
classifications like womanist and mujerista. These terms reflect the narrowing
particularity of feminist thought. Some scholars are even referred to as ―new‖ Catholic
feminists, though their theological methods seem quite traditional.140
This discussion is not meant to criticize feminist theology in general, nor should it
be inferred that Cahill does not employ feminist methods in her essays, especially since
the previous section highlighted her feminist critique of moral theology. Instead, it might
be better stated that Cahill‘s methods shift in her later writings to synthesize what she has
deconstructed in her previous work, and does not despair (as some feminists do) of
finding an objectively-knowable moral order. For instance, ethicist Cristina Traina
describes Cahill as an exemplar of ―natural law feminism.‖141 She founds this claim on
Cahill‘s argument that Roman Catholicism‘s natural law values are reasoned inductively,
through ―a communal model of reasoned moral insight.‖142 Traina notes elsewhere that
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experience is both the ―most-cited factor and wildest variable‖ in moral debate.143
Reliance upon a relational, embodied appeal to universal moral norms is an essential
element to promote public discourse in an epistemologically fractured world, and, ―to
save feminism from morally debilitating relativism.‖144 If this is the case, then both
natural law and feminism are Cahill‘s constructive tools with which she build her
arguments in later essays. Perhaps, then, a concept of embodiment in Cahill‘s work may
have been ―homogenized‖ by her integration of these two methods.
Furthermore, this shift may be accounted for by her use of other contemporary
philosophical methods. As argued in Chapter One, Cahill‘s work (up to this transitional
point) has been influenced by the philosophical contributions of Mary Midgley, and
Stephen Toulmin and Albert Jonsen; she synthesizes their respective contributions in
order to aid her in articulating the objective order of which she writes. Following
Midgley, Cahill‘s natural law claims are ―modest,‖ insofar as they are derived from
induction, rooted in experience, and subject to revision.145 At the same time, she utilizes
the refined casuistry of Jonsen and Toulmin, who approach a moral situation by analogy
through paradigm cases. Prudent, dialogical interaction with each case is required. Cahill
also expands this discussion beyond act-centered morality to cover the practices of social
groups. Instead of providing ready-made solutions to complex public issues, her method
encourages a ―social and intellectual milieu in which the social priorities of religious
143
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communities can be recognized sympathetically.‖146 This critical, contextualized
engagement with the Catholic tradition has also given Cahill some cause for optimism.
She sees signs of a gradual opening of the institutional hierarchy toward greater gender
equality, though other scholars do not share her sanguinity.147
Additionally, through the course of this period, Cahill has yet to interface fully
with the Catholic social tradition, which in its earliest form is derived almost exclusively
from natural law and in its later forms is also argued from Sacred Scripture. But it is
during this time when social justice comes to the surface in some of her writings and
remains a constitutive part of her methodology. Now the dissertation turns to see this
burgeoning assimilation of CST in Cahill‘s writings in social and political thought.

Justice and Social Ethics
Chapter One analyzed Cahill‘s arguments in support of increased participation by
theological voices in the public forum. These writings appear during this transitional
point. In 1990, she begins to make arguments for public involvement, and in 1992, she
outlines the content of that contribution as editor of a volume of Journal of Medicine and
Philosophy. In this interim period, she also applies this participation in various ways. For
instance, in the initial debate regarding stem-cell research, Cahill points out that discord
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over ―higher principles‖ does not discourage substantial consensus on practical
solutions.148 Citing again the work of Jonsen and Toulmin, she takes the position that a
―locus of certitude‖ is not found in universal, general norms, but in ―a shared perception
of what was specifically at stake in particular kinds of human situations.‖149 She claims
that committees engaged in such ―prudent deliberation‖ must be not only diverse in their
makeup, but also serious about self-criticism in achieving consensus. Implied in this
discussion is a sense of equity, which overcomes the ―spectre (sic) of interests‖ which
obstructs resolution of public dilemmas.150 As Cahill‘s theological inquiries begin to
branch out into other particular issues, this implicit idea of social justice becomes
apparent. Unlike embodiment, justice remains an undergirding concept throughout the
remainder of her essays, as the final section of this chapter demonstrates. This portion of
the chapter describes Cahill‘s growing commitment to social justice in two areas: war and
family. Because of the shifting context for both situations, CST makes a vital
contribution to these complex realms of her moral analysis.

Justice, Pacifism, and Just War
As discussed in Chapter Three, the political landscape of the 1980s was shaped
largely by the polarization engendered from the half-century-long Cold War. The
promotion of democratic capitalism on the one side and socialist communism on the
other defined the strategic and political aims of opposing nations during the period. With
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the collapse of communism, this polarization quickly subsided, but just war issues did
not. Immediately after the Cold War, the United States and its NATO allies found
themselves in yet another conflict in the Persian Gulf. Ethicist J. Bryan Hehir believes
that this new war changed the face of military intervention in two ways. It first of all
highlighted the erosion of national sovereignty for some nations to pursue their own
interests within international society. Conversely, it magnified the interdependence and
cooperation among other nations in military, economic, and political matters.151
Cahill‘s published work on the subject of war began in the mid-1980s, with a
series of articles in the biblical theology journal Interpretation, where she considers both
the historical and biblical foundations for Christian pacifism and just war.152 This
groundbreaking work for Cahill lays a foundation for this transitional period of her
essays, and also offers a few insights into the adaptation of her work to new
circumstances. This section considers two of Cahill‘s positive contributions to ethical
discourse about war and pacifism. The first is her appropriation of the magisterial
documents related to justice and peace. The second is the continuation of her theme of
community-building. Cahill‘s initial inquiries into war and pacifism entail a broad
historical approach, which includes Sacred Scripture, select Patristic authors (especially
Augustine), Thomas Aquinas‘ philosophy, and the reflections of Christian Reformers.153
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Her research distinguishes those thinkers who understand the Christian community in
eschatological terms from those who envision it in political terms. Each camp has
difficulty dealing with counterexamples found in the bible, and in turn must resort to
justifying their positions with a contrasting interpretation of the troublesome texts. With
this diversity of philosophical and biblical views, Cahill concludes her early study with a
dividing question: ―whether the Kingdom‘s peace can characterize history, or whether
peace waits upon establishment of justice, even if by coercion and even if by
violence.‖154
During the transitional period of her work, Cahill employs social teachings from
the United States‘ Bishops, who side with the latter part of the issue when they claim that
justice is prior to peace.155 Following the sources of CST, they insist that coercion has its
limits and proscriptions in the prosecution of war. For example, the Bishops‘ document
echoes the condemnation of nuclear warfare, especially when aimed at civilian
populations.156 They also realize that just war involves more than a moral evaluation of
weaponry or military strategy, but instead must attend to moral choices that reflect
Kingdom living.157 Their pastoral is set not only within a pluralistic context of the
American political community, but also within diverse views about Christian ethics. They
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attempt to appeal to the common good, which they understand in the context of Vatican
II‘s Pastoral Constitution as a universal, transnational norm.158
With this pastoral foundation, Cahill picks up the theme of the universal common
good in her essays on war and peace during this time. She notes that social teachings
have become less explicit in their support for unlimited national sovereignty and ―more
interested in joining nations together in the common cause of peace under the leadership
of a world government.‖159 Justice is another important component. Cahill claims that
Aquinas influenced the Catholic tradition regarding justice and peace.160 Much of his
theological reflection is derived from Aristotle‘s naturalism, and calls for a moral order
that is, in principle, knowable to all reasonable agents. But in the Aristotelian tradition,
justice was reserved for the members of the community (i.e., of the city-state), while
provisional hospitality was afforded to strangers. In envisioning a global, interdependent
community, even one that includes a nation‘s enemies, justice must remain an
overarching concern.
In terms of their respective interpretations of Aquinas‘ thought on justice, there is
a clear distinction between Cahill and Jean Porter, whose work was discussed in the
previous chapter. As Porter notes, justice can produce conflict because of the attempt to
achieve finite human values and ends, and must therefore be supplemented by the virtue
of charity.161 By contrast, Cahill sees a Thomistic sense of justice as privileging the
common good over individual good. She points to a series of questions from the Summa
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which suggest that that justice must rule over individual concerns. For example, Aquinas
suggests that public officials, motivated by charity, must seek the public good over that of
individuals.162 Related to this example, Cahill notes that in Aquinas, a judge who issues
the death penalty may prefer the common good to that of the individual, but allows that
conversion and expiation may also be effected in the criminal by this sentence.163
What is more important here is the drastic effect of pacifism upon Cahill‘s critical
appropriation of the natural moral law. She notes that Aquinas wrestled with many of
―radical implications‖ of Jesus‘ teachings on nonviolence and nonresistance, but did not
let them challenge his ―essentially philosophical moral perspective.‖ However, Cahill is
challenged by the idea of pacifism and nonresistance. She demonstrates that Christian
pacifism and just war theory are not simply two moral options, but two ―fundamentally
contrasting evolutions of Christian identity.‖164 While both entail a presupposition against
violence, she claims that pacifism alone is a ―way of life.‖ In other words, only pacifism
can be called a ―communal practice‖ in Christian life. She highlights that this shared
practice is not monolithic, and discerns two types of pacifism: compassionate and
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obediential.165 In fact, it is just this type of discourse that makes pacifism a ―practice‖ in
MacIntyre‘s use of the term in that it has complexity, internal goods, and standards of
excellence. 166 Moreover, it is part of an ongoing debate within the community about the
overriding importance of imitating Christ‘s actions and teachings.
Just war theory clearly has its roots in the natural moral law. As such it seems
reasonable to suppose that a plausible account of the theory could be adapted to the
Christian community. However, Cahill makes the startling claim that
Just war theory is not communal in any specific sense (other than that it emerges
from Western cultural and moral traditions), precisely because its purpose is to
unite different and even antagonistic religious, moral, and cultural communities
around a set of excluding or negative and minimal criteria of mutual association
in exceptional circumstances. The presupposition of these limiting criteria is
positive – peace is a value and is to be sought – but while the just war theory
deters infractions against peace, its so functioning does not depend on agreement
about a positive, substantive view of peace or justice or even war.167
Cahill‘s strong reluctance about just war considerations can be explained in large part by
her suspicions about religious coercion. She notes that the U.S. Bishops‘ pastoral letter
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did not question whether a genuine peace can be established coercively.168 She also
highlights the historical use of compulsion in the Catholic and Reformed traditions.169
In her future essays, though, Cahill is generally less wary of coercive policies. For
instance, she envisions appeals to enlightened self-interest as an ―indirect and
anticipatory form of coercion, in which an agent rationally considers future or potential
negative consequences of a certain course of action. Bad press, trade sanctions, and
punitive taxation are three examples of these forcible practices. In fact, within a decade,
she also seems to reverse her earlier criticism of just war theory.170 Due to human
sinfulness and structural injustices, force is sometimes needed.
Thus, an element to be accentuated in social teaching of the future is the
occasional, but still very definite, need for coercion to secure justice in social
relations. Still needed is a principle of forceful intervention that is similar to the
principle that undergirded the traditional just war theory. Once again, though, the
structures of social agency have changed in the age of globalization; coercive
authority is not limited to the nation-state, a comprehensive public authority, or
international institutions. Activist networks and non-governmental organizations,
along with dissenting national governments, can challenge and even coerce some
aspects of global systems, at least some of the time.171
As Cahill‘s work more fully integrated CST, she seems to come to terms with the
tradition that coercion is sometimes needed in the face of dehumanizing injustice.172 CST
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also evolved during this time of change in Cahill‘s thought. Since Vatican II, CST, which
in its earlier form is grounded in natural law, began to lean more heavily upon Sacred
Scripture in order to generate timely, practical solutions to pressing social problems.173
Critical interaction with social teachings will become foundational of her later ethical
writings, especially bioethics.
Her deeper consideration of CST has even further implications for her ongoing
work in sexuality and the family. During this transitional time in her writings, she
continues to draw in the social tradition into her essays. Building upon Chapter One‘s
analysis of her use of CST, the next section analyzes Cahill‘s understanding of justice
within the family context.

Justice, Family, and Sexual Ethics
The opening chapter of this dissertation described the importance of the family in
CST. For instance, Leo XIII insisted that compensation for labor should provide
sufficiently for a worker‘s family, which is the first natural society.174 The family is also
the narrowest demonstration of the sociality of human beings, one of the three basic
affirmations of CST. But the family is more than a basic economic unit, and the family
structure is not beyond ethical critique. Even though Cahill‘s early work in sexual and
her scholarship, she has endorsed just-war theory, when it is truly used as a limited last
resort. It is also important to note that her understanding of just-war has been largely
informed by Catholic Social Teaching. See Meinrad Scherer-Edmunds, ―Is This War
Just?‖ U.S. Catholic 66, no.12 (December 2001), 12-16, with an acknowledgement of
thanks to Dr. Bailey, who directed me to this article.
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family ethics underscores the communal dimension of both, it did not include any
references to CST. Instead, she attempts an inductive and contextualized appropriation of
the natural law that moved beyond emphases upon individual acts.175
In her later work in family ethics, natural law is still a prominent element, as it
was in her early work, but she also fully integrates CST into her mature project. At the
same time, Cahill‘s notion of justice evolves beyond the natural law‘s basic definition as
―giving others what is due to them.‖ This commutative and distributive principle remains
a part of her work, but it also becomes idealized in concert with the social tradition‘s
understanding of social justice. This section analyzes her work in family and sexual
ethics during this transitional period by placing it within the stream of her research, past
and future. It includes a brief comparison both to her previous essays, while the next
section considers her later thought related to family ethics.
As described in Chapter One, Cahill founds her claims about the family on the
biological aspect of human sex. It is vital for the continuation of the species, and thereby
is constitutive of the natural order. Family and gender organize reproduction
―cooperatively and socially‖ toward this end. By the same token, justice is a uniquely
human notion in the created order, promoting the life of the species beyond mere
survival. In order to orient human sexual activity in a proper manner, the common good
provides content for justice in its interpersonal and social dimensions. Thus, in humans,
the family is the primary conduit through which sex and gender relate to the common
good.176
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During this period of Cahill‘s scholarship, her notion of justice moves beyond the
egalitarian and personalist tendencies of her previous work toward a solidaristic and
interdependent framework for justice.177 This conception of justice deemphasizes the
moral sense of responsibility away from principles and stresses it toward persons,
especially to those in need. For example, in her discussion of Aquinas‘ views on marriage
and family, she considers the justice aspects of these institutions which are highlighted in
his work. She sees his insistence on monogamy as ―more naturally just‖ than polygamous
marriage or non-marital childbearing.178 Monogamy places a clear restraint on men from
―indiscriminate insemination,‖ and the responsibility for men to provide material
protection to expectant mothers and their children.179 Moreover, it protects older women
who have lost either beauty, fecundity, or both.180 Cahill‘s discussion of justice in
Aquinas‘ thought is a new development from Between the Sexes, where she looks to the
interpersonal dimension of couples in his work.181 In this classical sense, justice is still
intrinsically concerned with giving to others what is due to them, and this theme is
likewise prominent in Cahill‘s discussion of honoring parents. However, Christian roots
of justice are far deeper than liberal notions of parenthood.
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Aquinas attributes greater love of humans for their parents to the ―honor‖ and
―reverence‖ they owe them (as contrasted to the ―care‖ owed children). Honor for
one‘s parents depends both on the memory and foresight necessary to recognize
intergenerational relationships, to experience gratitude for past benefits, and to
maintain a moral sense of indebtedness for such benefits, even when their
prospective utility is past.182
This intergenerational portrayal of justice demonstrates her constant rejection of
utilitarian and social contract bases for justice, but it also underscores the ―interactive
reason‖ which is constitutive of the dialogic nature of Cahill‘s developing notion of
justice.183
The common good gives content to her notions of justice, with solidarity and
responsibility as two guiding virtues that help to contribute toward the common good.
One example during this period is found in an essay on suffering. While keeping the
essential equality of persons intact, Cahill begins to shift the focus away from
egalitarianism as such to ―solidarity and mutual care.‖ This ―Christian resocialization‖
penetrated the early community to its core, and disrupted the effects of economic, gender,
social and other differences. 184 Contemporary Christian ethics must not only address the
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suffering of others but also determine their responsibility for it.185 On this basis, Cahill
claims that CST brings together freedom and responsibility together under the theme of
participation in the common good.186 Family relates to this aspect of CST in two
reciprocal ways.
Christian families should not turn inward, nurturing only their own interior
relations and spirituality. The family also has social responsibilities, and families,
in turn, need social support so that they can participation in the common good and
fulfill their responsibilities. My main point is that, taken together, both kinds of
responsibility mean that more-advantaged families have an obligation to lessadvantaged families, including broken, single-parent, impoverished families and
families suffering from racial or ethnic discrimination.187
On the one hand, the social responsibilities of families are universal, in that they must
refrain from turning inward on themselves. Implicit here is that families are both free and
dependent at the same time, because they need help to participate fully in society. On the
other hand, these social responsibilities often have a particular dimension to them,
especially when families are confronted with the suffering of another family. The virtue
of solidarity is thereby given a context that concretizes the universal principle of social
justice.
Justice considerations also have an influence on sexual and family ethics within a
global social context. Contraception as a population-reducing strategy is a very different
question from a couple‘s family planning scheme. Cahill grants that the welfare of a
community (local or global) might require limitations on family size, but it must be
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considered in relation to economic and political justice, including justice for women. It
must also be assessed according to distributive schemes and other justice factors within
an interdependent community, with a focus on disadvantaged or vulnerable
populations.188

Conclusion to the Analysis of the ―Transitional‖ Period in Cahill‘s Work
This section has attempted to navigate the complex, circuitous development in
Cahill‘s conception of justice during a transitional period in her scholarship. On the one
hand, personal justice as a Thomistic virtue is an enduring component of her work. To
call it ―personal‖ does not mean that justice is an isolated or private matter. In her work,
―justice for individuals‖ always implies individuals within a community. At this point,
Cahill‘s notion of personal justice has to do with equality, especially in her sexual and
gender ethics. On the other hand, the community as such becomes the locus for her
considerations of justice. Like the twisting of a kaleidoscope, the perspective shifts while
the constitutive elements of justice remain the same. Her concept of embodiment gives a
social and historical context to the agent, and in turn offers a turn to the social dimensions
of justice. This social perspective, which recognizes the universality of mortality and
sickness, allows for compassionate care and resurrection hope. However, embodiment
disappears as a fundamental concept in her later work. This early social perspective also
seems to exclude explicit references to Catholic Social Teaching, but as the third segment
of this section demonstrated, she begins to incorporate CST into her scholarship during
this time. The affirmations of human dignity, sociality, and the common good – which,
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taken together, perhaps imply embodiment – become an indispensable part of these and
future essays.
In terms of just war and pacifism, it is clear during this part of her career that
Cahill privileges the latter. Against the general view of the social tradition, she sees
nonviolence as the only practice that can be emblematic of an authentic Christian
community. She later modifies and eventually reverses this position, as she comes to
understand that coercion can and at times must be used to thwart deeply entrenched
injustices. This shift can be explained by a more complete integration of CST, which
demands that Christians maintain responsibility for their part in the evolution of historical
events that impact upon the common good.189 Her growing attention to the common good
has enormous influence upon her ethical writings on family. The common good supplies
a concrete measure for justice in all human relations, and participation is the first
indicator of justice. Participation implies an egalitarian aspect of justice with regard to
equal respect and social power. It also requires contribution from all toward the common
good, and generates responsibility on the part of society to ensure that all can fully
participate. While the family can help to secure the goods required for human flourishing,
society must be able to afford their widest possible distribution.
The final section will demonstrate that the social dimensions of Cahill‘s writings
take on a fully global perspective, and it is indeed a rare essay that does not include some
ethical import for worldwide society. It analyzes her continuing work on the family and
bioethics as she increasingly assimilates CST into her method. Her strategies to achieve
both personal and social justice in both of these areas of her research reach out across an
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array of religious, political, governmental and non-governmental entities. In short, the
next section addresses the considerations of Cahill‘s ―collaborative justice.‖

Collaborative Justice and the Common Good in Global Perspective: 1997 - Present
Cahill‘s growing attention to justice in the universal church and global society
become the overwhelming focus in her later writings, and this theme persists to the
present day. Her notion of justice attempts to cover nearly every area of ecclesial and
public life. She accomplishes this goal by fully integrating the Catholic social tradition
into her work. At the same time, she understands that justice cannot be achieved at local
levels as a result of top-down interventions. Outsiders can serve a vital role through
public advocacy, material and technological support, and advisory personal, but the
responsibility of local improvement must belong to the local polity. Her insistence upon
homegrown or grassroots empowerment is an application of the principle of subsidiarity,
which is also a component of CST.
This final section analyzes Cahill‘s application of collaborative justice in family
and social ethics, which remains a major part of her scholarship up to the present. In this
context, she amplifies many of CST‘s concepts to buttress the foundation of her earlier
work in sexual and family ethics. She also calls for greater participation of the laity, and
especially women, in the governance of the Catholic Church. Her critical understanding
of CST becomes apparent in her analysis of several challenges to the social tradition.
Nonetheless, she remains optimistic that CST is the best way to express Catholic identity
in the public forum. The dissertation also summarizes the structure of collaborative
justice, and compares Cahill‘s vision of justice with the philosophical and theological
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accounts of justice offered in Chapters Two and Three. The dissertation‘s conclusion will
discuss the possibility of applying Cahill‘s collaborative justice to future public discourse
about genetic enhancement, an issue which she has also considered extensively.

Collaborative Justice in Family and Social Ethics
This section explores Cahill‘s growing tendency to utilize collaborative strategies
in achieving justice throughout her theological project. In doing so, she refines her earlier
work in sexual and family ethics, and recommends ways in which diverse family types
can serve the common good of society. She also encourages greater participation
especially for women in all areas of social life, including the church. She argues that
complementarity undermines the church‘s mission by marginalizing a large number of its
members. With regard to social ethics, Cahill continues to insist that religious voices
should maintain a leading role in public debate. This persistence is driven by her firm
commitment to collaborative justice, which transcends liberal and communitarian
approaches to justice.
The first chapter summarized CST‘s vital influence on Cahill‘s later work on sex,
gender, and family. Cahill‘s writings on the family have moved from its significance for
sustaining today‘s Christian community to the transformative values of solidarity and
responsibility for the larger society in which Christians live. This trend begins in essays
during the transitional period of her career, and further evidence is found in her 2000
book, which analyzes the Christian family through the lens of CST. There, she defines
family as ―an organized network of socioeconomic and reproductive interdependence and
support grounded in biological kinship and marriage.‖ Historically, marriage and the
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family have been the primary ways in which economic and social structures are
managed.190 Michael Walzer also described marriage as one of the predetermined social
arrangements in which humans find themselves.191 Employing John Paul‘s metaphor of
the family as domestic church, Cahill confirms the interdependence of the family and
society.192 She calls on society to provide support for the well-being of families, so that
they might thereby contribute effectively toward the common good.
However, Cahill is also concerned that the Christian community has not yet
achieved complete participation of its own membership. For example, social encyclicals
on the family still insist on a paradigm of complementarity which assigns women to
domestic (i.e., private) roles in society. In other later essays, Cahill points out that, even
though most non-ordained ministerial positions in local parishes are held by women,
there is still no role for women in the Roman Curia, which preserves and perpetuates
Catholic teaching.193 At the same time, theological perspectives that tend to idealize the
nuclear family actually undermine Catholic teaching on the common good.194
Consequently, Cahill‘s commitment to justice for all within the community engenders a
certain hesitation in her other later essays to utilize fully the metaphor of family as
―domestic church.‖
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Cahill makes three arguments which attempt to rehabilitate this domestic church
imagery by transforming the participatory nature and diverse structures of the family
itself. First, she claims that Christian families‘ internal structure should be based on
reciprocity (elsewhere called mutuality) and spirituality rather than complementarity.
Moreover, families should turn outward in order to transform society in a manner
consistent with CST. Finally, a diverse church should be able to tolerate varied family
structures in their struggle.195 In short, Cahill calls on families to be just, to work toward
justice, and to be supported by just institutions, including the church itself.
Furthermore, she offers five recommendations which she believes will give rise to
a justice-seeking domestic church. 196 First, the family‘s internal relationships should
embody justice insofar as it is rooted in mutuality, dignity, and respect. In another essay,
she employs the concepts mutuality and reciprocity as a ―guiding vision‖ for the church,
in hopes that ―justice and love can be more fully realized in society and in the church.‖
She also calls for a reinvigoration of the church‘s teaching on human createdness in order
to ―preclude any idea that men can imitate Christ more than women.‖197 Next, familial
roles should promote participation in the common good. Third, kinship should not be
placed above discipleship as a ―family in Christ,‖ Fourth, the domestic church, like the
universal church, should seek justice with a preferential option for the poor. Fifth, the
family‘s internal moral commitments must be contextualized by its relationship with God
in all aspects of life – religious and secular. Cahill‘s five-fold emphases on human
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dignity, common good, firm discipleship, preferential option, and holistic lifestyle all
reflect the complete integration of CST into her theological reflections on the family.
Cahill‘s collaborative justice in family ethics continues to insist on gender
equality as its point of departure. Equality within the family ―teaches an important lesson
for the way we approach those outside our families.‖198 To this point, she praises John
Paul II‘s refusal to limit women‘s roles to the domestic realm in his social encyclicals. 199
Despite the central place the pontiff gives motherhood for women, a position that Cahill
believes creates an imbalance in his social thought, she also believes that gender equality
can be realized by locating it under the aegis of the Preferential Option for the Poor. The
Preferential Option affirms justice through its call for social justice and inclusive
participation in the common good. The historic and ongoing exclusion of women from
roles in public life warrants their categorization among the world‘s poor. 200
Moving to Cahill‘s work in social ethics in general, one finds aspects of
collaborative justice in nearly all of her essays. Each account of justice presented in
Chapter Two clearly proposes certain consequences for participation in the public sphere.
It is apparent from the breadth of Cahill‘s most recent writings that she generally rejects
liberal strategies which prefer market forces and autonomous choice as the guiding values
for moral deliberation. It is equally clear that she does not intend to call for the church to
isolate itself by withdrawing from the public forum. Even though she consistently accepts
that CST is the unsurpassed method for Catholics participating in public ethical
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discourse, she is also fully aware of the challenges for CST in an age of globalization.
This dissertation makes the case that Cahill‘s notion of collaborative justice, expressed in
CST‘s concepts of solidarity and subsidiarity, effectively answers these troubling
questions about CST. The remainder of this chapter section on social ethics summarizes
Cahill‘s response to various challenges to a Catholic understanding of the common good,
and the conclusion will demonstrate how she applies collaborative justice to the area of
genetics.
Cahill sees that one nagging obstacle for a common good approach to social
issues in an age of globalization has to do with world governance. The social encyclicals
look hopefully toward the United Nations to become the final arbiter of international
conflicts and problems. Even Benedict XVI still seeks a world political entity with the
authority to implement proposed solutions to international development.201 In the absence
of such an entity, Cahill claims that powerful organizations like the World Trade
Organization (WTO), the International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank have moved
into this vacuum. The WTO‘s objective is to ―guarantee a safe and stable political and
financial environment for first world producers and investors.‖202 Part of this problem is
tied directly to CST, especially the social encyclicals, which envision layers of authority
in a top-down fashion. While the social tradition accounts for these layers through the
principle of subsidiarity, which allows these levels to operate within their respective
spheres of operation, it remains committed to a worldwide authority at the top.

201

Benedict XVI, Caritas in Veritate, 67.

202

Cahill, ―The Global Common Good in the Twenty-First Century,‖ in James
Keating ed., Moral Theology: New Directions and Fundamental Issues (New York:
Paulist Press, 2004), 238, 239-240.
319

By contrast, Cahill perceives in the principle of subsidiarity an implicit notion:
there is acceptance of a plurality of social organizations, with overlapping and reciprocal
areas of competence. Globalization challenges CST‘s hierarchical paradigm to include
this pluralism which imagines an authority that is ―multifaceted, dialogical, flexible, and
open-ended.‖ As an alternative, Cahill calls attention to organizations that she refers to as
―transnational advocacy networks,‖ groups of activists who share a practical consensus
about a certain value or injustice (e.g., the environment, HIV/AIDS, global debt, etc.).
Using the same communications and transportation technology that brought about
globalization, these networks can work on behalf of the marginalized or against the
interests of the powerful.203
Cahill makes analogous claims in the area of moral theology in general. Utilizing
Australian feminist legal scholar Hilary Charlesworth‘s model of ―transversalism,‖
understood as a cross-cultural and empathetic process reaching moral consensus, Cahill
insists that there is very little cultural pluralism with regard to the most basic needs of
persons and societies. Transversalism has potential ―to invigorate our quest for
justice.‖204
Where cultural pluralism makes a huge often negative moral difference is in
defining the systems of access by which individuals and group either do or do not
obtain the goods their welfare and flourishing require. Access to goods is
typically restricted. Every culture and institution known to humanity systematizes
types of discrimination. Modern terms such as ―human dignity,‖ ―full humanity,‖
―democracy,‖ ―human rights,‖ ―equality,‖ ―solidarity,‖ and ―equal opportunity‖
are ways of challenging inequitable access patterns. Such language represents a
203

Ibid., 243, 244.

204

Cahill, ―Moral Theology: From Evolutionary to Revolutionary Change,‖ in
James Keenan ed. Catholic Theological Ethics in the World Church (New York:
Continuum, 2007), 224-225. Transversalism refers to a universal understanding of basic
needs across cultures. See Hilary Charlesworth, ―Martha Nussbaum‘s Feminist
Internationalism,‖ Ethics 111, no.1 (October 2000), 64-78; Cahill cites at 76-77.
320

social, political, and legal ethos in which participation in the common good and
access to basic goods of society is universally shared, even though on man
possible cultural models. This is the modern definition of social justice, and social
justice is an indispensable constituent of contemporary moral theology.205
The natural law tradition, which grounds CST, also offers the warrant for religious voices
to dialogue about these and other public moral problems. It is built on the premise that
shared humanity will resolve practical threats to the common good.206
In some ways, Cahill‘s conception of collaborative justice resembles Margaret
Farley‘s notion of ―compassionate respect.‖ As described in Chapter Three, Farley
envisions the content for justice being provided by compassionate respect, whereas the
common good offers meaning for just social relations. In Cahill‘s work, the common
good provides the content, while solidarity and equality help to define justice‘s meaning.
But in both cases aid is not rendered in a top-down, paternalistic manner. The action and
activism required to ameliorate an unjust situation is accomplished in a way that respects
persons within their particular contexts.
Collaborative justice also demonstrates Cahill‘s commitment to participation in
the political process. In a 2012 essay, she asserts that political participation is one of the
most significant activities in which humans can fulfill their human dignity, and it is
crucial for sustaining a healthy democracy and justice. But she is also concerned that
Catholic citizens, especially in the American context, too often become ―single-issue
voters.‖ 207 She cites the 2008 U.S. Presidential election as evidence of Catholic voters
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moving away from a tendency to focus myopically on a candidate‘s stance on abortion
while ignoring virtually all other social issues.208 Cahill calls for a further distancing of
Catholic voters from what she refers to as the ―culture wars,‖ and instead move toward
―forging a dynamic vision from constructive debate, respectful criticism, practical
commitment, and a hermeneutic of generosity toward others‘ value priorities.‖ 209
In a bipolar world, where twenty percent of the world‘s developed nations tend
toward overconsumption while many in the developing world suffer from
malnourishment, greater attention to global justice helps to achieve these urgent political
goals.210 She is encouraged to see Benedict‘s Caritas in Veritate call for global social
reform, which requires a ―global solidarity,‖ a public place for religion, and a love which
leads to ―engagement in the field of justice and peace.‖211 He also insists on a world
political authority to oversee such policies, a task Cahill believes is no longer a viable
solution.212
It warrants repeating here that although Cahill generally rejects the notion of an
overarching authority with regard to international development that she does not reject a
universally expressible morality. In fact, on this point Cahill differs with Jean Porter, who
takes the position that theological ethical norms cannot be expressed to those outside the
community. Moreover, Porter claims that a global ethic is neither necessary nor possible.

208

Cahill, ―Religion and Politics: U.S.A.,‖ Theological Studies 70, no.1 (March
2009), 177-178. See also ―Voting and Living the Common Good,‖ 28-31.
209

Cahill, ―Voting and Living the Common Good,‖ 31.

210

Ibid., 36-37.

211

Benedict XVI, Caritas in Veritate, 56, 1.

212

Ibid., 24, 67; cf. Cahill, ―Caritas in Veritate: Benedict‘s Global Reorientation,‖
Theological Studies 71, no.2 (June 2010), 292.
322

A universal ethic could only be described at the highest levels of abstraction, emptying
them of any actual universal meaning.213 Instead, Cahill has consistently claimed that
Catholic ethics is intelligible to larger society to the degree that Catholic theologians can
resist proceeding deductively from first principles.214 Cahill has maintained this position
for over a decade.
Global ethics does not stand or fall with a universal set of specific moral
prescriptions, which few today would defend, but with the idea that there are after
all some moral nonnegotiables and some clearly identifiable injustices to which
all cultures and religions should be responsive for humanistic reasons.215
The unprecedented rise of globalization now requires global patterns of morality. Mass
communications and rapid transportation technologies have already shaped relationships
among human persons and communities across national and cultural lines.216 Cahill‘s
attention to unjust situations and structures in global society has oriented her search for a
suitable common morality, and collaborative justice seems to be its comprehending
principle.

The Elements of Collaborative Justice and Comparison with Other Accounts
What are the contours of Cahill‘s notion of collaborative justice, then? Four
observations can be made. First of all, it is rooted in the Thomistic definition of giving to
others what is due to them. This classical understanding has been pronounced in writings
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which span her entire career. What is most interesting here is how the subject of justice
has developed during this time. In Cahill‘s early writings, justice was subtly and
strategically placed within select writings in order to resolve particular issues within a
communal context. Individual persons inside the Body of Christ were the subject of
justice. Issues like occasional contraception, committed homosexuality, and remarriage
after divorce are deeply personal, yet they can also affect others within the larger
community.217 Her later work tends to portray this communal dimension in broadlyinclusive shades, a perspective that moves beyond Aquinas‘ conception of ―community,‖
as discussed in Chapter Three.
Next, the common good gives content to collaborative justice. Participation in
striving for the common good is essential to living out one‘s human dignity. Justice
requires that persons contribute to their fullest capacity. It also demands that society
provide each family with what they lack, so that they can fulfill this responsibility to
justice. Cahill has noted that the latter part of this mutual arrangement is the ―flip side‖ of
social justice.218 Thus, there is an interdependent, reciprocal relationship between the
individual and society. The final part of this section also describes her ―bioethics of the
common good,‖ which gives substance to bioethical applications of justice.
Third, Cahill‘s writings describe collaborative justice as a universal principle.
This principle is not logically deduced, but experientially inducted. Induction is also not
an isolated intellectual process, but an engaging dialogical one. Occasionally, she has
referred to this common morality by way of David Hollenbach‘s idea of ―dialogic
universalism,‖ which Cahill describes as premised upon human dignity but articulated in
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a ―pluralistic but interdependent world.‖ Practices of solidarity are vital to the universal
scope of collaborative justice, so that the common good may be achieved appropriately
and differentially within the ―network of crisscrossing communities.‖ 219
Finally, as this dissertation concludes with a consideration of Cahill‘s writings on
genetic enhancement, it is important to preface that analysis with her lengthy description
of justice, what this dissertation calls ―collaborative justice,‖ as it applies to germline
modification.
The definition of justice upon which I rely, and which I will apply in the area of
germline modification, is procedural, substantive, social, and global. Justice
requires procedures by which all social members can participate in establishing
practices and institutions that affect their welfare and that of their communities.
Justice requires access to the basic human goods necessary for human life, wellbeing, and society. Justice refers to and includes patterns of social relationships
and institutions that allow individuals and groups to be related to one another
consistently at distances of time and space. Justice as participation, as sharing in
basic goods, and as social or political is a global norm or ideal, applying to all
peoples or cultures.220
Cahill‘s depiction of justice here includes the three major aspects of collaborative justice
that were described in the preceding paragraphs. It consists in giving to others their due.
Justice‘s demands are determined by reference to the common good. Likewise,
participation is a constitutive element of the common good and, by extension, justice.
Furthermore, her definition is global in scope. Further still, Cahill‘s definition resonates
and contrasts in significant ways with the accounts of justice analyzed in the Chapters
Two and Three.
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Collaborative Justice and the Philosophical Accounts of Justice
For example, Cahill and John Rawls both construe justice in procedural terms.
Both express egalitarian tendencies, with regard to respect for individual persons. They
are also concerned with the welfare of society‘s least-favored citizens. Rawls expresses
this responsibility in the Difference Principle, while Cahill looks to solidarity as the
primary, guiding virtue. The two concepts are similar insofar as both attend to the least
well-off in society, but they are quite far apart in practice. On the one hand, Cahill claims
that solidarity gives content to the larger practices of justice. Rawls, on the other hand,
envisions the Difference Principle qua principle, and lexically follows the primacy of
liberty. Cahill might reasonably be able to practice solidarity in a manner that resonates
with the Difference Principle, but it is only incidentally so. Cahill‘s solidarity is an
application of Rawls‘ Difference Principle only because Cahill has a foundational sense
of the good prior to Rawls‘ two-fold conception of justice. This good is equality rooted in
human dignity, which is related to, but quite distinct from, liberty. As the Epilogue will
bear out, solidarity requires that liberty sometimes be constrained, even coercively.
Furthermore, their respective notions of justice imply both cooperation and
competition among its constituents, while trying to subtract power from its original
position to avoid unfair exploitation of initial advantages. Rawls accomplishes this task
intellectually through the veil of ignorance. In reality, however, power differentials are
often found in policy debates. By contrast, Cahill employs a participatory bioethics that
includes action and activism.221 Several examples were offered in the present chapter as
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well as the first, like Cahill‘s description of transnational advocacy networks.222 Cahill‘s
collaborative strategies thereby diffuse these power gradients more effectively than the
constant government intervention required by Rawls‘ Difference Principle.
Ultimately, Cahill rejects Rawls‘ two-fold political conception of justice, which
privileges liberty above all else in its serial ordering. Rawls rules out substantive
discussion about the good life for liberty‘s sake, thereby allowing citizens to pursue their
own life plans. Cahill takes the position that, lacking a fuller notion of the good, public
discourse becomes ruled by ―the values of individualism, science, technology, the
market, and profits.‖ Instead, she calls upon theologians to recover its prophetic voice,
and join the public forum as ―an energetic adversary of the liberal consensus.‖ 223 Cahill
also critiques Rawlsian approaches to genetic medicine on the grounds that unjust
patterns of health care access, which already exist, will continue to exclude the
marginalized with regard to genetic interventions. Ordinarily worthy values like free
choice and tolerance tend to short-circuit serious considerations of the common good.224
This issue is also addressed further in the conclusion.
As described in Chapter Two, Cahill does not share MacIntyre‘s pessimism
regarding the state of moral discourse. To the contrary, she depends upon cooperation
from diverse elements of the community to achieve a higher standard of justice.
However, when it comes to justice as such, Cahill and MacIntyre both ground their
respective understanding in a Thomistic account of justice. They also agree that there is
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no concept of a neutral, tradition-free rationality that can give rise to an adequate account
of justice.225
Cahill and MacIntyre both critique globally-significant state activity, though they
describe them in different terms. MacIntyre states that particular public cases are
adjudicated by employing the concepts of utility and rights through government entities
like the courts and legislatures.226 But in contemporary society, as MacIntyre has shown,
the government is not neutral in deciding among competing claims. Powerful interests
appoint judges to the courts, and equally formidable lobbies have the ear of legislators.
Further still, since governmental power to enforce decisions endangers the stability of
local communities, agencies of the state should not be the ones to exclude participation in
public discourse. By contrast, Cahill sees some value in collaborating with the
government on policy. Lacking such controls, she believes that powerful interests can
monopolize the debate, effectively short-circuiting any action that subtracts from their
profits.227
Moving to a comparative analysis with Michael Walzer‘s conception of justice,
one can find many points of similarity. For instance, both critique a conception of public
discourse that is couched in terms of strictly-deliberative practices. In deliberative
processes, disagreements are negotiated through discourse which is qualified by
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reciprocity, transparency, and accountability.228 Deliberation seeks a practical consensus
on individual issues, but it must also have recourse to a ―macro level‖ theory of justice.229
While Cahill applauds this vision of discourse, she also calls it ―ideal.‖ She also
sees such theories of deliberative democracy as illuminating examples of participatory
theological bioethics.230 But in many ways, public discourse is not neutral, and in this
sense, she shares a strong connection to Walzer‘s view on egalitarian justice. Justice is
not a principle, but an end-product. It is also achieved through non-deliberative strategies,
including coercion, as the conclusion to this dissertation will demonstrate. As both
MacIntyre and Walzer have pointed out in their own ways, public discourse can easily
mask the deep-seated powers at work within the debate. Powerful interests can limit the
scope of the debate or can extinguish all effective opposition to a proposed course of
action. But this is only true if the discourse takes place at the level of deliberation, where
activist strategies cannot be accounted for. At the same time, deliberative democracy can
lack the tools to question the deeper values at stake in public discourse, like issues which
affect notions about the common good. Despite Cahill‘s fairly positive appraisal to the
theory of deliberative democracy, she tends to reject it in the realm of public discourse
about biotechnology, as the Epilogue will make apparent.
Cahill and Walzer also attempt in their respective projects to overcome the
dominance of particular social goods like political power or wealth. In Walzer‘s view,
respectful toleration for religious groups is only good as long as those with beliefs
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requiring such consideration remain at the margins of the political community. But Cahill
goes another step further than Walzer with her call for wider inclusive participation.
Those groups must be brought into the conversation, even if they remain politically
disengaged to some extent.
Both Walzer and Cahill have multifaceted understandings of justice in practical
contexts. Because justice is determined by context, Walzer claims that substantive
accounts of justice are necessarily local in scope.231 The willingness to debate and
negotiate implies that all complicated issues are potentially resolvable. Similarly, Cahill‘s
later work makes deep connections to the complex of social relationships, from which
free choice is no mere abstraction.232 Especially in bioethical applications, Cahill‘s claims
resonate with Walzer‘s in that justice itself is contextualized.233 This is not to say that
Cahill has abandoned an attempt at a universal principle. But Rawlsian bioethical
principles fall short because they ratify market-based approaches to genetic medicine.234
As technology drives on, absent a moral or even political compass, it becomes imperative
to find a method of engagement that slows its relentless march, or at least steers it toward
its least harmful conclusion. As Walzer notes in Politics and Passion, activism frequently
arouses the negative passions of envy and resentment. But if theological voices engaged
in this future public debate are successful, then the inevitable achievement of human
germline enhancement still leaves open a possibility of forgiveness and reconciliation.
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Collaborative Justice and the Theological Accounts of Justice
Compared with her early writings, the Catholic social tradition clearly influences
Cahill‘s later work. CST has enhanced her theological inquiries into family, sexuality,
and bioethics. In her earliest writing, Cahill struggles to negotiate the personalist
tendencies of Catholic sexual ethics within a larger communal setting. As CST is brought
to bear in her later writings, she urges Catholic teaching to become more inclusive in its
own understanding of community. She almost always draws from social teaching,
especially with regard to participation in the common good. Guided by the virtue of
solidarity and practices of subsidiarity, CST has had a telling effect on her conception of
justice.
She also maintains CST‘s roots in the natural law tradition. She perceives natural
law ethics as the most coherent language with which to join in public discourse from her
Catholic standpoint. However, she also attempts to transform the participants‘ value
systems beyond CST‘s appeals to human rights. The social tradition tends to avoid
suggesting specific solutions to social problems in favor of a more modest appeal to
rights language, which is grounded in natural law. CST expresses special concern for the
vulnerable members of the world‘s communities. Cahill upholds these rights, but also
suggests concrete ways to increase the participation of the poor and marginalized. She
offers many examples of solidaristic activism in cases where powerful elites are reluctant
to include others in public discourse.
At the same time, Cahill is also aware of CST‘s tendency toward idealism and
naiveté in at least two ways. As Chapter Three demonstrated, the social encyclical
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tradition is often characterized by its search for a global governing authority.235 They
have frequently looked to the United Nations to fill that role, but the U.N.‘s legitimacy is
not recognized by all of its member states‘ governments. Instead, Cahill uses CST‘s own
principle of subsidiarity to demonstrate that political power can be multilateral and
pluralist in nature. Grassroots activism can be even more effective than a U.N. mandate.
The second way is related to the first in her understanding of coercion. Informed by the
social writings of Reinhold Niebuhr and others, Cahill understands that good
argumentation alone will not bring about substantive social change. Some situations are
so unjust and dire that immediate, forcible action is required beyond public deliberation.
Cahill reserves her sharpest criticism for the objectifying dangers of biotechnology and
against those who exclude the marginalized from any social benefits which it might
bring. In a global context which lacks comprehensive oversight, transnational advocacy
networks must attempt to secure ―equilibrium of power and reciprocal relationships that
constitute social justice.‖236
Moving to virtue ethics, it is interesting to note at the outset that James Keenan
dedicated one of his recent books to Cahill.237 Like Cahill‘s methodology, virtue ethics
tends to move beyond act-based decision making. Consistent with Keenan‘s work, Cahill
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shares an inherently relational anthropology. Both also see justice as the overarching
virtue of all human action, though they apply them differently in the case of genetic
enhancement. Keenan‘s classification of justice as the operational virtue humanity‘s
general relationships fits well with Cahill‘s firm adherence to equal personal dignity.
Cahill looks more to the social context and worries for the exclusion of marginalized
citizens or the dangers of genetic stratification. By contrast, Keenan‘s relational and
teleological anthropology tends toward openness to the ―distant horizon of genetic
research,‖ and is less pessimistic about the prospects of germline modification. But, like
Cahill, Keenan acknowledges that there must also be a negotiation of the short- and longterm conflicts among goods when utilizing enhancement technology. 238
There are also other significant differences between Cahill and Porter on method.
First, Cahill does not often use the vocabulary of virtue. Instead, she tends to employ
CST‘s discourse of rights. While Porter‘s view of justice is hesitant to move beyond the
Catholic context, Cahill attempts to recover a sense of dialogic universality in moral
reasoning. Just as Cahill‘s work contrasts with MacIntyre‘s on public discourse, Cahill
differs with Porter in that the former believes that substantive universal consensus about
justice can be achieved through public dialogue and collaborative action. Cahill‘s faith
commitment gives rise to this participatory strategy, and shapes the contours of her
contribution to such involvement.
Turning to justice in bioethics, the most significant contrasts between Cahill and
Margaret Farley have already been noted in Chapter Three. Farley seems to emphasize
more the internal ecclesial debates with regard to justice, while Cahill tends to focus upon
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the valuable external contribution of theological voices toward public discourse. Cahill
envisions the debate within the church as part of a self-critical and self-limiting practice
for the community which participates in the discourse. Both Cahill and Farley emphasize
the prophetic aspect to the church‘s participation in the public sphere. They also differ on
location of the meaning and content in their respective accounts of the common good.
Farley‘s concept of compassionate respect finds content for justice in the particularity of
one‘s context. The common good illuminates a general meaning for justice in social
relations. Cahill‘s collaborative justice receives its content from a notion of the common
good. Solidarity, subsidiarity, and equality help to define justice‘s meaning in different
contexts. Cahill differentiates between respect and compassion within the context of
CST. Respect corresponds to the dignity of the person, while compassion corresponds to
the solidarity of all in pursuit of the common good.239
Finally, Shannon and Cahill originally developed similar notions of justice during
the early part of Cahill‘s career. In fact, they co-authored a commentary on the Vatican‘s
1987 Instruction: Donum Vitae. Their attempt to demonstrate the interrelated issues of
parenthood and sexuality in a contemporary, pluralistic society represents one of Cahill‘s
first attempts at a sustained application of CST in her writings. However, Shannon tends
to deny that there is a teleological thrust to ―human nature,‖ which is a point of contrast
with Cahill.240 Moreover, Shannon‘s later attempt to ―update‖ the Vatican‘s Instruction
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focuses on issues that illumine the context for personal decision making, while
developing a position that is defendable in the public forum.241 By contrast, Cahill insists
upon the primacy of the social context in the area of assisted procreation. This difference
is significant because it demonstrates a shift away from personalist ethics when
technological aids enter the discussion. To expand on this difference, the dissertation‘s
exploration of Cahill‘s later essays now turns to its conclusion, which analyzes her
theological inquiry into assisted procreation technologies aimed at cloning and
enhancement.
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EPILOGUE
COLLABORATIVE JUSTICE AND FUTURE PUBLIC MORAL DISCOURSE
ABOUT GERMLINE GENETIC ENHANCEMENT

This conclusion to the dissertation explores the possibility of utilizing Cahill‘s conception
of justice – what has been described as ―collaborative justice – in future public discourse
about human genetic engineering and especially germline enhancement. Since 1998,
Cahill has written or edited numerous works related to biotechnology and particularly
genetics.1 Taken together, these writings demonstrate three further aspects regarding
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Cahill‘s application of collaborative justice to contemporary bioethics. First, she
continues to resist reducing ethical discussion to a consideration of individual acts. This
countercultural, ―prophetic‖ facet of her project has been prominent since at least the
transitional period of her writing career. Second, she consistently encourages the
presence of theological voices in public bioethical discourse about genetic interventions.
She claims that the theologians‘ strongest contribution is their focus on the common
good. Third, she perceives several participatory strategies for this participation. Some of
these modes of involvement are aimed at policy discussion, others look to social
activism, and still others strive for greater inclusion of the marginalized.
This conclusion is constructed in three sections, with each part corresponding to
the aforementioned features of Cahill‘s collaborative justice. It opens with a summary of
her analysis on the probable wrongness of the act of germline enhancement. Her
emphasis on the common good is an especially powerful component to her argument
against human engineering, since human dignity can be used by both sides in the debate.
Next, the discussion turns to public discourse about genetic technology. In this context,
her prophetic mode of public discourse challenges the participants to imagine the concept
of justice at the service of the poor. Finally, the dissertation closes with a consideration of
Cahill‘s approbation for the utilization of transnational activist networks in order to
maintain pressure on the governments and corporations who may choose to pursue
genetic enhancement technology. Since policy debate ultimately aims toward deliberative
consensus, it is vital that opponents of these genetic interventions employ some of the
non-deliberative strategies described in Chapters Two and Four of this dissertation.
Cahill‘s examples of coercive tactics drawn from other bioethical issues serve as
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analogous illustrations of the shape of future public discourse about germline
enhancement.

Germline Enhancement as “Contingently Wrong”
To begin, theological and philosophical arguments about the act of germline
genetic enhancement tend to break down due to conflicting views with no rational
discriminant for resolving them. There is even plurality within Christian assumptions that
ground respective arguments for and against enhancement. For example, human
createdness is a foundational point for Catholic anthropology. Chapter One discussed
creation as the basis for CST‘s affirmation of human dignity. Grounding teaching in
human dignity can lead to wide, substantive agreement on many issues. But Cahill points
out that theological reflection on creation can lead to diverging views about the limits of
human action. One view holds that humans are ―co-creators‖ with God. In procreation,
biological kinship is secondary to the inclusive love that is part and parcel with the idea
of human dignity.2 The other view expresses a worry that autonomous freedom is the
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guiding moral factor in contemporary American culture. It is wary of ―playing God‖
through rash, uncritical, and disproportionate approaches to science. This view balances
the dignity that comes from creation with the finitude that arises from sin. Since sin is a
―nearly universal religious metaphor,‖ it has limited value for those outside of the
tradition. 3
Furthermore, supporters and detractors of genetic interventions tend to focus – too
narrowly, in Cahill‘s estimation – on the demonstration of the act‘s moral goodness or
badness. For instance, in the case of cloning, she claims that this possibility is a ―virtually
unquestioned assumption‖
Either because every instance will demonstrably violate the freedom of
individuals; or because it involves specific physical or psychological harm or
great risk of harm. If neither of these outcomes can be shown beyond reasonable
doubt, the cloning should not be prohibited. Individual purveyors and clients
should be free to perfect, provide, and purchase cloning. Approaches to values
and to society that are more inductive, more affective, more long-range, and less
conclusive have much less persuasive power in a culture that values clear
evidence and immediate outcomes over gradual consensus-building and
incremental social results.4
Physical heritability is the distinctive moral feature in both human cloning and germline
modification. In both cases, offspring are born with intentionally predetermined traits
which can be passed to subsequent generations. At the same time, there is wide
disagreement on the issue of whether or not this hereditary factor constitutes harm to
potential descendants. Harm which arises from unrefined techniques can be ameliorated
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as these interventions become perfected. Moreover, commodification is overcome by
informed consent.5
Cahill concludes that there are no ―lock-down‖ arguments against genetic
manipulation. With regard to reproductive cloning, she admits that it is difficult to locate
its immorality on intrinsicist grounds; it is not ―just wrong.‖ Instead, it is significant to
point out that cloning generates offspring with only a single genetic parent, who is the
―later-born twin‖ of the parent. If there is anything intrinsic to the argument, it is derived
from cloning‘s effects on understandings about the family.6
Moving to the issue of germline intervention, Cahill admits that she does not
believe it is possible to conclude that it is intrinsically immoral. Instead, she insists that
germline modification is ―contingently wrong.‖ Personalist concerns like potential harm
or commodification are not primary issues, though. On the one hand, if safety and
efficacy could be assured, then germline therapy could be considered morally permissible
and perhaps even obligatory. On the other hand, enhancement is far more troubling for
two reasons: the definitional problem of ―enhancement‖ and the social control of its
benefits.7 The former concerns philosophical issues about normal physiological function,
and it has implications for understanding the idea of human nature. The latter describes
inequalities that can arise from genetic technologies, and it demonstrates the wider social
import of Cahill‘s analysis of genomic ethics.
Consistent with other examples of Cahill‘s later work, justice is at the root of her
inquiries into germline enhancement and cloning. Additionally, her criticism is unusually
5
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sharp in these areas as it relates to justice. In the case of cloning, Cahill implies that
therapeutic or reproductive cloning is likely to be used strictly by the affluent. To add
cloning to the myriad modes of assisted procreation is simply to continue to sidestep
questions of how such techniques are part of an ―ethically worthy society governed by the
norms of justice.‖ The dividing question is whether or not justice is ―concerned
exclusively or primarily with individual freedom‖ or if it refers ―to responsibility to the
common good.‖ Cahill sees adequate health care access as one of life‘s basic necessities.8
Regarding germline enhancement, Cahill claims that it is ―obvious‖ that such
interventions will be made available only to those who can afford them. She envisions a
dire social situation in which the poor will be forced into eugenic abortion in order to
compete with wealthy, or risk their children becoming part of a ―genetic underclass.‖ 9
She uses the pharmaceutical industry as an illustrative warrant for her urgent worry.
Facing an actual downturn in innovation and in the development of new products,
pharmaceutical companies are desperate to maintain their incredible profits. They
achieve this by maintaining monopolies on drugs, by introducing new drugs that
are little more than copies of old ones, by promoting new drugs that may be less
effective than old ones, and by spending a huge proportion of their budgets hiring
researchers they can control, brining doctors, and marketing directly to
consumers. In the race to the bank these companies abandon unprofitable products
with little regard for the consequences for individual or public health.10
For Cahill, the current behavior of drug manufactures, set within a consumerist society‘s
social context, provides a bellwether for the prospects of just use of futurist genetic
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technologies like germline enhancement and cloning. Citing the work of bioethicist Mark
Frankel, Cahill envisions a genetic future where eugenics policies will not be forced upon
people. Instead, they will be marketed ―as something we cannot live without.‖11
Cahill‘s harsh indictment of biotechnology in the case of germline enhancement is
highly unusual when compared to her many other writings represented in this
dissertation. Throughout her career, her work has consistently been collegial in their tone,
even when it is clear that she is completely at odds with her dialogue partners. For
example, she diffused MacIntyre‘s rather caustic critique of her 1979 essay in an almost
playful manner.12 In fact, when negotiating her differences of opinion with other scholars,
she often affirms the positive aspects or recognizes the similarities before firmly
describing their points of disagreement. Moreover, Cahill‘s substantive critiques of
church teachings and social practices do not reflect the accusatory quality as they do in
the case of biotechnology.
This dissertation claims that Cahill‘s participatory bioethics accounts for the
contrast between the tone of these writings about genetic enhancement and those of other
essays. Chapter One described Cahill‘s five modes of public discourse: ethical, policy,
prophetic, narrative, and participatory.13 The first four are drawn from the work of James
11

Ibid., 161. See Mark S. Frankel, ―Inheritable Genetic Modification and a Brave
New World: Did Huxley Have It Wrong?‖ Hastings Center Report 33, no.2 (JanuaryFebruary 2003), 32.
12

Cahill, "Theology and Bioethics: Should Religious Traditions Have a Public
Voice?" Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 17, no. 3 (June 1992), 263. ―Alasdair
MacIntyre‘s critique of the essays ended the volume with cranky savoir-faire…The
editors, both theologians, and unable to resist a preemptory rebuttal, alluded in their
introduction to ―that fictional denomination called autonomous rational moral agents to
which our colleagues in moral philosophy would seek to evangelize all of us.‖ Cahill then
gently reminds readers how much MacIntyre‘s view has evolved since that response.
13

Cahill, Theological Bioethics, 35-40.
342

Gustafson, who was influential to Cahill‘s later essays.14 Cahill‘s ―participatory
discourse‖ emphasizes the public nature of the moral discourse by attempting to
determine the moral and political contours in which public debate situated. At times, it is
also necessary to shift those lines which demarcate the limits of public debate. Prophetic
engagement does not attempt to dictate policy in the public forum. Rather, it seeks to
expand participants‘ moral vision.
Like the prophets of the Hebrew Bible, theological prophets today often forward a
critique of economic systems that exclude the poor from basic goods such as
health care. They combat an overly pragmatic and individualist approach to
biomedical decision making and insist that not all human problems can be
resolved by more technology. Though their utopia is ultimately eschatological,
they hold up a vision of a more equitable society characterized by the virtues of
solidarity and compassion and of justice inspired by love of God and neighbor.15
Also like the prophets of Israel, Cahill‘s biting words attempt to turn society away from a
destructive path. Systematic injustice toward the poor is one of the clearest signposts
along this route. Throughout later essays, Cahill documents a litany of inequities in health
care access which undermine both the aims of health care and the common good. With a
strong prophetic voice, she hopes to deter adding this extreme mode of intervention to
that list.
Cahill‘s tendency to contextualize moral acts beyond individual decision making
is an element of her later essays in bioethics. The social context thereby becomes the
locus for her entry into public moral discourse. It is also where her notion of collaborative
justice develops into one of the most valuable contributions that theologians can make to
that discussion. The dissertation now considers Cahill‘s work in policy discourse about
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assisted procreation and especially germline enhancement. In this context, her prophetic
mode of public discourse challenges the participants to imagine the concept of justice at
the service of the poor.

Public Moral Discourse and Human Genetic Engineering
In assessing the morality of the various forms of assisted procreation, Cahill
moves beyond an awareness of the dangers of commodification, that is, the potential for
perceiving one‘s children as a manufactured product. By treating infertility as a disease,
for instance, she looks to issues of economic justice. Here, she continues the prophetic
aspect of policymaking discussed in the previous section. Participants with strong
religious commitments are richly nourished by their narratives, symbols, and communal
practices, but it is difficult to express those constitutive elements of their faith in a public
forum. Alternatively, a prophetic dimension of her participatory bioethics challenges a
worldview that allows special-interest politics to threaten ―to pull policies out of
alignment with the common good.‖ 16
As with Cahill‘s treatment of aging discussed in Chapter One, she makes the case
that public policy about assisted reproduction technology (ART) should avoid
medicalizing social problems. Citing the work of feminist ethicist Maura Ryan, Cahill
sees three issues at stake in pursing ART. 17 First, there ought to be a bias toward
utilizing scarce medical resources to address needs which are ―truly medical‖ in scope.
Assisted procreation must treat the disease of infertility. Next, there must be serious
16
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consideration of success rates of ART in light of its considerable expense and dubious
efficacy. Finally, social justice must be at the center of policy discussion. ART is not
simply a ―private‖ matter between patient and caregiver. Discussion must also attend to
the clear reality that wealthy consumers utilize ART far more than less affluent people.
One can question whether it is the case that infertility afflicts primarily the economically
privileged, or that only the well-off can be treated.
Correlatively, policy discourse aimed at modes of genetic manipulation like
reproductive cloning and germline enhancement help to elucidate a more productive
analysis than discussions about their intrinsic moral goodness. In her analysis of cloning,
Cahill notes three serious shortcomings that warrant its severe regulation or even
permanent prohibition.
Commercialized, technology-driven reproduction affects the social institution of
the family and parenthood in deleterious ways because it makes basic, intimate
human relations and communities subject to individualism, commodification, and
exploitation.18
Cloning ignores ethical and religious resources about family structures in favor of
uncritical and ―triumphalist‖ views of biotechnology. At the same time, it uses this knowhow to ―make profits with little consideration for the common good.‖ Most importantly,
it ignores huge inequalities between the wealthy individuals who would utilize this
biomedical technology and many poor who cannot even access basic health care.
This social context for justice has been a constant feature in Cahill‘s later work,
but it is especially evident in her ethics of genetic technology.19 As mentioned several
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times in this dissertation, solidarity is a preeminent virtue that guides action toward
justice. In a global, interdependent society, solidarity is essential. John Paul II writes that
solidarity is a ―firm and preserving determination to commit oneself to the common
good.‖20 Cahill applies this view to bioethics by demonstrating that solidarity facilitates
action toward distant communities.21 Echoing John Paul‘s view of the communal nature
of property from Chapter Three, Cahill argues that there is a ―social mortgage‖ on all
private property that requires it to be placed at the service of the common good. Like
John Paul, she includes intellectual property and medical technology in this view.22 Thus,
solidarity demands that the issue of sharing the benefits of genetic research by wealthy
industrialized nations with developing countries must be a focal point of social justice in
policy discussions.
Inclusive participation is also a vital component to Cahill‘s collaborative justice in
its application to genetic technologies. Throughout Cahill‘s later work, she is consistently
sensitive to the marginalized in the community and around the world. In the context of
genetic therapies for the elderly, she argues that the principle of participation requires that
allocation for such resources must be reconciled with ―basic care needed to maximize
social participation.‖ Like genetic techniques used for assisted procreation, Cahill places
such interventions for the elderly within the wider context of the family and local
remain the self-interest of those who retain control over the acquisition of genetic
knowledge and its application.‖ Cahill, ―Genetics, Ethics, and Social Policy,‖ xii.
20
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community, who are charged with their care. Older citizens‘ participation has been
severely limited by what Cahill calls the ―privatization and mobility‖ of the nuclear
family. This reality creates an obligation on the part of communities with elderly
populations to improve access to health care, income security, adequate housing, and
proper nutrition.23
In the context of genetic enhancement, the question can be raised: who are the
marginalized? Cahill claims that the poor in developing nations are those excluded from
participation. She sees two ways that marginalization can occur. The first has to do with
the vague policies which regulate the development of this technology. Regulation
generally permits germline genetic intervention for ―therapeutic‖ reasons but restricts it
for ―enhancement‖ purposes. Many of these regulatory entities focus primarily on human
cloning, and their actions usually restrict the creation/destruction of embryos for ―purely‖
research purposes.
Since the 1990s, policy-making bodies in North Atlantic nations have endorsed
such restraining measures.24 However, many nations have not ratified these policies.25 In
23
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light of this situation, Cahill worries that the United States and European nations will
refine their genetic protocols in their home countries, and then move their project to a
poor nation, where genetic technology is less-regulated.26 Exploitation arises when these
researchers ―help‖ infertile women there with reproductive cloning or genetic
enhancement interventions. Injurious or pernicious outcomes can be corrected before the
techniques are marketed to ―paying customers.‖ For example, attempts to develop
HIV/AIDS vaccines in Africa have left many in the local community to suspect that
Western researchers come there with ―dirty hands,‖ as they conduct unsupervised
investigations of their drugs.27
The second instance of exploitation has to do with exclusion. Even if the first kind
of exploitation is unlikely to result, Cahill is certain that the poor will be shut out from
benefits gained from germline interventions or human cloning.28 Her assertion in the
genetic sphere can be understood based on similar practices in the pharmaceutical
industry, like their HIV/AIDS clinical trials in Africa. After concluding a trial, many
researches simply close their laboratories in the study‘s host nation. Equity for human
subjects does not extend far beyond informed consent. There is little or no compensation
after the study‘s conclusion. Subjects are also expected to pay full price for the
(Council of Europe, European Treaty Series, no.164, 1997). The United Nations has
consistently upheld human rights in the face of advances in genetic research, from the
1997 Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights to the 2005
Declaration on Human Cloning. They ban all forms of cloning which are contrary to
human dignity, but neither of which are binding.
26
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antiretroviral medication regimen.29 Moreover, other reports indicate that few primary
investigators are in-country during the trial. In reality, there are very few HIV/AIDS trials
compared with the pandemic nature of the disease in Africa.30 There is little reason to
believe that researchers and biotech companies will behave any differently than drug
manufacturers.
In her advocacy for the marginalized, Cahill is once again expressing the
prophetic dimension of participatory bioethics. She attempts to convert the majority of
interlocutors from a worldview that is rooted in self-interested individualism to one built
upon the virtues of social justice, like ―compassion, altruism, and solidarity.‖31 From
CST, John Paul II has argued that market capitalism is not likely to secure the rights of
the poor, and that the participation of all is required for a truly just society. In neither case
is the market or society the final purpose of humans.32 With a globalization scheme
dominated by corporate investment and other exclusive practices, it is difficult to give
guiding virtues like solidarity and altruism a ―functional priority‖ when power interests
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are threatened. 33 In another work on the common good in global context, she cites moral
theologian James Hanigan on the problem of finding the moral and political will to work
toward justice. ―The human problem is not that we do not know what to do, but that we
do not want to know and we do not want to do it.‖ With a narrow moral vision which
considers only short-term benefits expressed in military and economic strength, altruism
seems somewhat naïve in the face of realpolitik. 34
This ―realism‖ challenges Cahill as she integrates CST into her work in two
ways. The first is the ―top-down‖ conception of social change envisioned in papal
encyclicals, which have been discussed at different points in this chapter. Cahill calls this
approach an ―endemic shortcoming,‖ since its calls for change are primarily for the
powerful.35 Religious voices can prioritize solidarity by pointing out that the common
good requires participation from all. In laying this claim, they can also present the
tangible needs of the poor at the local level, and present a realistic, achievable plan to
meet needs and increase participation. In other words, subsidiarity overcomes this
challenge to CST.36 The second challenge relates to the first insofar as it engages
established hierarchies of power. As the previous section discussed, applications of
Cahill‘s collaborative justice to bioethical discourse is similar to Michael Walzer‘s
position, which recognizes that parties can hold contrasting, strongly-held beliefs.
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Disagreement can be resolved passionately but reasonably settings.37 Cahill takes the
position that platitudes about justice will not be compelling unless they can rouse a
community‘s sensibilities to imagine themselves ―at the side of the poor.‖ 38
Cahill contends that there are two entrenched interests which militate against her
claim. The first one comes from biotech companies and their investors, and is more
readily apparent.39 For example, fertility clinics have often been reported to implant
several embryos in order to increase pregnancy rates.40 The previous paragraphs also
noted various behaviors of pharmaceutical corporations, who serve largely the same
interests in a related industry. One could add to this list: transnational agricultural
enterprises which have been introducing genetically-modified foods, clothing
manufacturers who have been exploiting poorly-paid workers, and retail stores which
have been patronizing those manufacturers. Their primary responsibilities lie with their
investors and executives. Thus, their behavior can be explained by their desire to
maximize profits. It can also be regulated by government oversight, provided one can
form a lobby powerful enough to overcome each industry‘s own political action group.
The second is a bit more subtle, but it is also a sedimented authority in the West. It is the
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power of the individual in liberal society, who is told to seek his or her own best interests
in a world of choices. CST tries to balance rights and obligations on behalf of the poor,
but its actions are often framed in terms of curtailing individual (liberal) freedoms.
Persons can choose to become citizens of the world, so long as it does not conflict with
the rights of those who do not choose to do so. In turn, it becomes impractical for the
―citizen of the world‖ to achieve the goods internal to that kind of membership if one
lives in a neighborhood of ―foreigners to the world.‖ A ―realist‖ understanding of the
individual becomes analogous to the short-sighted vision of state politics, which is
concerned with one‘s social status and economic status. Consequently, it undermines an
individual‘s efforts toward solidarity in the same way that national interests resist
attempts at international cooperation in ways that are not beneficial to the nation.41
In closing, in the case of genetic engineering, Cahill insists that the common good
and inclusive participation are better achieved through cooperative strategies rather than
technological solutions. At this point, the prophetic aspect of Cahill‘s participatory
bioethics is the strongest contribution in public discourse about germline modification.
Solidarity with the marginalized remains a constant virtue that helps the practice of
collaborative justice. To a lesser degree, government mandates can be helpful insofar as
they resist being driven by economic interests and moral individualism. But both of these
realities are firmly embedded in many contemporary interpretations of society and the
individual. At times, coercion is necessary to break the hold of both types of power. This
dissertation now concludes with a consideration Cahill‘s assessment of activist strategies
which are part of her application of collaborative justice in germline enhancement.
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Collaborative Justice, Coercion, and Activism
Finally, in order to demonstrate how Cahill‘s conception of collaborative justice
may function in practice, it is necessary to investigate the role of non-deliberative
strategies in her work. This closing part analyzes the formation of unjust power structures
that stem from the absence of a global authority. At the same time, it describes Cahill‘s
scholarship on appropriate, forceful responses to unjust behavior by those powerful
entities. These strategies are applications of her participatory moral discourse, which has
been informed by her notion of collaborative justice. This final section has three parts.
First, it continues the discussion from previous sections about the problems related to a
lack of a global authority to ascertain best policy and to enforce them. Next, Cahill points
out that various transnational groups, especially the World Trade Organization (WTO),
have moved into the power vacuum. Thus, the second part describes the dominating and
at times dehumanizing tendencies that come from this situation. Third, the analysis turns
to Cahill‘s understanding of coercion through social action aimed at justice.
As mentioned previously, the United Nations remains a hopeful center of global
governance for CST, especially in the papal encyclicals. UNESCO‘s 1997 Universal
Declaration on Human Genome and Human Rights calls for genetic knowledge to benefit
all humanity as a whole.42 Article 1 pronounces that the genome undergirds ―the
fundamental unity of all members of the human family,‖ and also grounds human dignity
as well as diversity.43 Cahill‘s research into the Declaration leads her to a five-fold
understanding of the genome as ―property:‖ ―non-appropriation, common management,
42
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equitable sharing of benefits, peaceful use, and protection and preservation for future
generations.‖44 However, this dissertation has also addressed the lack of authority with
regard to myriad problems which CST addresses. Cahill sees as untenable the social
encyclical tradition‘s longing for a centralized, top-down authority.45 Instead, she
perceives some value in governments‘ attempts to regulate genomic inquiry. She employs
the analogy of just war to illustrate the limits of competent authority to control
biotechnology.
Justifying a war requires the engagement and consent of a legitimate authority.
Who is that authority in the case of genetics research? Federal and state
governments are involved; so are national advisory bodies. Research done with
federal funds must also pass the scrutiny of institutional review boards in the host
institutions.46
While there is some degree of oversight with regard to publicly-funded research, there is
virtually no restraint on privately- or corporately-sponsored genetic research. Like the
situation with drug companies, profitability will drive allocation decisions in the genomic
sphere.47 The only accountability is to investors and executives.
Moreover, the legislative and executive branches must stand periodically for
election. It is reasonable to expect that the ideological aims of the political parties will
view genetic technologies in different ways. For example, in 2001 President George W.
Bush permitted federal funding for embryonic stem cell research, but limited backing to
cell lines already in development. Many critics on both sides of the issue saw this
compromise as unsatisfactory. Those who seek to protect all early human life, including
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embryos, saw this move as a capitulation to those who want to further a ―culture of
death.‖ But those who support stem cell research envisioned this settlement as far too
narrow, especially after discovering only a small number of usable cell lines. Still others
applauded the policy change as a suitable ―middle way‖ that took the convictions both
sides into account.48 But almost eight years later, newly-inaugurated President Barak
Obama promised to ―restore science to its rightful place‖ for an array of scientific fields
from the environment to stem cell research.49 Less than two months after his inauguration
speech, President Obama signed an executive order which effectively allows genetic
research to use federal funds to develop new stem cell lines. The order has been contested
in federal courts, but in August 2012, the U.S. Court of Appeals unanimously upheld
previous rulings that permit the President‘s policy. 50 With these ebbs and flows, it seems
that biotechnology regulation, depending on the branch of government in question, is
liable for seismic shifts every two to four years.
But powerful economic groups do not wait for a President who is more favorable
to their endeavors to enter office. Cahill takes particular aim at the WTO, which provides
a forum for nations to negotiate trade agreements. Their stated purpose is
To help trade flow as freely as possible – so long as there are no undesirable side
effects – because this is important for economic development and well-being.
That partly means removing obstacles. It also means ensuring that individuals,
48
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companies and governments know what the trade rules are around the world, and
giving them the confidence that there will be no sudden changes of policy. In
other words, the rules have to be ―transparent‖ and predictable.51
―Fairness‖ is noticeably absent from this description, though it can be inferred by the
WTO‘s other two constitutive requirements for trade rules. Cahill is particularly wary of
the WTO‘s 1995 standardization of property rights called the Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), which she calls ―undemocratic‖ in character and
neglectful of the poor. 52 TRIPS especially concerns pharmaceutical and genomic patent
laws. Cahill calls TRIPS ―part of the price of entry into the global economic market.‖
Non-compliance with TRIPS‘ strict policies can cause trade sanctions and discourage
capital investment.53 Cahill asserts that the WTO‘s objective is to ―guarantee a safe and
stable political and financial environment for first world producers and investors.‖54 It
does so by protecting drug, food, and genetic patents in a way that privileges
corporations. Not only does the agreement tend to privatize scientific knowledge, it also
excludes the poor from full social participation ―in helping to determine issues that affect
their lives.‖ 55 While it also allows nations to suspend parts of the agreement during times
of national emergency, Cahill claims that few countries are willing to forego TRIPS ―out
of fear of retaliation by trading partners.‖56
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Finally, government has sometimes stepped in to check the power of industry, and
these instances are clearly example of coercion. However, force does not necessarily have
to be applied by government regulation alone. In fact, Cahill states that the solution to
effective public policy will ―clearly not‖ be found in establishing a world oversight
body.57 Here, the dissertation alludes to solidaristic activism, another important aspect of
Cahill‘s participatory bioethics. She writes that ―if concepts like the human person and
the common good are to be relevant today, they must be advanced in the public forum in
more innovative ways.‖58 Just as there are current models which can predict social
consequences for germline enhancement based on other industries‘ behavior, Cahill finds
corresponding models of activism in light of various efforts at combating the influence
and power of those companies.
One of Cahill‘s favorite examples is the International Cooperation for
Development and Solidarity (CIDSE), which she describes as ―a network of fifteen
nongovernmental development organizations from Europe and North America.‖ With
overtones of CST in its public statements, CIDSE asserts that there is no ―absolute right‖
of property ownership, and looks to patent issues within a larger framework of
―responsibility and the common good.‖59
In addition to their solidaristic practices that aim toward advancing the common good,
CIDSE and other activists can compete against larger and more powerful interests by
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using the same communications and transportation technologies that brought
transnational corporations to global power.
In Cahill‘s estimation, these strategies represent the new face of CST‘s principle
of subsidiarity. Subsidiarity is a basic practice for collaborative justice, which, in turn,
has the common good as its object. Cahill claims that the common good ―has always
begun from the experienced needs and goods of human beings, and from insights into the
sorts of social relationships that promote human welfare.‖60 Collaborative justice is
ultimately about an individual‘s – or, in parts of Cahill‘s project, a family‘s – capacity for
participation in the common good. In local and global contexts, Cahill describes four
aspects of the common good.61 One, it is substantive in that it must actually enumerate
concrete human goods which are necessary to secure participation. As with Gaudium et
Spes and the social encyclical tradition, there must be a workable schema of positive
rights to those goods. Two, the common good is also procedural to the degree that it
involves an inclusive decision-making process. This kind of practice is distinctly Western
in that participatory democracy is brought into conversation with a consensus-building
deliberative process.62 Three, there are also necessary virtues that lend themselves to the
practices of subsidiarity and the common good. The dissertation has already identified
solidarity as a primary virtue, but at times Cahill has also described hope as another
important virtue to seeking the common good. The two are connected temporally:
solidarity refers to the present, while hope looks largely toward the future. 63 In fact, a
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case can be made that Cahill‘s pessimism about the future of germline enhancement is
brought about by a lack of hope, since the present reality is that solidarity is sorely
lacking. Four, there must be efficacy with regard to practices that serve the common
good. It must engage with diverse intellectual positions, religious and cultural traditions,
and political movements in a way that respects their values and needs.
Transnational advocacy networks begin with a ―practical consensus‖ about an
injustice, that is, a policy or practice that excludes individual persons or social classes
from participation in the common good.64 Cahill depicts as watershed moments in
participatory discourse, events like disruptive protests of the 1999 WTO summit in
Seattle by anti-globalization organizations and public denunciations of a 2001 lawsuits
brought by South Africa drug manufacturers, who claimed royalties were not paid under
the TRIPS agreement.65 Using press briefings, social media and rapid transportation,
these groups can protest a powerful organization‘s exclusionary practices in the public
sphere. Their tactics are significant because these tools and technologies are the same
ones that larger, more politically-connected and economically-empowered companies and
organizations utilize each day in their drive toward profits.
In a participatory schema, coercion can take many forms. It can simply be a
matter of bad press, which many companies often want to avoid in an age of 24-hour
news access. It can also encourage a boycott of an individual company‘s products, which
civil- and labor-rights groups have proven an effective tactic in the twentieth century.
Most importantly, when private funding is at stake, as it is in the case of genetic research,
64
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coercion can target the primary investors and parent companies of genetic enterprises.
Activists can plead with and denounce capital investors and fund managers to withdraw
their financial support for such industries. They can also use similar tactics to convince
large corporate conglomerations to divest themselves of their unjust subsidiaries. In short,
activism can ―have teeth‖ in the public sphere of a well-functioning democracy in ways
that national and global governments cannot.
In closing, Cahill‘s collaborative justice, as it has been described in this
dissertation, relies heavily upon a fully-formed integration of the Catholic social
tradition, and grounds future public discourse about human germline genetic
enhancement. Its balanced attention to personal and social concerns is accomplished by
way of the CST‘s insistence on inviolable dignity and human sociality. But especially
coloring every essay in Cahill‘s later body of work, which was analyzed in Chapter Four,
is an overriding concern for the common good. To participate in its advancement is the
mark of human dignity and the call to contributory justice, as described in Chapter One.
To possess the tools which facilitate participation is the ―flip side‖ of that same justice. In
public debate about the modification of the human genome, the guiding virtues of
solidarity, subsidiarity, and equality of all will help to shape the structure of this future
technological achievement. Many of these concerns are also located in the other
philosophical and theological accounts of justice as they were described in Chapters Two
and Three. Surely, others can be identified as well. But Cahill‘s collaborative justice also
includes the possibility of forgiveness and reconciliation, which are often seen as beyond
the ordinary norms of justice. Restorative justice can make a person whole; collaborative
justice can repair a fractured community.
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